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Spring 1988

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Soviet Special Forces in America

Tragedy in Mecca

Why Political Interference Is Good for the State Department

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VOLUME 32 NUMBER 2 SPRING 1988

The Institutions of Foreign Policy

Why Political Interference Is Good for the State Department — Michael Lewis — 167

The United Nations: Some Parts Work — Richard S. Williamson — 187

Soviet Special Forces in America: The Day Before — James Adams — 199

Will *Glasnost* Bring the Reactionaries to Power? — Aron Katsenelinboigen — 217

Tragedy in Mecca — Martin Kramer — 231

Tuna Poaching and Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific — Paul F. Gardner — 249

Review Essay

Terrorism in Decline — Patrick Clawson — 263

Documentation

The Yeltsin Affair — Vladimir Tismaneanu — 277

Qadhadhafi's Diminished Vision — Daniel Pipes — 286

Correspondence — 295

Brief Reviews

World Politics — 302

International Economics — 307

War Studies — 312

The Middle East — 315

Asia and the Pacific — 323

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe — 327

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WHY POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IS GOOD FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT

by Michael Lewis

As millions of viewers learnt from the British television satire "Yes Minister," obdurate civil servants can — and frequently do — frustrate ministerial wishes. But despite this problem, most Western democracies favor an insular civil service and permit political appointees only at the pinnacle of power. In Great Britain, for example, civil servants staff almost all the senior levels of the bureaucracy. In principle, they provide impartial expertise; in reality, they assure that politicians exert only extremely limited control over the bureaucracy. Hence, "Yes Minister."

By contrast, the federal government of the United States assumes that elected officials should make policy, and therefore it reserves many bureaucratic positions for political appointees who share the president's goals. As a result, the United States leads all democratic governments in appointing non-careerists to senior positions in the bureaucracy. This American system has much to commend it. It is flexible; it is responsive to the views of the electorate; and it permits genuine policy change to occur. Admittedly, the American approach could result in cronyism. But at present, anyway, political appointees generally serve as stewards for the president's agenda, not as beneficiaries of political payoffs.

Unfortunately, there is one part of the bureaucracy where this American system is relatively weak: the Department of State. In other departments, non-career presidential supporters do in fact fill the preponderance of bureaucratic policy-making positions. Only at State do careerists rise in substantial numbers to the policy-making level. Nor is this simply a passing phenomenon: since 1853, more than one-third of the assistant secretaries of state have been careerists.[1]

Within the State Department, moreover, five of the most important policy-making positions, the regional assistant secretaryships, have persistently eluded political control. Although the men who fill

[1] Dean Mann and Jameson W. Doig, *The Assistant Secretaries: Problems and Processes of Appointment, 1945-1961* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1965), p. 35.

Michael Lewis, a foreign-policy analyst in Washington D.C., wrote this article as a Research Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

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these posts are little-known to the public, they control a vital chokepoint in the formulation of foreign policy.

The exemption of the State Department from the American system of bureaucracy, and the exemption of these posts in particular, I shall argue, is detrimental to the department and detrimental to the formulation of U.S. policy. The State Department, and especially these five key posts, should be brought in line with practices elsewhere in the United States government.

Regional Assistant Secretaries

At the assistant secretary level, the State Department divides into regional and functional specialties. The regional bureaus cover five geographical areas: Western Europe and Canada (known in the government as EUR), the Middle East and South Asia (NEA), Africa, East Asia, and the Americas. Functional bureaus cover topics, and include such matters as political and military affairs, intelligence and research, economics, education and culture, and international organizations. Assistant secretaries or their equivalents (directors — who do not undergo congressional confirmation) head these bureaus.

Our concern here will not be with the functional bureaus of the State Department, but solely with assistant secretaries for the regional bureaus, where the department's exceptionalism is strongest.

That the regional assistant secretary is neither the sole nor the most influential position in foreign policy making is evident. But that he exerts considerable policy influence is virtually undisputed. Regional bureaus handle almost all governmental activity concerning individual countries and regions. The bureaus do basic work: in-depth analyses, instructions, option papers, and day-to-day decisions. They also determine which matters are passed up to the secretary for a decision. As Harold Saunders puts it: "Even if we don't make the [policy] decision, we shape it by writing the draft."[2] Or, as Henry Kissinger notes, policy can be influenced at the level of the assistant secretaries because that is the formative moment.[3]

Assistant secretaries also have a major role in policy implementation and personnel administration. They can be immensely helpful to presidents seeking to control the bureaucracy, for an effective assistant secretary can pilot a president's foreign policy through the bureaucracy.

Presidents often see assistant secretaries as valuable instruments for utilizing and controlling the State Department. This role — part policy maker, part policy implementor, and part personnel admin-

[2] Martin Mayer, *The Diplomats* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), p. 205.

[3] Henry Kissinger "Bureaucracy and Policymaking: The Effect of Insiders and Outsiders on the Policy Process," in Morton Halperin and Arnold Kantner, eds. *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 85.

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istrator — provides a rationale for making the position a political one. And that is why assistant secretaries are exempt from the provisions of the Hatch Act, which regulates the political behavior of federal office holders.

On the other hand, the secretary of state who participates in the selection process tends to look for intelligence, experience, leadership, and an ability to accept responsibility. This "merit system" usually leads to a mixture of career and non-career appointments. The number of careerists among the senior officials is thus determined in part by the outcome of this appointment process, which normally includes the president, his close political advisers, the secretary of state, and senior officials in the State Department.

The power of the regional assistant secretary has been often noted by those who know the State Department well. John Kennedy declared that his regional assistant secretaries of state were more important government officers than most of the Cabinet.[4] For Roger Hillsman, the regional assistant secretary is important because he is the presidential appointee who stands at the junction of all strands of policy. Hillsman recalls Dean Rusk stressing that the assistant secretary "was the crucial post in terms of the art of management of policy in our relations with the rest of the world."[5] Hillsman also cites Paul Nitze's warning never to underestimate the importance of a regional assistant secretary. He is the first person on the ladder able to commit the United States and the first official entitled to apply political considerations to foreign affairs.[6]

John Kennedy declared that his regional assistant secretaries of state were more important government officers than most of the Cabinet.

George Ball states that some secretaries of state, including Marshall and Acheson, permitted their assistant secretaries to conduct American foreign policy in their areas of responsibility, leaving only major issues and overall departmental policy for the president or secretary to decide.[7] Joseph Sisco, himself a former assistant and

[4] Lincoln Gordon "The Growth of American Representatives Overseas" in Vincent Barnett, *The Representation of the United States Abroad* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 25, cited in Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucratic Power in National Politics*, 3rd edition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985), p. 294.

[5] Roger Hillsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1967), p. 28.

[6] Ibid., p. 29.

[7] George Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), p. 194.

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under secretary of state, considers the regional assistant secretaries to have, after the secretary of state, the critical positions at State.[8]

Power, however, does not come automatically with the position. There are variations among administrations, among bureaus, and among individual secretaries. Under Henry Kissinger, assistant secretaries had little more than administrative authority. In the Carter administration, assistant secretaries reflected their superiors' positions more than they shaped policy. In the Reagan administration, assistant secretaries are said to enjoy more leeway than at any time in the past twenty years.[9]

Too, the regional bureaus themselves differ in influence. The European bureau, despite being the oldest and (in the eyes of foreign service officers [FSOs]) the most prestigious bureau, fails to exert a strong influence upon an administration's regional policy. Similarly, the East Asian bureau also ranked highly for much of the 1960s and early 1970s (during the Vietnam War and the breakthrough to China). But even at their peak, the East Asian assistant secretaries implemented instructions rather than initiated policy. Ironically, those assistant secretaries who deal with areas generally perceived as less glamorous and less important to the U.S. government — Africa and the Americas especially — enjoy the most autonomy and authority. The assistant secretary of state for Inter-America is sometimes de facto secretary of state for Latin America.

Finally, the influence of regional assistant secretaries depends on their personal qualities, their relationship with the secretary of state, and a host of other factors, such as who else in government is interested and what issues are being addressed. If an issue has domestic import, decisions rise above the assistant secretary. But these are comparatively few in number and where domestic politics does not intrude, issues are routinely left for the assistant secretary to handle.

The permutations of these factors are endless. The assistant secretary has greater influence if the president or secretary of state is receptive to him or his bureau. If he has the president's and secretary's confidence, the assistant secretary can formulate and execute policy with only occasional reference to the president. If he has the secretary's confidence and the secretary has the president's confidence, and in addition the secretary does not know the bureau's region, then assistant secretaries are at their most influential. (Of course, the converse of each relationship also applies.)

[8] Joseph Sisco, in "Joseph Sisco Speaks His Mind," *Moment Magazine*, January / February 1980, pp. 10-13.

[9] Author's confidential interview with former State Department official.

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A Tradition of Exceptionalism

The first thing to know about the Foreign Service is its long-standing pride in exclusivity, a pride that necessarily requires excluding somebody. For many years, foreign service officers earned a reputation, still not completely eliminated, of being drawn primarily from elite circles. Even today, the Foreign Service continues to have a low number of blacks and women. Increasingly, however, this sense of exclusivity has been shifted to career background rather than social class.

Thus, in a sense, State's tradition of bureaucratic exceptionalism also extends to its political appointees, most of whom tend to be careerists in their own right. Many have spent long years in public service or had some closely related experience. Again, this preference for previous government service is more pronounced at State than elsewhere in Washington. The consequence has been the perpetuation of careerist domination over the department.

This said, variations do occur. Although the influence of careerists at the State Department endures, it differs according to bureau, according to president, and according to the age of an administration.

VARIATION BY PRESIDENT. Presidents intent on playing an active role in foreign policy via the State Department tend to appoint the highest percentage of outsiders as assistant secretaries. Non-activist presidents, and activist presidents who concentrate policy in the National Security Council (NSC), select more careerist appointees.

Looking at the post-World War II presidents, Harry Truman accorded complete control over State personnel selection to Dean Acheson. Dwight Eisenhower did likewise with John Foster Dulles. But precisely because Dulles had elevated FSOs to senior political positions, John Kennedy identified the Foreign Service with the previous administration, and did not believe it could serve him with commitment and enthusiasm. Kennedy thus made a special effort to appoint outsiders to the State Department, viewing these outsiders as his own men who would implement a new foreign policy. To get the right personnel, Kennedy involved himself deeply in the selection of assistant secretaries and even made some assistant secretary appointments prior to selecting Rusk as his secretary of state. Indeed, Kennedy's very first announced nominee was the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, G. Mennen Williams. Kennedy is also the sole president to have appointed an outsider to NEA — Phillips Talbott. (Former Carter national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski expressed regret that Carter did not emulate Kennedy's decision to clean house at State.)[10]

[10] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1983), p. 526.

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Richard Nixon harbored a deep distrust of the State Department, but circumvented it by concentrating foreign policy in the White House. The relative unimportance of assistant secretaries in his administration explains the apparent paradox of Nixon's appointing so many careerists. Only Middle East policy was left in the hands of Secretary of State William Rogers and the department, though even this was ultimately taken over by the White House. When Henry Kissinger became secretary of state, he appointed relatively junior FSOs to senior positions, counting on their being more loyal to him than to the department. In the process, Kissinger excluded FSOs from most key decisions.

The last two presidents, Carter and Reagan, took office pledging fresh approaches to foreign policy. Neither administration concentrated policy making in the hands of one man to the degree that Nixon did with Henry Kissinger. But Carter, more than Reagan, intended to be his own secretary of state. Accordingly, Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, played a far more important role in the formulation of policy than did any of Reagan's six national security advisers. And the effect at the State Department was somewhat similar to Nixon's: Carter's first secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, endorsed the appointment of FSOs and relied on them completely, feeling that expertise alone, rather than ideology should determine their selection.

Finally, Reagan has tended more toward the Kennedy model: the administration came into office suspicious of FSOs and imposed outsider appointees upon Secretary of State Alexander Haig. It should be noted, however, that the role of FSOs in policy making during the Reagan administration has depended on the bureau and the issue. Some regional assistant secretaries (like Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, and Chester Crocker) played major roles in policy making; others (Richard Burt and Richard Murphy) played lesser roles.

In sum, of the administrations since World War II, Reagan appointed the highest number of non-careerist assistant secretaries of state to the regional bureaus (6 out of 12, or 50 percent), followed by Kennedy (4 out of 9, or 45 percent), Carter (2 out of 7, or 29 percent), Johnson (2 out of 9, or 22 percent), Nixon and Ford (3 out of 17, or 17 percent), and Eisenhower (1 out of 14, or 6 percent).

VARIATION BY BUREAU. Careerists tend to prevail in the regional bureaus, while outsiders predominate in the functional bureaus. This results, in part, from the fact that functional bureaus are newer and less prestigious than the regional bureaus, and therefore less desired by careerists. (Until recently, several of the functional bureaus were headed by directors, not subject to Senate confirmation.) Also, their roles are somewhat different. The functional bureau is more oriented to action and politics, with less focus on the concerns of foreign

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countries. Not having ambassadors reporting back and receiving instructions from them, the functional bureaus do not suffer from the problem dubbed "clientitis" — more concern with the foreign state's interests than with those of the United States.

Even among the regional bureaus, however, the number of careerists varies. Like the regional/functional division, this is partly explained by their prestige within the Foreign Service. FSOs dominate EUR and NEA, the two bureaus they most esteem. Also, when FSOs dominate a bureau, they usually succeed in minimizing the number of outsiders appointed to it and so perpetuate their control over it.

Of course, the status of a bureau can change over time. The Asian bureau once ranked with NEA and EUR and consequently had very few outsiders. Personnel changes in the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War made it lose standing and therefore become more permeable to outside leadership. The bureau rigidly resisted change during much of the 1950s and the early 1960s; it was the last regional bureau overhauled by President Kennedy. Only when Averell Harriman, an outsider, became assistant secretary in December 1961 were significant personnel changes made.

In the almost quarter century since Lyndon Johnson became president at the end of 1963, the percentages of non-careerists appointed as assistant secretaries to the regional bureaus have varied considerably: East Asia, 57 percent; the Americas, 38 percent; Africa, 29 percent; Europe, 12 percent; Near East and South Asia, none.

VARIATION BY AGE OF AN ADMINISTRATION. We saw above that there were changes in the Nixon administration's approach when Kissinger became secretary of state. But in one respect, the pattern of appointments changes in all administrations, and in all departments. As an administration ages, outsiders become increasingly reluctant to join it, and careerist assistant secretaries increase in number. This is especially true near the end of an administration's second term. Policy ideas have become stale, while momentum for policy change has slowed. Meanwhile, alternate opportunities beckon prospective outsiders. Under these circumstances, the needs of the administration are often perceived as being met by turning to careerists.

The Case for Careerist Assistant Secretaries

Despite the evident importance and influence of regional assistant secretaries, their selection has been the focus of little public discussion or analysis. Prior to a presidential election, candidates devote little consideration to staffing their administration. In the election's aftermath, the victorious candidate usually devotes scant attention to sub-cabinet appointments.

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Should regional assistant secretaries come from the ranks of the career State Department bureaucracy? Or should they come from outside the department?

Those who favor careerists typically base their arguments on five grounds: their expertise, bureaucratic skills, coherent world view, non-political nature, and greater competence.

EXPERTISE. Careerists are said to be more knowledgeable about a region than outsiders. According to Nicholas Veliotes, the last-but-one NEA assistant secretary, a careerist himself (and one of the few interviewees prepared to comment on the record for this study): "Ideally, a regional assistant secretary should have considerable experience in the region for which he is responsible. Without this background, the incumbent risks being abstracted from the realities of the area — people, culture, politics — for which he is responsible."[11]

Thus, with regard to NEA, it has been argued that an outsider thought to possess Middle East expertise probably really knows only the Arab-Israeli conflict, while the bureau handles far broader issues.[12] The tensions in this region are so important that they demand an experienced expert.[13] Further, the policy process requires a "balanced" perspective of the conflict.[14] A pro-Israel or even a Jewish appointee might damage relations with the Arabs.[15] And so forth.

BUREAUCRATIC SKILLS. Careerists claim to have more bureaucratic experience and therefore more skill at dealing with the intricacies of the State Department. Reflecting a fairly widespread careerist view, Veliotes argues:

> There is no question that career officers will generally do a better job as assistant secretaries. Every secretary of state and president during my long career obviously agreed with this position since the vast majority of assistant secretaries of state, including NEA, have come from the career service . . . . Without prior successful experience in the bureaucracy and running the bureaucracy to some extent an incumbent will be at a considerable disadvantage.[16]

COHERENT WORLD VIEW. To assert that there is a bureaucratic consensus towards a region would be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it would be facile to deny the presence within bureaus of a general series of precepts or a world view towards certain core issues. Outsiders with differing precepts would disrupt this bureaucratic world view. In the case of NEA, this is a world view known as Arabism, a concept examined later in this study.

NON-POLITICIZATION. The whole process of making foreign policy, especially at the State Department, should be separated from

[11] Letter to the author from Nicholas Veliotes.
[12] Author's confidential interview with former NSC official.
[13] Author's confidential interview with former NSC official.
[14] Author's confidential interview with former NSC official.
[15] Author's confidential interview with former NSC official.
[16] Letter to the author from Nicholas Veliotes.

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domestic politics. The aphorism that politics halts at the water's edge implicitly justifies the naming of careerists as assistant secretaries. Careerists, unlike outsiders, are purportedly free of political and electoral influences. Veliotes again speaks for others: "Although there are important exceptions, I believe that the nation is better served if most of the core substantive assistant secretaryships are in the hands of highly skilled and experienced professionals."[17] Some FSOs go so far as to state that the assistant secretary and the bureau should reflect less the president's view than the view from abroad. According to this argument, it is the bureau's job to reflect the regional perspective, leaving American policy decisions to the secretary of state or the White House.[18]

This formerly prevalent view has diminished as FSOs have come to accept the inevitable intrusion of domestic considerations into foreign policy. But one influential voice advocates professional control over foreign policy even at the sacrifice of democratic values. George Kennan writes:

> History does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our domestic politics . . . . If you say that mistakes of the past were unavoidable because of our domestic predilections and habits of thought, you are saying that what stopped us from being more effective than we were was democracy as practiced in this country . . . . [There is a need to] find something to do about it.[19]

Paradoxically, careerists sometimes debate the notion that outsiders better reflect the president's views. Outsiders may be better attuned initially, the argument goes, but the president's policies often evolve more than those of his aides, and careerists may be better equipped to adapt to his new views and reflect them.[20] In any case, a wide diversity of views are represented within the Foreign Service, so a president can just as well find a political soul mate in the bureaucracy to serve as an assistant secretary.[21]

COMPETENCE. Those who argue in favor of careerists maintain that many political appointments have been of poor quality.[22] Veliotes provides a careerist perspective of this problem:

> There are some outsiders who have been so thoroughly unprepared by their previous experience for senior policy-making functions in the national security field that they

[17] Ibid.

[18] Author's confidential interview with former State Department official. This attitude inspires a number of snide remarks by Americans not in the Foreign Service. "Rumors are spreading in Washington that the Reagan Administration is about to take the ultimate step toward reforming U.S. foreign policy by opening an American Interests section at the State Department. The foreign service claims this would violate its most cherished principle of high diplomacy: never take sides on any issue — it complicates the negotiations." (*National Review*, November 20, 1987.)

[19] Kenneth Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 102.

[20] Author's interview with Lawrence S. Eagleburger.

[21] Author's confidential interview with former NSC official.

[22] Author's confidential interview with former NSC official.

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have clearly been a hindrance to policy formulation and implementation. And this has been a very unhappy experience for them . . . . There is an almost infallible corridor grapevine which operates and the incompetent outsider will often be bypassed or isolated in the policy-making or policy implementation process . . . . Often the senior-most political appointees in an administration, for the sake of the more effective and efficient execution of their own responsibilities, will tacitly cooperate in the process of isolating and limiting the damage of an incompetent at the assistant secretary level.[23]

Other arguments are sometimes made in favor of careerists: circumventing FSOs precludes the institutionalization of foreign policy and squanders the State Department's assets. Appointing a career assistant secretary helps build an institutional memory in foreign policy. If FSOs do not fill these positions, the number of senior positions available to them would be further restricted, with a concomitant dampening of morale. (Similar reasoning is used to argue against a high proportion of political ambassadorial appointments.)

Does all this mean that careerists would have the president make no political appointees? Not quite. Those who advocate careerists as regional assistant secretaries are prepared to accept a limited number, to "seed" the department. But these individuals should be carefully selected. Only outsiders with extensive bureaucratic experience should qualify. Moreover, these outsiders should go only to those regional bureaus where deep divisions over policy divide the country (for instance the Inter-American Bureau). An outsider is deemed unnecessary at NEA because no such divisions exist concerning U.S. policy in the Middle East(!), and hence there is no need for political change.[24] (An alternate view holds that careerists are usually appointed to NEA precisely because no administration has a consensus on the Middle East.)[25]

Principally, though, careerists argue that outsiders should be appointed only to the functional bureaus, for these are more politically oriented, less in need of experienced diplomats, and traditionally not the preserve of FSOs.

The Case for Outsider Assistant Secretaries

The counter-argument holds that outsiders usually make for better regional assistant secretaries. It takes the careerist's arguments — expertise, bureaucratic skills, coherent views, non-politicization, competence — and turns them on their heads.

EXPERTISE. Careerists possess no monopoly over qualifications in foreign affairs. In fact, they may be far less expert than outsiders. Their narrow experience as an FSO may make them less qualified than an academic steeped in regional expertise, or an appointee with

[23] Letter to the author from Nicholas Veliotes.
[24] Author's interview with Samuel W. Lewis.
[25] Daniel Pipes, "Breaking all the Rules: American Debate Over the Middle East," *International Security*, Fall 1984, p. 146.

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previous experience in foreign policy making, or an individual with congressional experience knowledgeable about the bureaucracy. Further, while assistant secretaries should be proficient in their region of responsibility, it is neither requisite nor possibly even desirable that such proficiency should derive from service in the State Department.

BUREAUCRATIC SKILLS. Outsiders unquestionably confront some special difficulties in the State Department bureaucracy. But this means that an assistant secretary of state needs FSO cooperation to run his bureau — not that he has to be an FSO himself. Citing an outsider's reliance on careerist cooperation no more weakens the case for outsiders than it would at any other department. If anything this merely exemplifies the problems and reinforces the case for greater political control over the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic obstructionism should not be rewarded by conceding control to the careerists.

COHERENT WORLD VIEW. State has a coherent view, to be sure, but there is nothing beneficial about this. The Foreign Service is a relatively small organization with shared norms, goals, and values. In the course of their careers, FSOs not surprisingly tend to internalize and inculcate the views of the Foreign Service, for advancement may depend on their doing so. But because careerists reflect their bureau's received wisdom, their appointment to high positions virtually ensures little innovation.

Placing an FSO in a political policy-making position makes him a defender of the administration. His future career could be harmed because he argued for the policies of a specific administration. How can he do the same for a new president who views the world differently? For these reasons, William Bundy advocates outsiders for controversial or sensitive areas.[26]

In contrast, political appointees espouse fresh views, dedicate themselves to the president's agenda, and break up bureaucratic logjams. They stay at their bureaus for only a limited period and have no reason to accept the Foreign Service shibboleths. Non-careerists tend to be more willing to challenge the bureaucracy and ultimately even to resign in protest; after all, they have career alternatives the FSOs lack. This is important, for an assistant secretary needs to take risks and be prepared to implement decisions in the face of institutional opposition.

NEA has been the bureau most recalcitrant in the face of change, persisting with many of its old views (for example, on the need to include the Palestine Liberation Organization in Arab-Israeli negotiations) — unchallenged by an outsider assistant secretary. By con-

[26] Author's interview with William Bundy.

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trast, Chester Crocker's "constructive engagement" towards South Africa and Elliott Abrams's policy towards Nicaragua offer examples of the political appointee's new broom.

NON-POLITICIZATION. The alleged impartiality of the Foreign Service is a fraud for, as even its members acknowledge, the Service has a well-articulated world view. The president who tries to buck this view often finds himself stymied by bureaucratic resistance. When it disagrees with a policy, former policy makers inform us, the bureaucracy procrastinates or takes unauthorized actions to reverse policy decisions. Also, without his own representative as assistant secretary, the president receives limited options.

The regional bureaus naturally tend to see issues through their own prisms rather than through a global perspective or from a functional perspective. Consequently, bureaus at State constantly clash with each other. In turn, State's interests as a department tend to focus on diplomacy and negotiation, as opposed to the president's broader concerns. (This reflects a larger problem. Presidents and their aides frequently complain that Cabinet officers represent their own departments' views more than the president's. Thus, despite initial promises to practice strong Cabinet government, presidents tend with time to concentrate policy making in the White House.)

In short, as a result of their bureau's very coherent world view, careerist assistant secretaries may pursue policies contrary to the president's intent. At the very least, they are unlikely to pursue his policies with the same single-minded dedication as outsiders. Rather, they tend to offer the departmental perspective as a counter to the administration policy; this is clearest in the case of the Middle East, where NEA pursues its world view whenever feasible, regardless of the president or his views.

Presidents have long complained about not controlling foreign policy. Harry Truman warned that "Eisenhower will say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike — it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating."[27] John Kennedy came to view the State Department as a "bowl of jello . . . slow, conventional, shallow in its ideas and resistant to fresh thinking."[28] Nixon's and Kissinger's antagonism towards the foreign-policy bureaucracy was legendary, and they solved the problem by circumventing the bureaucracy on crucial decisions.

Other presidents got around the bureaucracy by relying on the State Department's Policy Planning staff or on the NSC. But these are not realistic options over the long term. Policy Planning is too

[27] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1980), p. 8.

[28] Smith Simpson, *Anatomy of the State Department* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 228.

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small (with only about twenty analysts) and the NSC has its own very definite limitations — as the Iran/Contra affair made so vividly clear. Indeed, the Iran/Contra affair demonstrated the president's dire need for a State Department he can rely on, rather than one he must circumvent.

The President's Special Review Board, established in the aftermath of the Iran/Contra affair (the Tower Commission), confirmed this point. It declared:

> It is the president who is the usual source of innovation and responsiveness in this field. The departments . . . tend to resist policy change. Each has its own perspective based on long experience. The challenge for the president is to bring his perspective to bear on these bureaucracies for they are his instruments for executing national security policy, and he must work through them. His task is to provide them leadership and direction.[29]
>
> It is up to the politically appointed agency heads to ensure that the president's goals, designs, and policies are brought to bear on this permanent structure. Circumventing the departments . . . robs the president of the experience and capacity resident in the departments. The president must act largely through them, but the agency heads must ensure that they execute the executive's policies in an expeditious and effective manner.[30]

The president's control over the foreign-policy bureaucracy is ensured by appointing committed supporters to key policy-making positions. Because assistant secretaries set the bureaus' course, those who reflect State Department views convey the wrong message to a bureaucracy already disposed to its own institutional viewpoint. Significant foreign-policy directions are best set by an administrative appointee, someone who can inject the broad political considerations affecting the president, and can consider the effects on different segments of American society. The assistant secretary should first advocate the president's views and only second those of his bureau.

With only rare exceptions, regional assistant secretaries should be outsiders.

Finally, the FSOs have no right to arrogate powers to themselves that the Constitution grants to the electorate and the political leaders — the president and Congress — they chose. Neither elected nor accountable, careerists should refrain from playing a prominent part in formulating foreign policy. Their role should be restricted to the implementation of such policy. While the views and interests of a bureau clearly should be heard and represented, ultimately the views of politicians, and not bureaucrats, must be paramount.

COMPETENCE. Incompetent regional assistant secretaries may well have held office, but those who make this case rarely cite specific

[29] "Report of the President's Special Review Board," February 26, 1987, v1.
[30] Ibid., v2.

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examples — perhaps because there have been so few outsider appointees to begin with. In any case, the occasionally incompetent outsider in no way invalidates the strong case for political appointees. In the first place, many outsiders have made excellent assistant secretaries; some careerists poor ones. Recent examples of qualified outsiders might include Elliott Abrams, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Burt. Citing poor careerists would be unfair. Highly talented and qualified, these individuals are simply misplaced in positions for which they are not best suited. Careerists very often lack the necessary experience as administrators and policy formulators; they are better equipped for diplomacy. This is what they have been trained for and where their expertise and experience lies.

Actually, criticism of the quality of political appointees is usually focused not on assistant secretaries but on ambassadors. And certainly a strong argument can be made that an inordinate number of ambassadorships are filled by political leaders, in repayment of political favors or in recompense for unsuccessful electoral efforts. Appointing ambassadorships for such reasons is not the most alluring feature of American political life. But none of this gainsays the powerful case for appointing suitably qualified non-careerist ambassadors. Accordance with the views of the president is an acceptable rationale for appointment of a qualified outsider as ambassador; and such appointees may be more effective than their careerist counterparts.

The Verdict: Outsiders Win

In his memoirs, Harry Truman refers to his problems

> with career men who seek to impose their own views instead of implementing the established policy of the administration. Sometimes they achieve this by influencing the key men appointed by the president to put his policies into operation . . . . It has happened in the Department of State . . . I wanted to make it plain that the president of the United States, and not the second or third echelon in the State Department, is responsible for making foreign policy, and, furthermore, that no one in any department can sabotage the president's policy . . . . The Foreign Service officer has no authority to make policy. They act only as servants of the government, and therefore they must remain in line with the government policy that is established by those who have been chosen by the people to set that policy.[31]

Little has changed in forty years. Career officials continue to look upon elected officials as just temporary occupants and regard themselves as the real policy makers who run the government.

If one holds that the assistant secretary's primary role is to reflect the views of the area or the bureau, then clearly selecting a careerist makes perfect sense. If however one believes that the assistant secretary's primary role is to help formulate and implement presidential policy, then an outsider is preferable. And the latter view is correct;

[31] Harry Truman, *Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 193.

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the assistant secretary is a political figure who implements an administration's viewpoint.

Therefore, with only rare exceptions, regional assistant secretaries should be outsiders. Appointing careerists as assistant secretaries is often tantamount to an administration placing obstacles in the path of its own policy. The assistant secretary should not be another slot for FSOs. Instead, the position should be filled by an outsider who supports presidential objectives, preferably someone with solid regional knowledge and bureaucratic skills.

The suggestion that the expertise or quality of FSOs is so high as to justify outsiders' exclusion is unconvincing. On the rare occasion where there is an outstanding FSO and no suitable outsider, a careerist might be acceptable. However, he should first resign from the Foreign Service — what civil servants in other departments of the U.S. government do when they become assistant secretaries. Conversely, most ambassadors should be careerists, where they can best make use of their diplomatic skills. Unfortunately, most assistant secretaryships are now filled by careerists and an inordinate number of ambassadorial positions are held by political appointees; both these practices should be reversed.

With their own appointees as assistant secretaries in place to push policies through the bureaucracy, presidents might have greater faith in the State Department. The results would be better use of the formidable abilities of foreign service officers, greater coherence in foreign policy, and — ironically — an increase in the department's influence.

But this means changing accepted practices. Irrespective of ideology, secretaries of state have tended to favor careerist assistant secretaries. Possibly they see careerists as more trustworthy than outsiders, some of whom may be more loyal to an agenda than to the secretary. The Reagan administration's dismissal of Michael Pillsbury, a middle-level political appointee in the Defense Department, for allegedly leaking policy disagreements exemplified this problem. The dismissal was noteworthy in a city where leaks stemming from policy disagreements are extremely common.

Secretaries of state may also believe that with careerists in high positions they have more personal power to make policy, which the FSOs will then faithfully implement. Even Secretary of State Haig, who knew the State Department's world view and predilections, felt confident that he could control the NEA bureau through a careerist. Such a belief, however, is facile. A secretary of state, preoccupied with a host of disparate issues, cannot single-handedly manage the department. Nor would it be efficacious for him to attempt to involve himself in departmental minutiae. Much like the president, the secretary must rely on subordinates, acting as pumping stations within

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the bureaucracy to help promote administration policies. Haig found his self-confidence misplaced.

A few observers do not see the issue of careerist versus outsider as pivotal. Rather, they stress that the assistant secretary should loyally (but not uncritically) support presidential policies.[32] Yet this ignores many factors, such as the institutional restrictions on FSOs and the greater likelihood of outsiders being loyal to the president. Those who assert that increasing the number of outsiders will effect no dramatic changes argue that political appointees tend to be circumvented or co-opted by the bureaucracy — "where you sit is where you stand." While partially valid, this assertion should not lead to abandoning all efforts to exert political control over the bureaucracy. Selecting appointees who will adhere to administration policy in the face of bureaucratic opposition can minimize the problem.

The Middle East Case

The State Department has a higher proportion of careerist appointees in the Federal government; regional bureaus have a higher proportion of careerists than functional bureaus; the Middle East bureau (NEA) has more careerists than any other regional bureau. NEA therefore stands as the most exclusive preserve of careerists and the most extreme case of the syndrome analyzed here. And what does it show? Precisely why careerists do not make the best regional assistant secretaries.

NEA's world view has evolved over the years, but its leaders tend to adhere to a specific set of beliefs. They hold that excessively close relations with Israel damage American relations with the Arabs, that the Arabs would be forthcoming to Israel if only Israel made concessions, that Palestinian terrorism can only be addressed by resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that the conflict cannot be resolved without inclusion of the PLO.

These views have led NEA to draw a long line of wrong conclusions. Prior to Israel's creation, it ignored strong signals that the USSR would support the partition of Palestine. Then NEA alleged that a Jewish state would become a bastion for the Russians in the Middle East and predicted the Jewish state would be unable to defend itself against Arab attack. In 1967, Lucius Battle predicted that Egypt would not go to war against Israel. In 1978, Harold Saunders assured President Carter at Camp David that the "moderate" Arabs would be receptive to an Israeli-Egyptian accord. Prior to the September 1982 enunciation of the Reagan Plan, Nicholas Veliotes told President Reagan that King Husayn would accept the plan. A few months later he gave assurances that the Syrians would leave Lebanon. And so

[32] Letter to author from James Hackett.

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on; there is a long list of NEA's incorrect predictions or misguided policy recommendations.

This dismal record suggests the time has come for a non-careerist assistant secretary in the Middle East bureau. Ideally, such an appointee would know the region, have administrative experience, understand the policy-making process, and be familiar with the vagaries of the American political process. While permitting opposing views to be expressed, he would promote the president's policy agenda through the bureau, rather than reflect the bureau's views to the president. There are a sufficient number of outsiders, many with previous bureaucratic experience, who would make excellent assistant secretaries. Outsiders have served with high distinction in other regional bureaus and in other departments. They should be offered a similar opportunity at NEA.

If for some reason, an outside appointee were not possible, probably the most acceptable compromise, although far from ideal, would be appointing a careerist from outside NEA, for example, from the bureau for International Organizations (which deals with the United Nations and is fairly attuned to American politics). This would at least provide a halfway station. In the past, some administrations do appear at least tacitly to have realized this. President Nixon appointed Joseph Sisco to NEA; the Reagan administration considered Samuel Lewis for the same position.

If the assistant secretary must come from within NEA, at least the old mold should be broken. Prior service in Israel should be a prerequisite. With the exception of Veliotes, no assistant secretary for NEA has previously served in Israel. The imbalance caused by extended experience with the Arab countries, without similar experience with Israel, should be self-evident. The assistant secretary needs an understanding of Israeli as well as Arab concerns if he is to deal effectively with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Conclusion

The implementation of electorally endorsed policies is a fundamental rule of democracy, and any attempt to restrict or exclude such public influence needs to be disavowed. To be sure, presidents are not normally elected with a detailed foreign policy, but the same is true of domestic policy. To the degree that an election serves as a plebiscite for future policy or a referendum on past policy, the results should apply to foreign affairs as well as to domestic. Such democratic control over foreign policy could and should be strengthened by appointing more outsiders as assistant secretaries of state.

Compared to many recommendations for reorganizing American foreign policy — revise the presidential advisory system, formulate and coordinate policy in the NSC, overhaul the whole foreign-

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policy apparatus — this is hardly a dramatic or utopian proposal. Claims made for it are likewise modest. Appointing outsiders might not make for drastic improvements in U.S. foreign policy. But it would offer a simple and cost-free method for bringing the State Department bureaucracy more nearly in line with presidential goals.

While we might argue about the foreign-policy responsibilities of the president vis-à-vis Congress, both are elected and accountable. The bureaucracy is neither. FSOs are assigned to conduct U.S. relations with foreign countries, not to decide what those relations should be.

APPENDIX
REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF STATE 1953-1987
(by year of appointment)

EAST ASIA
(7 out of 14 outsiders)

Gaston Sigur	(1986)*	William Bundy	(1964)*
Paul Wolfowitz	(1982)*	Roger Hillsman	(1963)*
John Holdridge	(1981)	Averell Harriman	(1961)*
Richard Holbrooke	(1977)*	Walter McConaughy	(1961)
Arthur Hummel	(1976)	J. Graham Parsons	(1959)
Philip Habib	(1974)	Walter Robertson	(1953)
Robert Ingersoll	(1973)*	John Allison	(1952)
Marshall Green	(1969)		

INTER-AMERICA
(6 out of 19 outsiders)

Elliott Abrams	(1985)*	Covey Oliver	(1967)*
Langhorne Motley	(1983)*	Lincoln Gordon	(1966)
Thomas Enders	(1981)	Jack Vaughn	(1965)
William Bowdler	(1979)	Thomas Mann	(1963)
Viron Vaky	(1978)	Edwin Martin	(1962)
Terence Todman	(1977)	Robert Woodward	(1961)
William Schlaudeman	(1976)	Roy Rubottom	(1957)
William Rogers	(1974)*	Henry Holland	(1954)*
Jack Kubisch	(1973)	John Cabot	(1953)
Charles Meyer	(1969)*		

AFRICA‡
(3 out of 9 outsiders)

Chester Crocker	(1981)*	David Newsom	(1969)
Richard Moose	(1977)*	Joseph Palmer	(1966)
William Schaufele	(1975)	G. Mennen Williams	(1961)*
Nathaniel Davis	(1975)	Joseph Satterthwaite	(1958)
Donald Easum	(1974)		

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APPENDIX (Continued)

EUROPE
(1 out of 13 outsiders)

Rozanne Ridgway	(1985)	John Leddy	(1965)
Richard Burt	(1983)*	William Tyler	(1962)
Lawrence Eagleburger	(1981)	Foy Kohler	(1959)
George Vest	(1977)	Livingstone Merchant	(1958)
Arthur Hartman	(1973)	C. Burke Elbrick	(1957)
Walter Stoessel	(1972)	Livingstone Merchant	(1953)
Martin Hillenbrand	(1969)		

NEAR EAST
(1 out of 13 outsiders)

Richard Murphy	(1983)	Lucius Battle	(1967)
Nicholas Veliotes	(1981)	Raymond Hare	(1965)
Harold Saunders	(1978)	Phillips Talbott	(1961)*
Alfred Atherton	(1974)	G. Lewis Jones	(1959)
Joseph Sisco	(1969)	William Rountree	(1956)
Parker Hart	(1968)	George Allen	(1955)

* Outsider appointees.
‡ Africa was part of the Near East Bureau Prior to 1958.

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THE UNITED NATIONS: SOME PARTS WORK

by Richard S. Williamson

Once seen as man's last best hope for international order and peace, the United Nations has fallen into severe disrepute among Americans.[1] Critics have pointed out many legitimate problems. Far from being ineffectual or an expensive Turkish bath, they charge that the U.N. General Assembly exacerbates the world's problems, is rife with double standards, and harms U.S. interests.[2] Or, as William F. Buckley, Jr., has observed, "Obviously our country attaches importance to the values and ideals of the United Nations. The question is whether the United Nations attaches any importance to the values and ideals of the United Nations."[3]

The U.N. General Assembly was created in the image of a deliberative chamber, a place openly to arrive at open convenants. But over the years it became a sideshow; awash in polemical propaganda, it lost most if not all of the authority it once commanded. The General Assembly grew obsessed with a few issues — North-South relations,[4] the Arab-Israeli conflict,[5] apartheid[6] — and deals with other issues through a U.N. prism defined by those three.

[1] In 1985, just 51 percent of Americans in a New York Times/CBS poll felt the U.N. was doing a good or very good job. "5-Nation Survey Finds Hope for U.N.," *New York Times*, June 26, 1985. See also, Senator Christopher J. Dodd, "On Nuremberg and the United Nations," *New York Times*, October 8, 1986; and Senator Paul S. Trible, "U.N. Anti-Americanism Will Backfire in the Senate," *New York Times*, December 15, 1986.

[2] Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick is amongst the thoughtful critics who have accused the United Nations of being "perverted by politicalization." Quoted in Burton Yale Pines, ed., "The U.S. and the U.N.: Time for Reappraisal," *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, September 29, 1983, p. 10. See also Charles Krauthammer, "Why the U.S. Should Bail Out of the U.N.: Let it Sink," *The New Republic*, August 24, 1987, p. 18.

[3] William F. Buckley, Jr. *United Nations Journal: A Delegate's Odyssey* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1974), p. 58.

[4] See Edward W. Erickson and Daniel A. Sumner, "The U.N. and Economic Development" in Burton Yale Pines, ed., *A World Without A U.N.* (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1984), pp. 1-21; and Stanley J. Michalak, "U.N. Conference on Trade and Development: Cheating the Poor," *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* (Washington, D.C., 1984).

[5] A study by the Heritage Foundation concluded that in 1982 the UNGA and its seven main committees devoted over one-third of the delegates' time to debate on the Middle East. In that same year, of the 430 UNGA-approved resolutions and decisions, 41 were devoted wholly or partly to criticizing Israel. "The United Nations' Campaign Against Israel," *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, U.N. Assessment Project (Washington, D.C., 1983). See

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In contrast to the General Assembly, U.N. agencies were established for non-political purposes. Some act as international clearing houses; others advance international standards or provide technical assistance. But even these limited goals do not protect against a General Assembly-like politicalization. Some states repeatedly use the specialized agencies to introduce resolutions on the usual issues — Arab-Israeli, South Africa, and so forth. As a result, battle lines were drawn between those who would broaden the debate and those who would keep it focused.

The former won in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), leading the United States government to withdraw from it in 1984. Some critics of the United Nations argue that the same failures contaminate the rest of the U.N. system and, therefore, that the United States should get out of the main organization and all its divisions.[7]

But before coming to this conclusion, it is important to recognize that some parts of the U.N. system do make a positive contribution in a professional, businesslike, and technically competent manner. As U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick commented when visiting the U.N. offices in Vienna in 1984, "I've always considered the United Nations as two parts: the political U.N. General Assembly which doesn't work, and the technical agencies that do."

I served as U.S. ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations in Vienna during 1983-85. Some of the nine U.N. organizations located in Vienna are not serious. They ignore their charters and are for political posturing and the recycling of tired, sterile North-South and East-West debates. But three of them — the International Atomic Energy Agency, the drug agencies, and (surprisingly) the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees — are well-run and make real contributions. They deserve some attention and a little praise; they also offer some hints on how to redeem the failed U.N. agencies.

Unusual Harmony at the International Atomic Energy Agency

Clearly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most important U.N. organization for the United States in Vienna, for the agency has a pivotal role in promoting the peaceful uses of

also, Thomas M. Frank, "A Place Where Lies Are Told: Israel Before the General Assembly," *Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 184-204; and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), pp. 169-99.

[6] See John Barratt, "South African Diplomacy at the U.N." in G. R. Berridge and A. Jennings, eds., *Diplomacy at the U.N.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 191-203.

[7] Charles Krauthammer, "Why the U.S. Should Bail Out of the U.N.: Let it Sink," *The New Republic*, August 24, 1987, p. 18; Ernest van den Haag and Joseph P. Conrad, *The U.N. In or Out?* (New York: Plenum Press, 1987); and Burton Yale Pines, ed., *A World Without A U.N.* (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1984).

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nuclear energy and in halting proliferation of the bomb. I devoted over two-thirds of my time and the resources of my mission to IAEA matters.

The agency serves as the world center for research on the practical uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. It provides members with a variety of services and supplies materials, equipment and facilities. It promotes the exchange of information and scientists. The IAEA sets safety standards and enforces those standards. It produces feasibility studies and does useful work on the siting of power plants. Of special interest to countries too small for their own nuclear power stations, the agency offers assistance applying radioisotopes and radiation in agriculture, medicine, biology, hydrology, and industry. It also supplies poorer countries with radioactive material and facilities to develop nuclear energy for peaceful ends.

Following the April 26, 1986, accident at the nuclear stations in Chernobyl, the IAEA performed invaluable work analyzing the causes of the accident and containing the fallout. It became a clearing house for information and mobilized international expertise to deal with the accident. Following the disaster, the IAEA sponsored negotiations that culminated in two international conventions, one requiring immediate and detailed notification of nuclear accidents, and the other setting guidelines for prompt assistance to a country suffering from a nuclear mishap.[8]

At the same time, the agency deters the misuse of nuclear material for military purposes through the application of international safeguards. In this, the IAEA acts as the vital linchpin of worldwide nuclear non-proliferation efforts. It has a predominant position in enforcing the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), a role that has helped focus the IAEA by giving it greater purpose.[9] The safeguards system relies on the independent measurement of nuclear materials by IAEA inspectors during unannounced on-site inspections of nuclear facilities, as well as by independent IAEA record-keeping.[10] The safeguards system aims to detect diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material to military purposes, and during my tenure in Vienna, anomalies led to immediate corrective actions. This program offers an excellent example of multilateral cooperation achieving a vital objective that a matrix of bilateral agreements could not.

[8] *Final Document Resolutions and Conventions*, Adopted by the First Special Session of the General Conference, September 24-26, 1986, IAEA, GC (SPL.1)/Res. (1986).

[9] Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires non-nuclear members to accept safeguards on all nuclear energy equipment in which fissionable material is used. Article III makes the IAEA responsible for managing the safeguard system. See *The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, (IAEA INFCIRC/153).

[10] International Atomic Energy Agency, *Non-Proliferation and International Safeguards* (78-2070), 1978.

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While membership is open to all states, the board of governors is a strong executive body. Ten seats are filled by permanent members who are designated those with the most advanced nuclear programs. The rest rotate on a geographic basis.[11] This guarantees continuity in the agency and a strong voice for those states most interested in its work. Unlike the U.N. General Assembly, where there is no "reason of the whole,"[12] this does exist within the IAEA Board of Governors due to indigenous nuclear programs, technology transfer and non-proliferation concerns. This permits the board to keep the agency closely focused on appropriate issues.

Further, the board of governors has only three regularly scheduled meetings a year, sessions not open to the public (and only summaries of discussions are published). Prior to each meeting the board chairman consults individually with each of the thirty-five IAEA governors. This allows him to identify problem areas early and to engage in quiet negotiations when they do appear.

During my tenure, all problems were either resolved prior to the actual board of governors meeting or, if they were not, the troubling issue received only limited discussion at the board meeting and was postponed to the next meeting (allowing more time to reach a resolution). There were no open confrontations or hostile votes. Members acted as the U.N. founders had dreamed they would — they showed real dedication to reach compromises on legitimate issues and to advance the objectives of the agency.

IAEA also benefits from the convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both governments want the IAEA to succeed and make sure the agency stays focused on its proper functions. Indeed, the U.S.-Soviet consultations at the IAEA are unique among all international organizations. We worked to exchange information, improve international safeguards, develop plans for the storage of plutonium and spent reactor fuel, and coordinate the transfer of technology.

I kept in close contact, as had my predecessors, with my Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Oleg Klestov. Approximately one month

[11] According to IAEA Statute Articles VI, members of the board of governors are, as designated by the outgoing board, first the ten member states most advanced in the technology of nuclear energy, including the production of source materials; in addition, the board elects, from each of eight areas — North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East and South Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific, and the Far East — the member state most advanced in the science of atomic energy, and whose geographical area is not represented by any of the above ten states.

[12] In his Speech to the Electors of Bristol, Edmund Burke outlined the importance of the "reason of the whole." He said: "Parliament is not a congress of Ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole — where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole." (B. W. Hill, ed., *Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society* [London: Fontana, 1975], p. 156.)

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before a board meeting, he and I had long meetings to review the agenda in detail. We exchanged views on every item. In consultation with our capitals, we sought to coordinate positions and coordinate tactics for debate. A day or two before each board meeting, after delegations had arrived from Washington and Moscow, the entire two delegations met to review the forthcoming meeting for a last time.[13]

Such U.S.-Soviet cooperation discourages others from politicizing the agency's deliberations. When potential political flashpoints arise, the U.S. delegation works with its allies and the Soviet delegation instructs its clients to reach a compromise. Each delegation also meets with other states with which it has influence.

A good example of U.S.-Soviet cooperation occurred in September 1983 at the IAEA General Conference. Just before the conference was to begin, a Soviet fighter plane destroyed Korean Airlines flight 007, killing hundreds of civilians, including many Americans. Worldwide, tensions shot up between the superpowers. President Reagan and Secretary Shultz condemned the Soviets' unlawful brutality and U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick forcefully berated the Soviet leaders at the U.N. Security Council. Diplomatic contacts were reduced to an absolute minimum. Nonetheless, both governments made a conscious decision not to let this act hemorrhage into U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the IAEA, and it did not.

On instruction from our capitals, Klestov and I worked together to prepare for the general conference. We even discussed how we would handle the KAL 007 issue. Klestov suggested how the Soviet delegation might refer to the incident during the debate. I with the South Koreans and Klestov with the North Koreans worked to contain the issue. The United States did not back off from its firm condemnation of the Soviets' unprovoked brutality, but it did acknowledge that the IAEA was not the proper forum to pursue this issue.

Two Test Cases: China and Israel

Close U.S.-Soviet coordination in the IAEA occasionally leads governments to accuse the superpowers of collusion. For the most part, however, the other IAEA members view this cooperation as helpful. For example, Peking indicated in July 1983 that it might wish to enter the IAEA. The Peoples Republic of China had been the only major country that had not long been a member of the IAEA, and its actions had for many years disturbed the nuclear non-

[13] Similar U.S.-Soviet consultations in Geneva went on in connection with the Third NPT Review Conference. And separate regular U.S.-Soviet meetings on more general peaceful nuclear matters have been established, rotating between Moscow and Washington. Because IAEA activities are integral to these matters, I was a member of the U.S. delegations to such consultations throughout my tenure in Vienna.

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proliferation regime.[14] It had exploded a nuclear device in 1964, then built a substantial nuclear arsenal. Not being a signator to the NPT nor having accepted limits on nuclear exports, the PRC remained outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its entry into the IAEA would be a first step in their journey to partnership in the regime.

But this also created several problems. While no state wished openly to oppose China's entry, some did have concerns, especially India. India had become the leading voice of the developing countries in the agency and held a permanent seat on the board due to its advanced nuclear program. The PRC's entry into the IAEA threatened both these Indian positions. Other states worried that the facilities on Taiwan under IAEA safeguards would drop out of this arrangement once the PRC entered the agency.[15] The industrial states liked the total composition of the board of governors which allowed a fragile but satisfactory control on budget matters, and the PRC could disrupt that control.

Fifteen months after the PRC's original overture and after hundreds of hours of consultations in capitals and in Vienna, the PRC officially entered the IAEA in an unusual arrangement: the permanent membership of the board of governors was expanded by one.[16] This accommodated both the PRC and India. The many other states with advanced nuclear programs (and therefore legitimate claims to permanent membership) agreed not to force their claims at that time.[17] The full board was also expanded by a single seat, and the many states that repeatedly had called for even greater expansion agreed not to force their motions just then. IAEA safeguards on Taiwan were allowed to remain through a linguistic gimmick (unfortunately one that is at any time vulnerable to an inquiry).

Any single one of the then 117 members could have disrupted the delicate balance needed to arrange the entry of the PRC. Any state wanting to politicize the issue or press its own advantage at the expense of the agency could have ruined the process, but not one did. Today the PRC is an active member of the IAEA and has taken other steps toward entering the nuclear non-proliferation regime. (For example, a U.S.-China Nuclear Agreement now further restricts PRC nuclear activities.)

[14] See Daniel Horner and Paul Leventhal, "The U.S.-China Nuclear Agreement: A Failure of Executive Policymaking and Congressional Oversight," *The Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs*, Winter 1987, pp. 105, 107-109.

[15] The Republic of China (Taiwan) had been an active IAEA member until 1971. That year, when the UNGA voted Taiwan out of the United Nations and the PRC entered the United Nations, Taiwan also left the IAEA.

[16] The 27th session of the General Conference (October 11, 1984) approved the membership of the PRC in the IAEA and its membership became effective on January 1, 1985.

[17] A number of nations had repeatedly sought expansion of the board including Spain, Italy, Venezuela, Argentina and others. See, in this connection, General Assembly Res. 32/49.

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But the greatest challenge to IAEA's avoidance of passionate politics was in response to the June 7, 1981, Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear research reactor at Osirak, which was under IAEA safeguards at the time of the attack.[18] It was the first military action taken to prevent the development of nuclear power. The attack created controversy over Israel's justification, over the integrity of IAEA safeguards, and the whole non-proliferation regime.

Even the United States condemned Israel's action in the U.N. Security Council.[19] At its June meeting, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution by 29 to 2 (with 3 abstentions) strongly condemning Israel "for this premeditated and unjustified attack on the Iraqi nuclear research center, which was covered by Agency safeguards," and recommending that the general conference "consider all the implications of this attack, including suspending the exercise by Israel of the privileges and rights of membership," and suspension of technical assistance. The United States opposed the resolution because it pre-empted prerogatives falling within the competence of the U.N. Security Council; because the United States opposed in principle the exclusion of any member from an international organization, except in strict compliance with statutory provisions, which did not exist in this case; and because all member states have the right to benefit from Agency technical assistance.

The Iraqi reactor having been under agency safeguards, the attack was relevant to IAEA interests. And since abuse of Israel is a foremost U.N. activity, the Israeli attack created a real danger of the agency being politicized. The "reason of the whole" for IAEA's principal members came under direct assault by the many states interested in isolating and delegitimating the state of Israel.

Approaching the 1981 fall general conference, the United States led those states arguing against continued debate in the IAEA on the Israeli raid. But the Iraqi delegation led a heated political attack on Israel, and the agency's general conference, for years an elite and apolitical gathering place of the world's nuclear physicists, became obsessed with Israel. Eventually, the United States mobilized the necessary third to block Iraq's proposal to suspend Israel. When it became clear that Israel would not be ousted, this effort was deferred to the next general conference, a maneuver that kept the issue alive. In the meantime, a resolution was adopted by 51 to 8 (with 27

[18] Prior to the Israeli attack there had been a pattern of suspicious events regarding this Iraqi research reactor which was being built by the French. In September 1980, Iraq temporarily evicted all French technicians, saying it could not protect them because of its war with Iran. Two months later, Iraq's government announced it would not permit IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities until the war with Iran ended. The Iraqi government refused French entreaties to allow it to substitute less highly enriched uranium rather than bomb-grade uranium for the research reactor. Nonetheless, in June 1981 when Israeli fighters attacked the reactor, it was under IAEA safeguards.

[19] On June 29, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 487 (1981).

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abstentions) that called the Israeli action "an attack on the Agency and its safeguards regime" and suspended technical assistance to Israel.[20]

In September 1982, the IAEA General Conference was again dominated by the Israeli issue. The conference passed another resolution condemning Israel and narrowly voted to deny Israeli credentials. This provoked the United States to walk out of the conference and temporarily suspend its participation — including financial — in the IAEA. (The United States rejoined in the spring of 1983.)

When I arrived in Vienna in June 1983, the Israeli issue still predominated. Only through extensive preparations and long negotiations could we put the genie back in the bottle. Gradually a coalition developed around the issue of the IAEA's value and the importance of the non-proliferation regime. When the Iraqis again moved to deny Israeli credentials, they met a counter-motion not to consider challenges to any credentials, and this passed by a vote of 54 to 24, with 7 abstentions.[21]

By 1984, the United States had achieved such overwhelming support for its position, Baghdad decided at the last minute not to challenge Israeli credentials, though some limitations were imposed on Israeli rights and privileges of membership in the IAEA.[22] At the 1985 general conference, the consensus had grown further; that year participants not only rejected an Iraqi effort to impose sanctions against Israel, but found that Israel had provided sufficient assurance that it would not attack peaceful nuclear facilities. The issue did not come up in the 1986 general conference.

The story of the IAEA containing and purging itself of politicalization is perhaps unique in U.N. history.

The Drug Agencies

Three U.N. organizations in Vienna deal with the control of narcotic and psychotropic drugs. They have generally avoided politicalization, open propaganda, or inflated expectations. While not the answer to illicit drugs, these U.N. organizations make a solid contribution.

[20] Later that fall, the UNGA considered the matter in three plenary meetings and on November 10, 1981, adopted an Iraqi-initiated resolution. It reiterated condemnation of "Israel's continued refusal to implement Security Council resolution 487 (1981)" and demanded that Israel withdraw "its threat to attack and destroy nuclear facilities in Iraq and other countries." The UNGA adopted the resolution by a vote of 123 to 2 (Israel, U.S.), with 12 abstentions (UNGA Resolution 38/9).

[21] See Richard S. Williamson, "U.S. Multilateral Diplomacy at the United Nations," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1986, pp. 5, 13-14.

[22] IAEA GC (XXVII)/RES/407.

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The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), which includes representatives of thirty states, deals with the implementation of international drug treaties[23] and sets U.N. policy on drug control. Throughout my tenure in Vienna, the CND avoided political issues and focused on its responsibilities. Although public, its meetings were businesslike and had none of the normal U.N. political rhetoric. The member states sent technical experts and all showed a strong interest in increasing the effectiveness of international drug treaties. While I was in Vienna the chairmanship rotated from Argentina to Hungary, with no change whatsoever in agenda, emphasis, or rhetoric.

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is responsible for the supervision of governmental implementation of drug control treaties. It reviews and confirms annual estimates of narcotic drug requirements submitted by governments and evaluates statistical reports on legitimate manufacture and trade. If treaties are breached, the board can require governments to adopt remedial measures and bring treaty violations to the U.N. Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Thirteen experts sit on the board, and they serve in their personal capacities. An American has always sat on the board since its creation in 1968. Meetings are closed, so there is little reason for propaganda.

The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), established in 1971, aims to reduce the supply and demand of illicit drugs. UNFDAC relies entirely on voluntary contributions and its research and training take place only in countries that invite its help. All countries involved with UNFDAC have a direct interest in its success and a commitment to its purpose. There are no open UNFDAC meetings. The UNFDAC executive director meets privately with ambassadors from major donor and recipient nations to review projects and work schedules. During my tenure in Vienna no issue was ever raised that did not focus entirely on the functional work of UNFDAC.

UNFDAC grew out of a realization that multilateral aid could succeed where certain bilateral aid would be politically unacceptable. In the early 1970s the United States sided with Greece against Turkey on the Cyprus issue. Therefore, even though Ankara wanted aid to encourage crop substitution from opium production to other crops, it could not take U.S. aid. But UNFDAC aid, however much of it came from the United States, was acceptable. The UNFDAC crop substitution project in Turkey has been a resounding success.

[23] The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted in 1961. The convention requires each of the 108 states who are signators to punish all international violations of its control provisions regarding cultivation, production, manufacture, trade, distribution, etc., of narcotic drugs. The Convention of Psychotropic Substances was adopted in 1971. It sets up a system of control for psychotropic drugs which is more elaborate than that of narcotic drugs.

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UNRWA's Unlikely Success

The General Assembly established the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to aid the Arab refugees who came out of the 1948-49 war between the Arab states and Israel. UNRWA began work in 1950 and services refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

UNRWA depends entirely on voluntary contributions, which it gets from governments, inter-governmental organizations, and private sources. Over the years, the United States has contributed over one billion dollars to UNRWA. But the agency has perennial financial difficulties in meeting its annual budget of over $250 million. UNRWA employs over 16,000 people, mostly refugees, of whom about 9,000 are teachers or instructors in the more than 650 elementary and junior secondary schools it runs. Education consumes over 60 percent of the agency's budget, with food and medical assistance taking most of the rest.

Many observers of the Middle East note that the continued existence of the Palestinian refugee camps after forty years, made possible in part by UNRWA's support, helps to perpetuate and exacerbate the problems. Without these camps, they suggest, the Palestinian refugees long ago would have assimilated into the Arab cultures of these neighboring states.

Even if one does not accept UNRWA's raison d'être, its headquarters in Vienna does a good job. Member states take care of UNRWA business without polemics and the UNRWA secretariat rarely engages in political posturing. Several factors contribute to this constructive environment.

First, the states that contribute to UNRWA have an interest in its success — the usual "reason of the whole." The work with the secretariat in Vienna is limited to voluntary contributors and host governments. UNRWA's Advisory Commission (which meets annually in Vienna to review UNRWA's programs and performance and draft a letter to the U.N. secretary-general) contains only major donors and host countries.

Second, the advisory commission's real work is not open and, therefore, there is little temptation to grandstand for a home audience. After very brief introductory remarks, the commission recesses. Members of the advisory commission leave the official conference room with its translators, transcribers, and other secretariat personnel and go to a small conference room for long, informal talks. During my tenure in Vienna, we had intense ten- to twelve-hour sessions negotiating the exact language of the advisory commission letter, discussing each phrase, every word. All parties pressed their positions hard but demonstrated a willingness to compromise. Once a consensus document had been drafted, the secretariat was informed and

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the delegations returned to the official conference room. The UNRWA commissioner-general would receive the document, and after very brief remarks, the advisory commission adjourned for another year.

Third, all parties have realistic expectations from UNRWA. No one sees it as a vehicle to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Emphasizing its temporary mission, UNRWA's mandate must periodically be renewed by the General Assembly. Fourth, UNRWA's task is specific — to aid Palestinian refugees with food, education, and medical help. It is not charged with the burden of resolving political problems.

Conclusion

The U.N. agencies that succeed share certain characteristics. Expectations for these organizations are realistic. They have specific assignments. A "reason of the whole" exists and affects behavior. The agencies' controlling bodies have a strong interest in fulfilling their mandate. Closed debate permits useful dialogue, compromise, and resolution.

These elements offer guidelines for the reform of those U.N. specialized agencies that matter to the United States. But they are probably impossible to implement in the General Assembly, where noisy rhetoric, distorted priorities, and vote-trading appear to be beyond reform.

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SOVIET SPECIAL FORCES IN AMERICA: THE DAY BEFORE

by James Adams

Some months before Cruise and Pershing nuclear missiles were first deployed in Europe in 1983, U.S. reconnaissance satellites detected new construction work beginning at a secret Soviet training base at Furstenburg, in the center of the East German plain, seventy-five miles from the West German border. Over a period of weeks, replicas of both NATO missiles, plus their transports, were constructed, and Soviet forces were later seen practicing attacks on them. The dummies were a useful addition to the mock-ups of Lance missiles, nuclear-capable NATO artillery, and nuclear storage dumps that had been in place for a number of years.

The complex of wooden buildings and parachute towers at Furstenburg is the center for Soviet special forces training in Europe. It lies in the middle of one of the largest restricted areas in East Germany and despite agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact allowing for inspection of training areas, the Spetsnaz — or Soviet special forces — base is kept strictly off limits — even to conventional Soviet forces. It is duplicated at Kirovograd near Kiev and in every Warsaw Pact country.[1]

Spetsnaz poses a key threat to the security of the West. In the days leading up to a war with NATO, its forces would attempt to sabotage the West's war-fighting ability. Posing as terrorists, they would employ chemical and biological agents to disable the civilian population, bomb military targets, and assassinate public figures. Agents-in-place in the United States, Britain, and other countries would precipitate strikes. These efforts could lead to logistical chaos, panic, and possibly a collapse of morale. With the beginning of a war, Spetsnaz would openly attack important military targets.

Training, Goals, and Organization

Spetsnaz are controlled by the 2nd Chief Directorate of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. The vast majority of the estimated 25,000 Spetsnaz troops that pass through the training schools are conscripts who have been creamed off from the regular forces during

[1] Information supplied from intelligence sources, March 1987.

James Adams is Defence Editor for the *Sunday Times*. This article is drawn from the author's *Secret Armies* (The Atlantic Monthly Press, forthcoming).

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the selection process. All recruits need to be politically reliable, physically fit, to have above average intelligence, and to demonstrate initiative. In addition, unusual security measures apply: they are forbidden emigration and all references to them in the general media are banned.[2]

Most Spetsnaz recruits are selected from the Komsomol, the Soviet communist youth organization which is considered politically reliable, or from the DOSSAF, a voluntary organization that carries out preparatory training for the armed forces. The DOSSAF has a number of flying clubs and parachute schools, and in the Spetsnaz any airborne qualifications are particularly welcome.

The Spetsnaz mission is to conduct what the Soviets call "Special Reconnaissance" (*spetsialnaya razvedka*). According to the *Soviet Military Encyclopaedia*, this is defined as:

> Reconnaissance carried out to subvert the political, economic and military potential and morale of a probable or actual enemy. The primary missions of special reconnaissance are: acquiring intelligence on major economic and military installations and either destroying them or putting them out of action; organising sabotage and acts of subversion; carrying out punitive operations against rebels; conducting propaganda; forming and training insurgent detachments, etc. Special reconnaissance is . . . conducted by the forces of covert intelligence and special purpose troops.[3]

Training is done in brigades and is organized by regular officers. Ordinary soldiers receive three months special training, and the officers six months. Each recruit spends two months at jump school and then goes on for more general training. Unlike their Western counterparts, there is very little cross-training in the Spetsnaz, so each unit of from four to ten men will have a radio operator, an explosives expert, and other specialists, but no one will be able to do the other's job. Such specialization is very inefficient and in part accounts for the large number of Spetsnaz.

During training, which is far less stylized and regimented than that of their conventional colleagues, the Spetsnaz recruits will be taught:

Covert infiltration and exfiltration of target areas. It is expected that special forces will arrive by road, rail, air and/or sea. Many Spetsnaz officers are required to carry out personal reconnaissance of the area where they will operate in the event of war. Therefore they arrive in Europe and the United States disguised as tourists, long-distance truck drivers, or aircraft flight crews. As many of them will be deployed in advance of hostilities, covert infiltration using

[2] Information on Spetsnaz comes from the following sources: three undated and unsigned assessments of Soviet special forces carried out by the British entitled *Operations in the Enemy Rear: Soviet Doctrine and Tactics, The Soviet Threat to Europe in the 1980s, Unconventional Warfare Operations*, a draft copy of the latest British Army Field Manual prepared in 1985; and NATO intelligence sources.

[3] Quoted in USAF Joint Special Operations Planning Workshop, Special Operations School, February 1986, p.8-1

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standard civilian routes will be preferred. "It is astonishing that they still do this when more détente and trust are being demanded," said Peter Kurt Wurzbach, the state secretary at the West German Ministry of Defense. "This is being done in a time that is not one of war."[4]

In January 1986 it was reported by *Jane's Defence Weekly* and others that women Spetsnaz teams had been permanently based outside the Greenham Common Cruise missile base in Britain since the first missile was deployed in 1983. The Greenham site had become the focus of a women's protest against Cruise missiles and a permanent peace camp had been established alongside the perimeter fence. It was reported that a number of Spetsnaz teams had rotated through the camp, although none was present by the time the report appeared.[5] Exhaustive inquiries in Europe and the United States suggest that this report was wrong. Allied intelligence has no evidence to suggest that any Spetsnaz forces have been based at Greenham or at any other Cruise missile base. As one senior intelligence officer said: "As far as I am concerned, there has been no evidence that Soviet special forces have attempted to infiltrate here either in exercises or at Greenham Common."[6]

However, Cruise missile bases are high on the list of Spetsnaz targets, so the Soviets will probably have agents in the area and will certainly have detailed satellite reconnaissance of every base readily available.

Spetsnaz also train HALO (High Altitude Low Opening) and HAHO (High Altitude High Opening) parachute techniques. They favour the UT-15 parachute which is a development of a civilian sporting type. During training, most jumps are done between 400 and 1,000 meters. Heavy loads can be dropped on pallets from An-12, An-22, or IL-76 aircraft. Two telescopic poles approximately four meters long hang down from the pallet and, on striking the ground, trigger a retro-rocket pack that reduces the pallet's rate of descent.

Sabotage methods. These include the use of explosives, incendiaries, acids, and abrasives. More important, since one of the Spetsnaz tasks is to spread panic behind the enemy lines, it seems likely they will make extensive use of chemical and biological agents to poison the water supplies of major cities and disable or kill large numbers of people in key areas. Biological agents placed in the New York City water supply to create acute dysentery for one week would disable one of the United States' most important centers.

Hand-to-Hand combat. "Spetsnaz seem to be obsessed with the martial arts and spend an inordinate amount of time learning Karate

[4] *New York Times*, November 4, 1986
[5] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 25, 1986, p.83.
[6] In an interview August 7, 1986.

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and Kung Fu," says one Western intelligence analyst.[7] "By contrast we do very little in that area." Silent killing is obviously an important part of their job, and the techniques are certainly taught to their Western counterparts.

Clandestine communications. Spetsnaz carry high-speed burst-capable radio transmitters and generally each unit will also have portable radio direction finding kits. These are used to locate enemy bases. As Spetsnaz are expected to operate up to 1,000 kilometers behind enemy lines, the radios they use are smaller and with longer range than those available to the regular forces.

Survival. Units are expected to survive for several weeks without resupply and are taught to live off the land.

Identifying and locating targets. Some units are now equipped with laser designators to guide in air strikes; others are trained in placing radio beacons to guide bombers.

Languages. All personnel receive training in the language and customs of the target country and every officer is expected to be fluent in at least one foreign language. Ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries may well be able to pass themselves off as native West Germans. Those whose language would not deceive native speakers might still hope to be able to fool NATO soldiers of a different nationality. It is not clear just how successful this tactic would be. In the paranoid atmosphere of a time of armed international tension, soldiers and civilians would see spies and Spetsnaz everywhere and anyone seeming out of the ordinary would be arrested. However, this would encourage uncertainty and chaos, which would be to the Soviets' advantage.

Weapons. Spetsnaz train with a wide variety of weapons, both Warsaw Pact and NATO. A large number of them will operate in civilian clothes or NATO uniforms and will carry NATO weapons and use transport common to the NATO forces. Each unit is equipped with camouflage smocks and a good range of personal equipment including folding spades, wire saws, silencers for guns, survival kit including fishing hooks and line, a compass, and maps. Each team will generally carry RPG-7 grenade launchers and perhaps anti-tank weapons, a wide range of mines and explosive devices, passive night vision devices, and target designators.

According to NATO intelligence sources, the primary targets given to Spetsnaz are listed below in the priority given to them by the Soviets themselves:

1. The physical incapacitation and, if possible, actual destruction of NATO nuclear and chemical warheads, means of delivery, and related command and control and guidance systems — both strategic

[7] In an interview in September 1986.

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(Trident and Polaris nuclear submarines) and tactical (Lance, Cruise and Pershing).

2. The interruption and disruption, from the very highest level downward, of NATO political, strategic and tactical command, control and communications elements. This includes the destruction not only of equipment and organizations (radio antennae, field headquarters, civil radio, and television stations) but also of personnel in key political and military appointments, especially those in the nuclear chain of command.

3. The physical incapacitation of some but not necessarily all electronic warning and reconnaissance equipment, radar, early warning systems, air defense equipment of all types. Even supposing they were able to destroy all such systems, some method of communicating with the enemy must remain in place to discuss such necessities as peace terms and exchanges of prisoners.

4. The capture of key airfields and ports to prevent reinforcement or redeployment, particularly by the United States; and the destruction or neutralizing (by mine or other explosives) of airfield and port facilities not required intact by the Soviet Union, and of railway and key road junctions important in mobilization plans.

5. The disruption of such key industrial targets and facilities as power stations, oil refineries, and military-electronics industries.

6. The destruction of troops in garrisons.

7. The destruction of logistic installations, e.g., fuel supply terminals and fuel and ammunition dumps.

8. The destruction and interruption of transport systems, traffic control posts, road and rail intersections, bridges and tunnels.

9. The seizure of dropping zones and tactical landing zones for subsequent larger landings.

10. The seizure of key areas of terrain — river and coastal bridgeheads, defiles, commanding ground, canal sluice and lock gates, bridges — essential for the continuation of a rapid advance by enemy forces.

11. The capture of prisoners for interrogation and of documents or items of equipment for examination and intelligence gathering.

Soviet military doctrine has a single concept, known as Desant, of putting troops behind enemy lines. While this may include the use of regular airborne forces, which mirror their Western counterparts, it is more likely that Desant forces will mainly be composed of Spetsnaz.

Though directly commanded by the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), the Spetsnaz are organized as follows:

a. Army. Each army has an independent company of 110-120 men.

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b. Front. Each Military District and Group Soviet Forces Germany has an SPF brigade with a fighting strength of 1,000-1,300 men and its own intelligence unit. Unlike their Western counterparts who rely on centrally organized intelligence, each front runs its own agents in enemy territory and is therefore able to work up-to-date intelligence directly into their own tactical plans.

c. Fleet. Each fleet has a naval SPF, although very little is known about their tactics apart from their apparent use of midget submarines (see below).

d. Strategic. Spetsnaz regiments of between 700-800 men are directly subordinated to the GRU central apparatus. These are both pure intelligence-gathering units and units that will engage in offensive action.

e. Warsaw Pact. Each non-Soviet army in the Warsaw Pact has its own special forces of around 800 men.

f. KGB. Although strictly an intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence organization, the KGB's Department 8 does have units trained for special forces work. It is believed they will mainly carry out assassinations of senior political and military figures.

g. Fifth Columns. Unconventional warfare operations in target countries are supported by large agent networks that fall into two basic categories: Intelligence gathering networks active in peacetime provide details on the enemy's order of battle, equipment, plans and any other details that might provide a tactical advantage. They are primarily KGB although the GRU are specifically tasked with gathering intelligence on technological developments in the West. Second, intelligence and sabotage agents are recruited and controlled by Spetsnaz to provide target information during peacetime; in the event of war, they will offer safe houses which may also house pre-dropped arms and explosives.

Spetsnaz in Action

Accounts of Soviet special forces in action are extremely rare. There have been defectors, but these still remain closely controlled by Western intelligence services. The only recent account of Spetsnaz training appeared in the Soviet Union in a paper written by Evgeny Mesyatser and was translated into English by the Soviet Studies Centre at Sandhurst. It is worth quoting at length as it gives a fascinating first-hand account of training, techniques, likely targets and equipment.[8]

Day One. We get up and turn to face the distant space below us. Our hands grip the strings controlling the parachutes. The green light — we are off . . .

[8] Evgeny Mesyatser, special correspondent of *Smena*, "Parachute Drop Reconnaissance Deep Behind Enemy Lines," translated in 1973.

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The grey and yellow dome obscures one half of the sky. . . . The ground is not more than 500m away — one can see a forest with some cuttings in it and a stream. One hundred metres. The air current has unfurled the parachute and I now descend with my back towards the ground. . . . A rough blow below the belt, a headstand, a somersault, a fall on a moss-covered hummock and I am being dragged towards the edge of the clearing. . . . We run into the forest leaving the space open for those who jump after us. They crash into the tall grass or slide off the trees. "Secure your weapons. . . . Check your haversack."

The loaf of white bread and two hefty tins of stewed meat and some fish have to be tucked away further so that they do not press against one's back. Poncho, camsuit jacket, spare footcloths, mess tin, spoon, a small net, hooks, a fishing line, matches, a wire-saw, packets of explosives, cartridges, a torch, bandages, cotton wool and tubes of disinfecting tablets have to be placed in separate sections of the kit bag. The flask of water, the folding spade, the small axe are hitched on to the belt. On the right hip — the pistol. We also have AKMs with silencers; a machine-gun, two RPG-7s; two radio sets and a set of batteries, a set of flares, magnetic and other mines, special instruments and devices for their destruction.

Silently we go through the dark forest leaving hardly any traces behind. The air is stuffy and humid. The mosquitos sing their boring tune, dry twigs crack softly under foot. In fifteen hours we have to cover more than 50 kilometres.

Day Two. The devil himself would not find our new hiding place. Each one of us has his own position; a fallen tree, an uprooted tree stump, a thick alder grove, a willow thicket. A dull ache of cramp in my feet, the soles have swollen and are burning; I have no strength to get up.

At three in the morning we come out of the wood on to a sandy cart track. We pass a village; a cock crows, dogs whine, a cow breathes heavily. Suddenly people are heard and the unit's scout imitates the call of a quail as a signal for the group to hide off the trail. We then approach a guard post . . . Safety catches on the AKMs are off, the RPGs have been loaded . . .

Dawn is breaking. We move stealthily along the bottom of an overgrown gully in the direction of the guard who is whistling in a low key. When he becomes silent we hold our breath. A twig cracks loudly on the other side of the road — this is the work of Korchagin. The guard has raised his AKM. As if shot forward on a spring, Glotov dashed from behind a bush. Vashurkin hurls himself at the feet of the enemy soldier, seizes him by the knees and with a shoulder hits him below the belt. One huge hand closes the mouth and holds back his head. The other hand grabs his throat — Glotov at once gags him.

I am looking at this lad — information is pouring from him like water from a tap. . . . Glotov seems to be reading my thoughts; "according to the rules of training, the prisoner of war should play the game. . . . If the 'enemy' captures me, my part has come to an end and I will have to answer all their questions . . ."

Glotov is preparing a raid against the battery. We cover the 400 metres in one swift movement. The caterpillar truck is standing by the wattle hurdle on the edge of the village; four men leap like cats into the cab, grab the driver who seems to have gone mad and pin him to the ground, and Glotov and I look for the Major. He was stretched out blissfully under the vehicle in a sleeping bag. The Major wakes up, raises his hands and then quickly turns over on to his stomach and tries to reach his belt. The Lieutenant kicks the belt away with the toe of his boot.

So far we are lucky. . . . We have a good rest on the bank of the stream in the wood. In the stream there is a lot of fish and crayfish but they are not for us. We must be ready at all times either to defend ourselves or to carry out a raid. At the end of the day, we study mines of various types, we are reminded how to make the

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simplest form of detonating fuse and how to obtain from almost nothing a powerful igniting fuse or blasting charge. The first drops of rain fall on our weapons.

Day Three. For some time now we had been soaked to the skin; our boots swelled with water and felt like penitentiary chains. Huddling against the pine trees and the aspens, hopping mad with anger, we curse goodness knows whom for the fact that no waterproof tobacco has been invented specially for us . . .

Towards three in the morning the rain abated. A warm wind woke up; the forest began to rustle, to whisper and to creak. The new sounds made it difficult for us to hear the birds which warn us of danger. The lead scout gave the signal: Stop . . .

A burst of automatic fire from behind. We throw ourselves to the ground grabbing our weapons as we do so. Gunfire from both right and left — an ambush. Glotov shouts the words of command: Do not return fire. We run through the wood and then towards the stream. We make our way through the marshy ground holding our weapons and the blasting charges above our heads; four or five kilometres along the sandy bottom of the stream will definitely cover up our traces. At last Glotov looks at the map for the hundredth time and orders us to make camp. I immediately sink into oblivion.

Reveille at half past seven. I have a headache: it is a bad thing to sleep at sunset. The radio operators intercepted an enemy radio transmitter. The portable direction finders are tuned into enemy signals. The indicator points at the village — some ten kilometres from us. It is precisely in the place that our air reconnaissance had seen the traces of caterpillar tracks. There is no reason for tanks to be there. Are they rockets? Perhaps there are artillery dumps near the village?

We reached the area of particular attention at 23.15 hours.

Day Four. In the village everything is quiet and peaceful. To avoid all risks we go round it by way of garden allotments and on the moist clay of the road we soon find the expected traces of caterpillar tracks. They lead us to a solitary barrier with an iron notice board: Out of Bounds. From here stretch two lines of barbed wire, watchtowers, several long, low vaults. Dumps. Their walls and roofs are covered with camouflage patterns — this is why our pilots found nothing here except those tracks.

The AKM's bayonet and its scabbard are converted into a pair of cutters with which we hack through the barbed wire. Three sappers equipped with a blasting charge move to the other side of the fence. The remainder of us take aim at the watchtowers with our weapons. Forty minutes later the sappers return with empty hands. . . . Powerful mines will go off activated by a radio signal which will be passed on to the detonators at the right moment by our distant headquarters.

Day Five. The anxious morning brings with it low cloud and drizzle. The water reserves are exhausted and we are forced to drink the tasteless rainwater which drips from the stretched surface of the ponchos. And then Glotov thinks up something else for us to do. How to recognize a minefield quickly, how to cross it without leaving any traces and how to make the enemy fall into its own trap. And then a show begins. Two men throw a third one into the air. He makes a somersault and just before reaching the ground and landing on his feet or falling into the mud, he fires a cartridge clip on to a target. They are doing the same using knives and sapper's spades . . .

The exercise continues for another twenty days as the unit scouts an army camp and an airfield, relaying the information it gathers back to headquarters in advance of a major assault.

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Another account, this time of a winter exercise, comes from a Soviet defector, Aleksei Myagkov, who served both in Spetsnaz and in the KGB.[9]

Once the sabotage group that I commanded was ordered to take part in an exercise which involved being dropped by parachute in the woods of Belorussia some 400 km from our base to destroy the opposition's communications centre, even if it were to cost the lives of the whole group to do so. The group was then to destroy two railway bridges, start a forest fire, attack some population centres and make its own way back to base. The targets were guarded by motorized infantry, and, of course, we were forbidden to cause any casualties during the exercise. It was winter and we had to cover some 800 km on skis.

We were allowed 24 hours to prepare for our mission and were issued with special explosives, incendiary materials and radio equipment; the latter known as the radiogram is able to shoot the message to the centre in just eight to ten seconds. Our machine-guns were designed to fire silently and without showing flashes. We were issued with dry rations for three days, but on my order took only enough for one day in order to carry more ammunition. We paid particular attention to the skis which were to be dropped separately in protective wrapping containing a small radio transmitter.

Each paratrooper carried a tiny receiver which emitted a homing signal in his earphones when he faced the transmitter so that the group could assemble as quickly as possible on landing. Using models and maps we planned our operation down to the last detail, including contingency plans for possible problems such as the transmitter failing to function.

The night of the operation was dark and cloudy and snow was falling thickly. At 10 p.m. we jumped from the aircraft and fifteen minutes later the whole group had assembled, looking like ghosts in their white camouflage. By 1 a.m. we had covered the 18 km to our target. The six guards were easily overpowered and tied up. The doors and windows of the barracks were booby-trapped with quantities of explosives sufficient to give a nasty fright to the twenty men inside without causing injuries. At the same time, mines were planted on the communications building. We could hear the explosions as we set off. By midday we had covered about 70 km and, concealed among the trees, slept for four hours, lying in pairs for greater warmth.

We continued to operate at night and sleep during the day, stealing provisions from the peasants until we had carried out all our tasks. At one time we were spotted from the air and were soon surrounded by ground troops who were gradually tightening the noose around us. We decided to seize an armoured troop carrier from the opposition to escape from the closing ring of troops, but these normally carried 10-15 men — too many to be easily overpowered by our small group. We waited for a command vehicle, which usually carries only two or three men. When one appeared, a soldier dressed in clothes stolen from a peasant waved it to a halt. When the officer got out to investigate, we seized him, his driver, and the armoured vehicle in which we then made our escape and returned to our base, looking more like unshaven forest bandits than regular soldiers.

[9] Aleksei Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage Training for World War III," in *Soviet Analyst*, December 20, 1979, pp.2-6.

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Spetsnaz at Sea

Western intelligence organizations concentrate their assessments and analysis on the threat posed by Soviet Spetsnaz operating on land. This in part is because so much more is known about them and because they operate in much larger numbers, and in part because the threat is easier to recognize. However, the Soviets have also invested men and equipment in developing and training a naval surface and sub-surface threat. Like their Western counterparts, the naval Spetsnaz are expected to carry out acts of sabotage and disruption against coastal targets, including civilian ports and military installations.

Examples of their training techniques are hard to come by. The most recent and detailed training over the past ten years seems to have occurred in the waters off Sweden and Norway. Spetsnaz operations first came to the attention of the world's press with the grounding of a Whisky class submarine on the rocks outside the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona in October 1981. This episode, inevitably dubbed Whisky on the Rocks by the media, was just the latest in a long series of violations of Swedish territorial waters.[10]

Exactly a year later the wake and periscope of another submarine were spotted by two Swedish soldiers inside the Stockholm archipelago. Helicopters and patrol boats immediately gathered in the area and there was sufficient evidence of sonar contacts for an extensive hunt to be launched. Over the next month, the full resources of the Swedish navy and air force were brought to bear; depth charges, mines and torpedoes were used against possible targets. On October 5, following the dropping of twelve depth charges, air bubbles and an oil slick came to the surface but no boat followed them.

The search was abandoned at the beginning of November 1982. As a result of sonar evidence and a search of the sea bottom by divers, the Swedish government is convinced that six submarines were involved, three of which were midgets. The divers reported that two different types of midget submarines had been used. One had two propellers and a reinforced keel; when it had moved off from resting on the bottom, the wash from its propellers had disturbed the sand and left distinct marks. The second type had a single propeller and twin caterpiller tracks to enable it to crawl along the bottom.

The Swedish government's report of the incident concluded that one conventional submarine, acting as a mother ship, had been sent to operate with its mini-sub in the middle of the Stockholm archi-

[10] The most detailed account of Spetsnaz operations in the Baltic comes in a study for the U.S. Department of Defense: Lynn M. Hansen, *Soviet Navy Spetsnaz Operations on the Northern Flank: Implications for the Defense of Western Europe,* The Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University, April 1984, no. SS84-2.

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pelago. After decoupling from its mother ship, the mini-sub had penetrated the inner archipelago.

This mini-sub made its way into Stockholm harbor during the last week of September; the mother ship returned to a holding area near Sandham, where it was later to reconnect with the mini-sub (this mother ship was observed during the evening of October 4 near Sand Island, where it was attacked with a depth charge); then, after the mini-sub rejoined the mother ship, both vessels left the area during the second week in October.

The other two mini-subs and their mother ships had missions in the southern area of the archipelago; on October 1 both mini-subs entered the area of Haarsfjaerden: one submarine left a week later and the other, which might have been damaged, was picked up by its mother ship on October 12.[11]

Dozens of further sightings off the coasts of both Sweden and Norway have since occurred. But despite improvements in sonar and anti-submarine weapons made by both the Swedish and Norwegian navies, there have been no successful attacks. This has puzzled analysts in the United States and Britain who have looked in vain from defectors and other sources for confirmation of Spetsnaz activity in the area. "We cannot be specific about Spetsnaz involvement," says one Western intelligence analyst. "Certainly the Swedes are convinced."

Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, it seems logical that the Soviets would regularly practice sub-surface attacks in the Baltic. Their own war plans place a great deal of emphasis on securing Norway in the early stages of any war, so that they can control NATO's northern flank. A key to that operation would be the disruption of port facilities in order to make reinforcement more difficult. Soviet exercises around neutral Sweden are less easy to explain, but it is possible that the Soviets calculate that if they ever attacked Norway, the Swedes would shelve their neutrality and join NATO. With a capable navy, NATO could pose a serious threat to Soviet naval forces, particularly to Russian submarines, which would be trying to break out through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap to control the North Sea and the Atlantic.

Tracks identical to those found in Swedish waters have also been discovered off Japan. In September 1984 divers found tracks within three miles of the Hokkaido coast in the Soya and Tsugaru straits. These are two of the three straits through which Soviet warships based at Vladivostock must pass in order to reach the Pacific Ocean. There have also been reports of midget submarines operating off the coast of Alaska close to the oil terminals.[12]

[11] Ibid., pp. 20-21.
[12] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, September 15, 1984, p.435, and intelligence sources.

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On the basis of the information gathered from these incidents, the naval Spetsnaz units apparently have two principal targets: carried in pairs on the hulls of specially converted India class submarines, the midget submarines with two propellers will infiltrate ports and naval bases to plant mines and destroy ships and facilities. The midget submarines with tracked keels will be used either to cut or tap communications cables on the bottom of the ocean.[13]

Inevitably, the Soviets will not limit their attentions to Sweden and Norway. They will also target vital installations such as the British nuclear submarine base at Holy Loch in Scotland, the Norfolk, Virginia, headquarters of CINCLANT [British commander in chief Atlantic Fleet], and Cherbourg, a key port for the reinforcement of Europe by the United States. And yet, apart from Sweden and Norway who have both invested substantial sums in the past five years re-equipping their navies with a more effective anti-submarine warfare capability, no country appears to take this threat seriously. Instead, the West's focus has been on land-based Spetsnaz operations, or on detecting the larger Soviet submarines which operate in mid-ocean. This is a serious omission. There is little point in protecting land bases if the communications and supplies going to those bases remain vulnerable to a different form of surprise attack.

Western Defenses

The most comprehensive testing of Western defenses against Spetsnaz attack occurred in the autumn of 1985, when 65,000 British troops took part in Exercise Brave Defender designed to test Britain's defenses against Spetsnaz operations. The nationwide exercise for the first time involved the police and civil authorities along with U.S. forces based in Britain. Eight thousand troops were infiltrated from Germany to act as the enemy, while SAS [Special Air Services] and SBS [Special Boat Services] troops attempted to penetrate defenses to key buildings and sensitive bases.

The exercise showed up serious weaknesses in Britain's defenses. Almost all the targets attacked by the SAS and SBS were successfully penetrated, detection and surveillance equipment for early detection of intruders was not available in many cases, and the 2,500 Home Guard units were too few to do an effective job — particularly as in wartime it is unlikely that reinforcements from regular units would be available. The British government has agreed to increase the Home Guard force to 5,000 men, but some senior officers believe this is still only a fraction of the numbers required.

[13] An interesting analysis of Soviet midget submarine capability appears in Captain J.E. Moore and Commander R. Compton-Hall, *Submarine Warfare Today and Tomorrow* (London: Michael Joseph, 1986), pp.222-29.

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General Sir James Glover, the commander-in-chief of United Kingdom Land Forces, reported that the Soviets had tried to penetrate Brave Defender. The number of Warsaw Pact cargo and fishing vessels off the British coast rose from a seasonal average of forty to seventy-six, and it proved impossible to keep track of the Soviet sailors coming ashore on leave. (This illustrates a situation very worrying to allied intelligence. In Britain, for example, 40,000 Soviet seamen come into the United Kingdom each year. They do not require visas and are seldom checked.)

"Obviously in time of tension we must regard Soviet merchant ships as an extension of the Russian Navy right inside our ports," said Glover. "We must now consider that, apart from mining, there could be pre-arranged scuttling at exits and entrances to strategic harbours. Surveillance could have gleaned valuable information about the way local army units and the police would respond to Spetsnaz intruders."[14]

Serious gaps were exposed also in the defenses around nuclear power stations, both during Brave Defender and in a series of other exercises carried out over the past three years. The SAS and the SBS are used to test nuclear security and, as a result of their demonstrations, it had been decided to increase the number of guards and install a wide range of sophisticated detection devices.

A more comprehensive approach to attacks on nuclear facilities is taken in the United States. In 1973, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency commissioned a study to examine the risks of a Soviet paramilitary attack on U.S. nuclear forces on the American mainland. The report is still secret but one of the conclusions points out:

> The possibility of moving paramilitary units through Mexico, into the United States and to their targets, without detection, seems serious when one considers the limited effectiveness of the US internal security forces in stopping illegal traffic in aliens and narcotics. The probability of a paramilitary unit being detected or captured prior to the attack could be further minimised by maintaining the independence of the units and limiting their interaction with each other and with the US populace. The usual procedure of limiting the detailed knowledge of any unit to that required for performance of its precise mission would severely constrain the information that might be obtained from a paramilitary unit, which might in turn be interrogated by US authorities. A judicious choice of the time and conditions for the attack . . . would further reduce the credibility of any defecting or captured unit. In addition, the Soviets would probably delay and confuse any US reaction by disguising the attack under a cloak of US terrorist or fanatic activity. As a result it might be weeks before the US could establish the credibility required to take serious action. . . . We conclude that the threat of a Soviet paramilitary attack on the US and NATO nuclear forces may be comparable to the threat of direct nuclear attack.[15]

[14] *Military Technology*, June 1986, p.69; *Defense Week*, March 25, 1985, p.13; *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

[15] L.G. Gref, A.L. Latter, E.A. Martinelli and H.P. Smith, *A Soviet Paramilitary Attack on U.S. Nuclear Forces — A Concept*, DARPA project No.048-4S-13665, November 1974, pp.2-1, 2-2.

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Ironically, it was the civilian nuclear authorities that responded most strongly to this and to other reports that sounded the same clear warning. The U.S. Department of Energy has a $700 million budget for safeguarding nuclear weapons and facilities under its control and employs 4,500 guards. Many of these men are former Strategic Offensive Forces and are armed with equipment that ranges from armored cars, through sophisticated perimeter defense, to surface-to-air missiles. These are in fact required if a nuclear facility is to receive an operating license from the government. They are constantly tested by private firms who use ex-Delta Force and SEALs in actual operational conditions.

According to the commander in chief of the United States Readiness Command, "We do not have a single soldier, airman, or sailor solely dedicated to the security mission within the US."

Nevertheless, the ability of the U.S. armed forces themselves to deal with an unconventional threat on the American mainland remains weak. During World War I, 100,000 men were used to protect vital facilities, and during World War II, 300,000 men. Today, as General Wallace H. Nutting, the commander in chief of the United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM) has made clear: "We do not have a single soldier, airman, or sailor solely dedicated to the security mission within the US. I question the advisability of this practice."[16]

The lack of resources is not because the nature of the threat is misunderstood. "The current assessment of the land threat . . . is that posed by the Soviet Union's unconventional warfare forces, Soviet doctrine calls for forces to operate far behind enemy lines for extended periods of time and to be capable of operating throughout an enemy's homeland. These forces are composed of KGB infiltration teams, possibly in-place agents and . . . Spetsnaz. Soviet unconventional warfare forces are tasked to perform acts of sabotage and assassination deep in the enemy's base. Additionally, land infiltration could become a future concern along the porous US-Mexican border. . . . These infiltration teams and in-place agents could be targeted against key command and control centers, nuclear capable assets, critical lines of communication and other targets critical to their war effort. Their overall goal would be to degrade or destroy the US war-waging capability."[17]

[16] Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington D.C., March 1, 1985.
[17] Ibid.

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Even so, although the increased threat posed by Spetsnaz has been used in part as a justification for the revitalization of U.S. special forces, there has still been no serious attempt to educate either military or civilian agencies in the dangers posed by unconventional warfare on the American mainland. All the training that currently goes on is directed at countering terrorism, and while many Spetsnaz techniques are similar to those used by terrorists, these men will be better trained and should have a much higher success rate.

Soviet strategy places considerable emphasis on surprise and a quick victory. In previous campaigns, for example the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, Spetsnaz were used to cripple the chain of command and secure key targets such as radio stations and centers of government. It is likely that any Soviet attack will use the same proven and successful tactics again.

There remains, therefore, a serious gap in U.S. defense which the Soviets must have discovered. This gap is acknowledged by senior U.S. military officers, but few believe anything will ever be done to plug it. In the constant trade-off between cash and resources, the money will always go on the front-line projects that have a high profile — the new fighter, tank, or state-of-the-art electronics. Guarding the rear is low profile and, until the shooting starts, of no demonstrable benefit. The United States has yet to experience a major attack on its territory either from terrorism or during any conflict since the Civil War. But in World War III the American mainland will be a prime target, and the short-sighted approach to defending the home territory currently being demonstrated by the service chiefs could prove critical to America's ability to fight that war.

As far as Europe is concerned, Western war planners assume that there will be a period of international tension that may last days or even weeks before World War III actually breaks out. The "bolt from the blue" scenario which envisions a pre-emptive nuclear strike or massive surprise conventional invasion of Europe is actually considered the least likely eventuality. But it is during this time of tension that Spetsnaz forces will convert their training to action, and the focus of their attacks will be on undermining the morale of the armed forces and the civilian population. Two likely methods will be the comprehensive use of chemical and biological agents to disrupt the civilian population, and widespread bombings and assassinations which will be conveniently blamed on indigenous terrorist groups. At the same time, agents in place in trade unions, the civil service and the armed forces will be activated to cause maximum disruption.

"The whole security system in NATO will become so overloaded that it will break down," said one intelligence officer. "Even when they fail in a mission they will still spread rumor and lower morale. It is a very cost-effective method of waging war." The timing of

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Spetsnaz operations will be critical. If they occur too soon, the value of surprise will be lost; too late and their effect will be insufficient. There is disagreement among intelligence analysts as to exactly when Spetsnaz forces will begin infiltrating, but some experts believe they will move in up to a week before hostilities break out. As one senior NATO intelligence officer puts it: "We have intelligence as well as deduction that brings us to question the Soviet Union's capacity for surprise. If you are going to have a preparatory program of sabotage, how then can you keep surprise for the main attack?"

If Spetsnaz should begin their attacks too early, the NATO allies already have a sophisticated warning system in place that should sound the alarm. For example, there is a list of key NATO officials, such as heads of intelligence and those in the nuclear chain of command, whose disappearance would trigger the system. It seems likely that industrial action and sporadic acts of "terrorism" might occur some days before the outbreak of war in a limited attempt to disrupt reinforcements. But the real campaign would happen during a very compressed few hours just before the Warsaw Pact moved its troops forward on the Central Front.

By using Spetsnaz simultaneously throughout the NATO alliance, the Soviets will hope so to create panic and undermine morale that NATO's ability to repel a massive Soviet attack will be severely reduced.

As with all Soviet plans, it is helpful to look at the past to get an idea of what they might do in the future. Students of Spetsnaz operations repeatedly cite the Manchurian Operation against the Japanese in August 1945. At the start of that operation, the theater commander deployed some twenty airborn assaults, each of between thirty and forty men. The troops were dropped close to Manchurian cities with the task of causing as much disruption as possible by sabotage and raids against strategic points, and military and industrial targets. At the same time, boats landed small teams of frogmen in North Korea with responsibility for disrupting ports through sabotages and diversions. The teams did not achieve a significant level of destruction in the Japanese rear — but they did create panic among the authorities, which greatly increased the effect of the massive surprise attack that followed shortly after.

As one NATO intelligence assessment puts it: "We consider this is a valid historical model for the initial employment of diversionary troops in any future war. The actual damage that a small team of

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men could accomplish might, with luck on their side, be moderate but would probably only be slight. However, the shock to national morale of an attack made on, say, the Ministries of Defense in Bonn, the Hague or London, or of the assassination in their own homes of senior politicians, industrialists, financiers etc. in the very first hours of the war would be disproportionally great in comparison to the small cost of attempting such an operation."

The window of opportunity available to Spetsnaz is narrow enough to have provoked debate among the allies as to how effective they will really be. In the British army, for example, General Jimmy Glover believes Spetsnaz could do immense damage and has consistently argued for greater home defense. His background entitles him to some respect, as he served in Malaya, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland where he gained considerable experience in dealing with terrorism and unconventional warfare.

However, other senior officers disagree with him. As one of them said: "In terms of capability there is a reasonable risk of Soviet Special Forces (SPF) threatening vital installations. But it is easy to exaggerate the amount of penetration the KGB and the GRU can do in peacetime. You have to ask yourself just how these people will get here. Will they land by submarine on the Norfolk coast and hike inland, or will they drop in by parachute? And when they are here just how much can they achieve? It just isn't as easy as all that."

Opinions within the intelligence community in fact only really differ in degree. Everyone recognizes that Spetsnaz form a vital part of the Soviets' preparations for war. By using them simultaneously throughout the NATO alliance, the Soviets will hope so to create panic and undermine morale that NATO's ability to repel a massive Soviet attack will be severely reduced. Of course, the opposite also applies. If the allies develop sufficient resources to defend the home territory against Spetsnaz attacks and if these therefore fail, then allied morale will be unaffected — and that would have a considerable deterrent effect on the Warsaw Pact planners, and in their eyes would lessen the likelihood of a swift resolution of the war.

Intelligence assessments suggest that in a long conventional war the Warsaw Pact would swiftly disintegrate, leaving the Soviets to fight on their own. Isolated and with very extended lines of communication, they would have considerable difficulties and would either resort to nuclear weapons or sue for peace. The performance of Spetsnaz could therefore prove critical to the course of any conventional war in Europe.

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On Afghanistan:
The allegations made against the Afghan government in Michael Johns' [POLICY REVIEW] article . . . have been repeatedly made against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and her historic and trusted friend, the Soviet Union. *M. Sharif Yaqubi, Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington Times*

On Angola:
Savimbi's strategy, as he outlines in POLICY REVIEW, is . . . "to raise the costs of the foreign occupation of Angola until the Cubans and the Soviets can no longer bear the burden." *Norman Podhoretz, Washington Post*

On Israel:
Israel gains "convert" in Christian rightist—Helms. Jesse's alternative, spelled out in POLICY REVIEW, was for the United States to "face up to the fact that aid to Israel is essentially a defense cost." *Wolf Blitzer, New York Jewish Week*

On Arms Control:
In POLICY REVIEW, Richard Pipes [stated that arms control] "negotiations have been a failure," Irving Kristol asserted the negotiations "have only benefited the Soviet Union," [and] Richard Perle stated . . . "I don't think the negotiations have helped us in the main." *George Ball, New York Review of Books*

On the Conservative Movement:
POLICY REVIEW . . . is the organ of the Heritage Foundation—the brain center of the most extreme reaction. *Pravda*

On Robertson:
Pat Robertson made the first extensive airing of his foreign policy views in an article in POLICY REVIEW. *Miami Herald*

On Balancing the Budget:
[Compared with George Bush] Jack Kemp has been getting off a bit easy. Now he's surfaced with an article in POLICY REVIEW entitled "My Plan to Balance the Budget." *Michael Kinsley, Wall Street Journal*

On Crime and Poverty:
In the days when decent people used to worry about the "roots of crime," a lot of us were convinced that one of the chief causes of crime was poverty. . . . James K. Stewart, writing in POLICY REVIEW, has turned the idea on its head. Crime, he says, causes poverty. *William Raspberry, Washington Post*

On Rock Politics:
Charlton Heston told POLICY REVIEW magazine: "This may sound snobbish, but the intellectual level of rock musicians is not to be envied." *People Magazine*

On Gas Prices:
[Once there were] widespread predictions that gasoline prices would rise to more than two dollars a gallon. POLICY REVIEW has published a large collection . . . of such predictions. It should be required reading. *Thomas Sowell*

On Liberal Schizophrenia:
POLICY REVIEW . . . managing editor Dinesh D'Souza . . . scorches THE NEW REPUBLIC for "a squid-like cloud of rhetoric" on difficult social issues. "It's no use accusing TNR of schizophrenia—the editors take it as a compliment," he writes. *Washington Post*

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WILL *GLASNOST* BRING THE REACTIONARIES TO POWER?

by Aron Katsenelinboigen

Is *glasnost* a good thing? Even to raise the question is surprising. Most Soviet specialists see the policy of *glasnost* — greater freedom and fewer political pressures — as unquestionably a positive development, both for the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Against it stand only the bureaucrats who want to retain the secure life to which they grew accustomed during the twenty years of Leonid Brezhnev's rule.

If that analysis is correct, certainly, then the vehicle of *glasnost* is a good thing. But is the analysis correct? I wish to suggest it is not. The situation in Russia is not a dichotomy — Mikhail Gorbachev vs. advocates of the status quo — but a trichotomy. Specifically, we need to include in our understanding of Russia another large and important group — the reactionaries.

Reactionaries should not be thought of as extreme members of the conservative anti-*glasnost* camp. The two groups are quite different. Conservatives strive to preserve the status quo, while reactionaries seek to change it. In this respect, reactionaries more closely resemble liberals, and one resemblance is the ability of both to make use of *glasnost*.

The opening of Soviet life currently taking place offers opportunities to all groups seeking change. But whereas the liberal seeks to open society, the reactionary pushes for a chauvinistic, authoritarian, and even dictatorial regime. Given Russia's past, it seems likely that reactionaries will exploit these opportunities more successfully than liberals. If their endeavors succeed, the result will be a regime even more repressive, and possibly more aggressive, than the present one. Including reactionism in the equation thus leads to the conclusion that the more widely and rapidly the policy of *glasnost* is implemented, the greater the danger it poses to the Soviet Union and to the world.

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The Legacy of Russian Nationalism

This perverse reading of apparently good news is well-founded in history, for, *mutatis mutandis*, much the same pattern has occurred in other countries. An opening of the political process often creates opportunities for the forces of reaction — be they of the left or right, nationalist or sectarian, tribal or ethnic. In several African states, the parliamentary democracy that followed colonial rule unleashed the lethal politics of tribalism. In Iran, reform elements helped bring down the shah — yet the Iranian Revolution brought the arch-reactionary Ayatollah Khomeini to power. And the tsar was brought down not by Communists but by the bourgeois-liberal revolution of February 1917. The Bolsheviks then exploited the freedoms of that regime to re-introduce a much harsher rule.

In the case of the Soviet Union today, however, some observers hold that nationalist tendencies, far from being a danger, offer the salvation of the country. "Because the Russian nation's self-interest lies in liberalization," this reasoning goes, "a nationalist Russia, after throwing off the shackles of communist doctrine, would gradually adopt that course. In this way, moderate Russian nationalism would combine with liberalism." No doubt, an appreciable number of moderate nationalists do live in the Soviet Union, and do believe that Russia would benefit from political liberalism. But the question is: will such moderates be listened to in a time, like the present, of deep stagnation?

Evidence of this stagnation is so overwhelming, that one might say everything is an example. Even the official press has offered evidence, and so has Gorbachev himself. In a June 25, 1987, speech to the Central Committee, Gorbachev acknowledged that the economic system is on the eve of a crisis. "History," he said, "has not left us much time to solve this task." It should be understood that Gorbachev's problem is neither short-range nor cyclical (such as a depression in the West); rather, it is nothing less than national exhaustion — the depletion of natural resources in populated areas due to barbaric methods of exploitation, the squandering and malinvestment of capital over decades, scientific and technical backwardness, and destruction of the population's health and morale. After seventy years, the time has come to pay the piper.

Typically, in such a time of debilitation and despair, moderates do not come to the fore: radicals do. Moderate nationalists, who might align with reformers, tend to become allies of the chauvinists, attracted as they are by the latters' ideals and resolve. This is what happened in Germany when Hitler came to power and it may happen in the Soviet Union, a country with strong militarist and nationalist traditions. If *glasnost* continues to develop, reactionaries will probably exploit it more than reformers. The former enjoy the sympathies

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of the Russian masses and, as extremists, they will probably act more decisively than the reformers. The tide of nationalism is rising under *glasnost,* and the forces of reaction have a real hope of playing a significant role in the Soviet future.

In pursuing this thesis, I would like to look at three topics: the fate of Russian nationalism under communism; the recent reactivation of Russian nationalism under *glasnost*; and the dynamics by which Russian nationalists might come to dominate Soviet politics.

From Nationalism to Communism — and Back

In the nineteenth century, Russian nationalism took a number of forms, official and popular. For our purposes, most important was the Russophile movement that began early in the century, as a branch of the Slavophile movement. Initially, the Russophile movement opposed both the Western ideas of democracy, rationalism, and individualism as well as the despotism, political idolatry, and nationalism of official Russia. Instead, it stood for paternalistic authoritarianism, true faith, and communalism. By the 1870s, however, Russophiles came to emphasize the need for the unification of the Slavic world under Russian auspices, and postponed their spiritual goals until that unity had been achieved. According to their main ideologue, Nikolai Danilevskii, the essence of Russophilism "consisted in the view that Russia could only fulfill her historical mission after transforming herself into a giant superpower."[1] In its third generation, at the beginning of the twentieth century, "It proved to be so easy for 'the folk first in the world' [the Russians] to discard not only the Slavophile but also the Pan-Slavic mask. And behind that mask turned out to be the naked drive for world hegemony."[2]

According to many accounts, the Russophile drive for power was interrupted by the October Revolution, resurrected by Stalin during World War II, and then continued by him into the postwar period. In this writer's view, however, the nationalist tradition was never interrupted. Only its strength and forms varied.

Clearly, Lenin preserved the tsarist empire, though he justified it with the new slogans of communism. Under his rule, the universalist concept of the "permanent revolution" yielded to the nationalist concept of "socialism in one country." The first phrase meant that, for the sake of world communism, even Russia might be sacrificed; the second meant that world communism could be achieved only under Russia's leadership.

Even early in his rule, Stalin used the term "Russian" where a communist leader would logically have said "Soviet." In 1930, for

[1] Quoted by Alexander Yanov, *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 34.
[2] Ibid., p. 41.

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instance, he damned the poet Dem'ian Bedny for "slandering and defiling the Russian proletariat," at a time when the workers of the world were "applauding the *Russian* working class, which they acknowledge as their leader."[3] The emphasis is Stalin's. Well before World War II, Stalin turned to nationalism for legitimacy. *Pravda* sounded the new appeal on June 9, 1934, with a call "For the Fatherland!" The newspaper went on: "That cry kindles the flame of heroism, the flame of creative initiative in all fields. . . . For the fatherland, for its honor, glory, might, and prosperity!" Two years later, according to Merle Fainsod, "nationalist historians were recalled and restored to their posts. The new history sought to establish the Soviet regime as the custodian of national interests. It celebrated tsarist military victories and territorial expansion, taught pride in Russia's achievements and the accomplishments of her great men."[4] Nationalist propaganda blossomed during the war against Germany and remained in place for the rest of Stalin's rule; toward the end of his life, it was joined with an ever-widening campaign of anti-Semitism.

After Stalin's death, Russian nationalist propaganda lost favor, replaced first by Khrushchev's giddy utopianism and then by Brezhnev's all-encompassing cynicism. But its foundations remained, and nationalists created new organizations. In Brezhnev's time, they hid behind the slogan "preserve the treasures of Russia's past," an unarguable position, especially as historical treasures were falling into ruin. But the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical Treasures, based in a church on Kalininsky Prospect, quickly turned into a nationalist and anti-Semitic organization.

As early as 1969, the prominent Soviet historian and publicist Alexander Yanov first noticed, and warned against this new, intellectual Russophilism. He opened the discussion with an article entitled "The Riddle of Slavophile Criticism," published in *Voprosy Literatury*.[5] Yanov showed that the nineteenth-century Slavophile movement was initially liberal; but the failure to achieve liberal reform drove the movement to chauvinism and reaction, by much the same process of "transfer" we are witnessing today. Yanov also called attention to the new Russophiles such as the prominent literary critic Vadim Kozhinov. In 1975, at a time when few people had grasped Solzhenitsyn's philosophy, Yanov pointed out that author's evolution toward anti-liberal traditionalism.

Many more signs of this cultural transformation have appeared since Yanov's articles. Under Andropov, the authorities opposed un-

[3] Quoted by L. Dymerskaia, "Zamechaniia k istorii, ili istoriia, sotvorennaia po zamechaniiam," *Strana i mir*, No. 11, p. 69.

[4] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 113.

[5] Alexander Yanov, "Zagadka slavianofil'skoi kritiki," *Voprosy Literatury* (1969). Reprinted in English in *The International Journal of Sociology*, Summer-Fall, 1976, pp. 184-219.

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abated nationalism. Thus, *Pravda* published a story by a renowned mystery writer, Iulian Semyonov, that condemned nationalism and anti-Semitism.[6] Although such mild steps could not uproot the deep nationalist feelings of the Russian people, they made it clear that Soviet officialdom included forces that, like Andropov himself, combined anti-liberal with anti-Russophile motives.

And what of the present regime? Gorbachev hopes that *glasnost* will reactivate the Soviet people, and thereby re-animate the stagnant Soviet system. But *glasnost* has already had some unexpected consequences, as the media have taken advantage of the new freedom to print reactionary thoughts. Thus, the newspaper *Nedelia* published an article praising the "Liubers," a reactionary youth group (on which, more later).[7] Such exploitation of *glasnost* by reactionaries has major implications.

From Liberalism to Communism — to Nationalism

Chauvinistic ideas have not been widespread among Russia's intelligentsia. Before the Revolution, the majority of intellectuals believed in liberalism, by which standard Russia was obviously lagging far behind Western Europe and America. They believed that, to achieve greatness, Russia would therefore have to follow the West. (That is also why many liberal-minded intellectuals showed sympathy to Marxism, for it was a product of the West.) After the Revolution, intellectuals believed the Bolsheviks were grooming Russia for greatness; that their scientific new social system would be the best in the world; and that it would serve as a model to the world. In this way, the Bolsheviks convinced the intellectuals to shed their view of Russia as a backwater and to accept the popular view of it as the center of history. "Socialism in one country" ("Communism in one country" after 1939) strengthened this Russophilism. Stalin's successes in industrialization and in war fed communist Russophilism. But it fell with Nikita Khrushchev.

After Khrushchev's removal from office in 1964, leaders set out to forget about the utopian program of building communism and encouraged realism instead. In a revealing move, the Soviet Academy of Sciences disbanded the "Scientific Council on the Competition between the Two Systems," created under Khrushchev. Khrushchev's successors sometimes indulge in nationalist rhetoric, but this reflects, as Flora Lewis notes, no more than wounded pride.[8]

Among intellectuals, raised to believe in the superiority of socialism, a considerable number hoped that socialism-plus-liberalization offered the Soviet Union's path to a free, prosperous country

[6] *Pravda*, January 2, 1983.
[7] *Nedelia*, No. 27, (1987), pp. 16-17.
[8] Flora Lewis, "Moscow Still Believes," *New York Times*, April 10, 1987.

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and world power. But Brezhnev's rule left many intellectuals despairing of the possibility of Western-style development. Those Russians who longed to feel proud of their country increasingly felt the need — and this is a key point — for a new basis of pride. To borrow from the vocabulary of psychoanalysis, they needed to transfer their pride from communist Russia to another vision of Russia.

Under Gorbachev, a few intellectuals may once again feel hope for the emergence of a social-democratic Russia. But more of them have directed their idealism toward the older Russian tradition. Implied in this allegiance is the Russophile faith of 150 years ago: "They believed that Russia possessed a culture distinct from and superior to that of the West. . . . It was destined to supersede European civilization, built as this was on the legalistic principle of the social contract and infected with materialism and unbelief."[9] These notions have gained popularity among many formerly liberal intellectuals.

Soviet Russophilism Today

This does not mean that Russophilism must inevitably triumph in the Soviet Union. But to dismiss it would be a dangerous oversight. A prominent Russian scholar put it this way in a 1986 letter to a friend in Israel: "There is a new phenomenon in our lives which began soon after your departure [in the early 1980s] and I take it very seriously. A re-orientation in the views of the Russian intelligentsia has taken place. The era of 'Westernizing' and democracy, or the aspirations for these, has disappeared. At the end of the 1970s one still saw remnants of this era, but now the dominant trend is Russian patriotism and ethnic awareness."[10]

For example, on August 21, 1987, *Pravda* published a full-page article by Vera Tkachenko, called "The Motherland was given to us one time only, and to our death."[11] In the 1950s, an article under this headline would have urged citizens to love their country because of its socialist system and to work toward that system's triumph. But this article preaches a gospel of suffering, and a mystical, non-rational nationalism. "You have to be proud to share bad times with the Motherland. You have to be proud that it allows you to be buried in its soil." The article includes a picture of the countryside, dominated by a stand of birches, a traditional symbol of Russia. Under *glasnost*, such traditionalism can be publicized without being designated as an official position. After all, on September 7 the paper even published some unfavorable responses to the article, although the overwhelming majority of published responses did turn out to be favorable.

[9] Avrahm Yarmolinksy, *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 69.

[10] I am indebted to Alexander Radin for passing this letter along to me.

[11] "Rodina dana nam odin raz i do samoj smerti."

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Anti-Semitism deserves special consideration insofar as it represents one facet of Russian nationalism. Extreme nationalism tends to define itself in terms of enemies, of groups that stand in the way of the national spirit. Among Russophiles (and others, of course), the enemies are Jews. Russophiles have long openly expressed anti-Semitism; but this used to be true primarily of Russophiles outside the establishment, including such recent writers as Gennadii Shimanov, Valerii Skurlatov, and Vladimir Osipov. Now Russophiles belonging to the establishment engage in anti-Semitism. Thus, State Prize Laureate V. Astaf'ev, one of Russia's most talented contemporary writers, accused the Jews of being responsible for many of the evil deeds that were perpetrated in Russia during the revolutionary period, including the brutal murder of the tsar's family. This accusation, made in a debate on Russian history, received wide distribution through *samizdat* publications. Such acceptance of anti-Semitism among sophisticated Russian nationalists is a recent development.

Reactionary voices sometimes express Russian nationalist ideas explicitly, but they need not, for their ideas can be linked to other concerns, including Russian history, the Russian Orthodox church, and physical vigor. (Obviously, these interests may also have innocent motives, and this sometimes makes analysis very difficult.)

RUSSIAN HISTORY. A rising passion for Russia's traditions can be seen, for example, in the restoration of pre-1917 city and street names. The cities of Ustinov and Brezhnev have gotten back their old names, Izhevsk and Naberezhnye Chelny. According to Radio Moscow-2, national deputies, workers, scientists and other citizens of Gorky (named in 1932) have suggested restoring their city's name of Nizhnii Novgorod.[12] (This small example illustrates the edge reactionaries enjoy over reformers: to restore the city's tsarist name is tradition, but to name it after Kerensky would be a provocation.)

Less benign are the activities of Sverdlovsk's historical-cultural organization, Otechestvo (fatherland). Members of the group have appointed themselves to censor productions at the local theater, where, they allege, the Jewish director distorts the classics of Russian drama. The executive committee of one of the city's raion soviets established Otechestvo and numbers journalists among its members, so the group has no trouble getting its wild charges heard.

Among historical organizations, however, the most notorious has been the organization Pamyat (memory). The program of that reactionary group has already been covered in these pages,[13] so there is no need to go into detail here. But one expert on the organization, Irina Shapiro, recently assessed Pamyat as having "tens of thousands

[12] "The USSR This Week," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 414/87, October 21, 1987.

[13] Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Friends and Foes of *Glasnost*," ORBIS, Fall 1987, pp. 351-78.

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of members, chapters in different cities, hierachy, discipline, membership fees."[14]

Apparently, the conservative bureaucratic faction also perceives Pamyat and similar organizations as a serious threat. In early August 1987, the central Moscow television station broadcast two programs about the Russophile movement, each lasting about two hours of prime time. The first program featured a Russophile writer, Petr Proskurin; the second hosted an extremely conservative journalist, Genrikh Borovik, a well-known and shameless supporter of the regime. Proskurin spoke honestly, but cautiously, about the Russophiles' program, and praised Pamyat. By contrast, Borovik heaped scorn on the organization. This suggests how much the conservative bureaucracy fears this reactionary organization, and probably with good reason. Evidence is mounting that Pamyat has influential supporters who are not ready to see the organization crushed.

On November 12, 1987, Novosti Press Agency issued a report completely exculpating the organization. According to Novosti, the fanatical statements attributed to Pamyat over the last year or so have actually come from a tiny splinter group using the same name. Unknown to the outside world, the genuine Pamyat has existed since 1953, when it was founded by a writer, and it is completely untainted by anti-Semitism. The genuine Pamyat is said to be closely linked to the official Russian nationalist monthly, *Nash Sovremennik*; and that journal's editor recently praised the real Pamyat in a talk to the Board of the RSFSR Union of Writers. His monthly magazine has also begun publishing articles in praise of the organization. In one, the well-known nationalist literary critic Vadim Kozhinov refers to it as a "noble movement," not to be confused with its extremist elements. No mention, however, has been made of the *Nash Sovremennik* article by the notorious Pamyat member Valerii Emel'ianov, in which he spoke of Zionism's aim "to achieve world domination."[15]

RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY. Christianity need not be linked to authoritarianism; the blossoming of Christianity in a liberal Russia is entirely possible. But conversely, a reactionary ideology in Russia must contain a strong Christian element, for "Motherland, Leader, and Orthodoxy" has been the standard formulation of the traditionalist's creed since the nineteenth century. A reactionary ideology could easily exploit an upsurge of religious sentiments, for Russia is the only large country representing Orthodoxy, and the history of the two is closely entwined.

[14] Quoted by Alex Goldfarb, "Testing *glasnost*," *The New York Times Magazine*, December 6, 1987, p. 150.

[15] Quoted by Julia Wishnevsky, "A Second 'Pamyat' Emerges," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 463/87, November 16, 1987.

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This is why Stalin, when he began his nationalist campaign in the 1930s, also re-established the Russian Orthodox Church. Khrushchev tried to cut back on religious activity and on the number of active churches. In the 1970s, the Church again gained momentum as disillusionment with atheism grew. The number of active churches in Russia graphically illustrates Orthodoxy's career; 54,000 in 1913, 100 in 1939, and more than 5,000 today.

All religious movements, Orthodoxy included, are gaining strength under Gorbachev, as evidenced by a number of events. The patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church, Dimitrios I, visited Moscow in the summer of 1987, the first such visit in 400 years. Dissident priest Gleb Iakunin — who began protesting religious persecution in 1965 and was quickly relieved of his parish, then arrested in 1979 — has recently been readmitted to priestly duties by the Moscow Patriarchate. The Moscow Seminary admitted more than five times as many new students in 1986 as in 1985. The 1988 celebration of the thousandth anniversary of the adoption of Christianity in Russia is expected to elicit new waves of religious fervor.

The ways that Orthodoxy might shape Russian politics are indicated by the thinking of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who writes:

> For a thousand years Russia lived with an authoritarian order — and at the beginning of the twentieth century both the physical and the spiritual health of her people were still intact. . . . However, in those days an important condition was fulfilled: that authoritarian order possessed a strong moral foundation, [namely, Christian Orthodoxy]. . . . It is not authoritarianism itself that is intolerable but the ideological lies that are daily foisted upon us. Not so much authoritarianism as arbitrariness and illegality.[16]

Of course, members of the communist hierarchy have not embraced Christianity, and would have great difficuty embracing it so as long as they claim to be Marxists. But this is where *glasnost* can be useful to officials who want covertly to pursue a reactionary program.

RUSSIAN VIRILITY. Concern with health and physical vigor offers a useful guise for extreme nationalism. Indeed, it is sometimes hard to separate what is innocent from what is not. The battle against alcoholism, one of the main campaigns for "clearing the air" begun by Gorbachev, has nothing to do with reaction. But the campaign for physical invigoration is given a nationalist twist (for example, by the new mass-circulation magazine *Sobriety and Culture — Trezvost' i Kultura*)[17] by those who claim that there is no tradition of alcohol consumption in Russia. Rather, there is a tradition of drinking — tea! The magazine duly includes photographs of people dressed in traditional Russian costumes seated around a samovar.

[16] Aleksander I. Solzhenitsyn, "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," *East and West*, translated by Hilary Sternberg (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 133-34.

[17] I am indebted to Vladimir Treml' for bringing this journal and its nationalist slant to my attention.

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Such nationalism can be amusing, but not when it leads to anti-Semitism. *Sobriety and Culture* ran an article exposing the country in which the problems of alcoholism and drug abuse are supposedly growing: Israel, of course. A lengthy article by V. Demin, entitled "The Logic of Violence — the Logic of Degradation," offers a theoretical basis for this connection: What can you expect from Zionists-fascists-imperialists who destroy innocent people? How else can they react to their evil deeds other than by increasing their consumption of alcohol and narcotics?[18]

It is well-known that the *glasnost* campaign permits the young to indulge their interest in Western culture and art. Less well-known is the fact that *glasnost* has also permitted anti-Western, "anti-decadent" movements to rise among the young. The "Liubers," young people from the town of Liubertsy, located outside Moscow, make up one of these movements. Liubers are young men who practice body-building, martial arts, and so forth. They tend to avoid tobacco, alcohol, and drugs. In the evening, they travel to Moscow to attack hippies, punkers, and heavy metal devotees, often beating them up and stealing their fashionable clothing and jewelry. A quatrain from the Liubers' theme song expresses their Hun-like nationalistic sentiments:

We were born and raised in Liubertsy
The center of raw physical force
And we believe that our dream will come true
Liubertsy will become the center of Russia.[19]

In short, according to the Liubers, raw physical strength is the essence of the Russian nation.

Other gangs have adopted explicitly fascist symbols. Like the Liubers, their principal activity seems to be random vandalism and street-fighting. Neo-Nazi groups have been reported in Moscow, Leningrad, Murmansk, Sverdlovsk, Kurgan, Yuzhno-Ural'sk, Omsk, Rostov, Kuibyshev, Saratov, Novokuznetsk, Voroshilovgrad, Belaya Tserkov', Kostroma, as well as in cities in Lithuania and the Ukraine. According to an article in *Leningradskaya Pravda*, the teenagers involved in Leningrad gangs are apparently based in the vocational-technical schools, and they say that their gangs are a reaction to the boredom of Soviet life.[20] Another source of the movement seems to be the television series "17 Moments in Spring," based on a novel by Iulian Semyonov, which depicts the Nazi leaders as sinister but powerful.

[18] V. Demin, "Logika nasiliia — logika degradatsii," *Trezvost' i Kultura*, No. 3 (1986), pp. 52-54.

[19] V. Iakovlev's "Kontora 'Liuberov,'" *Ogonek*, No. 5, 1987, pp. 20-21.

[20] V. Koshvanets, "Shtandartenfyurer s Maloi Okhty," *Leningradskaya Pravda*, July 11, 1987. Reported by Valerii Konovalov, "Neo-Nazis in the USSR: A Menace to Society or 'Mindless, Childish Games'?" *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 437/87, November 4, 1987.

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Anyone who knows the conditions of Soviet life must ask: who is orchestrating the neo-Nazis' activities? How are they able to find the means to hire sports halls, trainers, and so on? The KGB and the Komsomol are the organizations most likely behind their rise. A possible reason for this support was implied by an article in *Leningradskaya Pravda* that appeared a couple of months after the exposé of the gangs. In the latter piece, the newspaper reported that the editorial board had severely punished the article's author. The neo-Nazis, said the board, were simply involved in "childish games." Moreover, some of the most prominent members of the group had since gone into the military and had done well, even being praised by their commanders.

Liberals in the Soviet Union (and consequently in the outside world) grossly underestimate the threat of the reactionary movement.

This comment suggests a reason why youth gangs might be tolerated, and even encouraged, by Soviet officialdom. Amid an increasingly cynical and bored generation of Soviet youth, gang members look forward to the demands and discipline of military training. They show an eagerness to take up arms and to learn the arts of violence. In their own way, they are solving a problem the army has failed to address: how a cynical society could produce tough, ruthless soldiers, soldiers that form the fighting core of the army. Their potential military value keeps these gangs from being stamped out.

Reactionary Support for Gorbachev?

If Russian reactionaries pose so great a danger, why do they evoke so little concern? Because liberals in the Soviet Union (and consequently in the outside world) grossly underestimate the threat of the movement. The liberal intelligentsia of the USSR sees the present system as its main enemy, an enemy it shares with the Russophiles. This shared foe causes them to de-emphasize differences between groups in the opposition. Some liberals believe the authorities fear the Russophiles, and this strengthens their eagerness for a liberal-reactionary alliance.

Keenly desiring the liberalization of their country, a large portion of Russia's pro-Western intelligentsia minimizes the threat posed by the reactionaries. They refuse to see that *glasnost* creates opportunities for the nationalists as well as for themselves. The reason for this lies in part in demographics; with a mean age over fifty, the active pro-Western intellectuals look upon Gorbachev and *glasnost* as their last hope. Also, extreme nationalists appear to them as a small

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group of poorly educated, crude and ignorant people not worth worrying about. As for Westerners, they probably do not fathom the threat of reaction because they get most of their information from Russia's reformist intelligentsia.

A Russification of the Soviet government has taken place in the three years since Gorbachev came to power.

A second reason for skepticism about the menace posed by the reactionaries has to do with problems facing Gorbachev. What could they offer him? Does not the decrepit economic situation compel him to take a liberal approach? At present, it is true, Gorbachev sees liberalization as the means to activate the economy. But there is a choice; Russophiles would work for this through the development of Russian patriotism. The evidence from Stalin's time suggests that the Russophile views have wide appeal; and Gorbachev himself initially used old Soviet methods for stimulating economic growth, including attempts to resurrect the Stakhanovite movement.[21] Many Soviets believe that the Russophile alternative might be tried again. As reported by Alex Goldfarb, the economist and journalist Lev Timofeyev "thinks that in the face of looming economic crisis, the only alternative to Gorbachev would be a military dictatorship with strong xenophobic overtones, a 'hybrid between Pinochet and the Ayatollah,' as one of Moscow's intellectuals puts it."[22]

A third reason for doubt about the potential of the reactionaries has to do with what Gorbachev himself favors. Has he not shown a personal preference for liberalizing reforms? One cannot overemphasize the need for caution when it comes to evaluating Mikhail Gorbachev. He is still in an early stage as a leader, and he has shown great flexibility. For the moment, Gorbachev has cast his lot with the reform faction, and opened up the political process. But Gorbachev is a man of profound cynicism who could cast his lot with any group that seemed likely to secure his power. Just as he evolved from an ordinary Soviet apparatchik to a liberal figure, so might he take steps in the opposite direction should circumstances warrant. Indeed, according to a recent headline in the *New York Times*, Gorbachev has already begun moving toward the "middle path."[23]

[21] In May 1985, Vladimir Shliapentokh organized a one-day seminar at Michigan State University devoted to the Stakhanovite movement and its meaning for Gorbachev's then new regime. I am indebted to Professor Shliapentokh for several ideas reflected in this article.

[22] Quoted by Goldfarb, "Testing *glasnost*," p. 150.

[23] Quoted by Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev: Middle Path," *New York Times*, January 14, 1988.

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The basis for such a shift certainly exists in the Soviet Union's elite, due to the Russification of the Soviet government that has taken place in the three years since Gorbachev came to power. Immediately prior to his accession, the top institutions in the Soviet Union — the Politburo and the Secretariat — had twenty-seven positions, which were filled by twenty-two men; fifteen of those (or 68 percent) were Russian. Every year since, that percentage has risen. At the time of this writing, there are thirty-one top positions filled by twenty-four people and twenty (or 83 percent) are Russian. Of the thirteen full members of the Politburo, ten are Russian, as are all six candidate members. At the CPSU Central Committee, eleven of the twelve secretaries are Russian. And of the twenty Russians filling these top posts, only three have experience in non-Russian republics. (Gorbachev is not one of them.)

As for non-Russians: with the departure of Geidar Aliev from the Politburo, that body now has no representative from any of the predominantly Muslim republics, even though Muslims constitute some 20 percent of the Soviet population. Eduard A. Shevardnadze, of Georgia, is the only non-Slav. Among non-Russian Soviet officials, those who advance farthest tend to be those who have studied and worked in Russian regions, (or, at the very least, Slavic regions).[24]

If reactionary elements seem most promising to Gorbachev in his fight against the conservatives, he would be well positioned with the powerful to swerve right and head up a Russophile movement. For this reason, it behooves us to consider the popular basis for an alliance between Gorbachev and the forces of reaction. Reactionaries could provide substantial popular support for the present Soviet rulers. And they are likely to throw their weight behind Gorbachev, for they share moral, ideological, economic, and international concerns with him.

Morally, many of Gorbachev's domestic undertakings — such as his struggles against alcoholism, corruption, special privileges, and so on — fit the Russophiles' program as well. Ideologically, Russophiles applaud Gorbachev's attack on the middle link of the party apparatus — the Brezhnevian conservatives. They welcome his resurrection of older Russophile writers and poets, shunted aside by Marxist ideologues. And of course they are very grateful for his aid to the Orthodox Church, against the wishes of the dogmatic party atheists.

In economics, there might be differences among the several subspecies of reactionism. Some would tend to be individualistic, others communalistic. Some envision a mighty Russia, others a rural Russia. Many, however, would applaud and extend Gorbachev's decentralization of the economy. Internationally, some Russian nationalists

[24] Ann Sheehy, "Non-Russian Representation in the Politburo and Secretariat," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 439/87, October 29, 1987.

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would set Russia even more decisively on a course of expansion, believing as they do in Russia's messianic role. For them, the army is a favorite institution, because it is seen as the defender of the nation, (unlike the KGB, which defends the regime). Gorbachev too seems to favor the army, despite the many personnel changes he has made.

Conclusion

In politics, as in mechanics, interrelations among three entities are infinitely harder to calculate than the relations between two. Nonetheless, if three entities exist, it does no good to pretend there are only two. We must face the fact that there are three contending factions in the Soviet Union. These three groups can be labeled (with the usual caveats) the reformers, the conservatives, and the reactionaries.

At present, during Gorbachev's liberal phase, Russian reactionaries are taking advantage of *glasnost* to make their views known. Their views seem to attract many of the Russian masses, and even members of the regime. Thus, one may reasonably argue, reactionism might replace, co-opt, or strongly influence the communist regime in the Soviet Union. And though it is now hard to conceive, such a reactionary state could be even worse for Russia and the world than the Soviet state that recently celebrated its seventieth anniversary.

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Tragedy in Mecca

by Martin Kramer

Despite the publication of many eyewitness accounts, our knowledge of the confrontation in Mecca between demonstrating Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces on July 31, 1987, remains sketchy. Even the number of casualties is in dispute. According to official Saudi figures, 402 persons died in the clash, including 275 Iranian pilgrims, 85 Saudi police, and 42 pilgrims from other countries. Iran cites a higher toll of over 400 Iranian dead and 4,000 wounded. As to what actually occurred in the streets of Islam's holiest city, conflicting versions abound. The Saudis and their supporters call the event a premeditated riot: violent Iranian demonstrators crushed themselves to death in a stampede of their own making. The Iranians and their sympathizers call it a premeditated massacre: the Saudis conspired to provoke and shoot Iranian pilgrims.

The precise course of events in Mecca may be beyond objective reconstruction. But whatever happened, the bloodshed at Mecca represents a watershed in contemporary Islam. Mecca's standing in Islam has always been that of an inviolable sanctuary. For one Muslim to raise his hand against another in the holy city is an abomination before God. The Meccan tragedy, in claiming so many lives, has come to symbolize the state of absolute division that now afflicts Islam.

Perhaps more important than what actually happened is what Muslims believe happened. The event admits multiple interpretations. The tragedy occurred at a moment of rising tensions in the Persian Gulf and Arab attempts to internationalize the war between Iran and Iraq. Yet it also expressed pilgrimage tensions that date back to Iran's revolution, an event that kindled an intense rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over primacy in the Gulf and in Islam. Since 1981, no pilgrimage season has passed without some incident involving Iranian pilgrims. Their annual demonstrations in the streets of Mecca and Medina have challenged the Saudi concept of pilgrimage, the Saudi interpretation of Islam, Saudi control of the two holy cities, and even the legitimacy of Saudi rule. This conflict has its remoter origins in the great historical animosity of Wahhabism, the fount of Saudi Islam, to Shi'ism itself. Nor can the most recent tragedy

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be divorced from the history of mistrust between Iranian pilgrims and their Sunni hosts, a history that stretches back to the sixteenth century. Then there is the still deeper level of interpretation, which sets the event in the context of the rivalry between Shi'i and Sunni Islam that has its origins in the seventh century, at the very dawn of Islam. For all these reasons, the tragedy in Mecca offended Muslims but did not surprise them.

My purpose here is to understand the events of July 1987 as Muslims do, in the context of both Islamic history and contemporary tensions. While the political crisis of the moment contributed to the violence, the rising political temperature in the Persian Gulf region cannot fully explain the tragedy; a longer perspective is necessary for this. From this vantage point, the rupture of the peace in 1987 appears not as a gross aberration, but as an unusually violent episode in a continuing controversy that divides Islam and casts a shadow over the pilgrimage. For centuries, Shi'i pilgrims claimed persecution in Mecca, and by this sought to blacken the reputation of the Sunni rulers of the holy city. For centuries, Sunnis have charged Shi'i pilgrims with abhorrent violations of Mecca's sanctity. Enough is now known about the immediate antecedents of the event to allow a preliminary reconstruction of the way in which ancient prejudices were translated into the death of hundreds on a late Friday afternoon in Mecca.

The Shi'i Factor

The conflict between Sunni and Shi'i Islam originated in a seventh-century dispute over succession to the Prophet Muhammad. Over the course of subsequent centuries the schism became a full-blown division over theology, exacerbated by social and economic disparities. The complex relationship between Shi'i and Sunni Islam is the subject of a vast body of Muslim and Western scholarship. Yet the pilgrimage ritual itself is not an issue about which Sunnis and Shi'is have conducted an elaborate polemic. Rather, the bedrock of their conflict has always been the issue of the Imamate — the question of legitimate authority in Islam. This controversy has little bearing on ritual practice.

Indeed, for the first thousand years of Islam, Sunni and Shi'i pilgrims could not be readily distinguished. Though a minority everywhere, Shi'is spoke the same languages and shared the same culture as the Sunni majority. Only in the sixteenth century, when a new dynasty in Iran set about converting all Muslims in its domains to Shi'ism, did Shi'ism become identified with Iran and the Persian-speaking world. Henceforth, Persian-speakers could be taken for Shi'is with reasonable accuracy, and this opened new possibilities for sectarian confrontation in the holy cities.

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Since that time, a vast corpus of bigoted lore has been produced about Shi'i pilgrims and Sunni hosts. The Sunni corpus is perhaps more readily documented, if only because it sometimes led to violent acts against Shi'i pilgrims. At the root of the Sunni outlook is the belief that Shi'is are compelled to pollute the holy premises. Ample evidence for Sunni belief in this libel exists both in Islamic textual sources and in European travel literature. John Lewis Burckhardt and Richard Burton, the great nineteenth-century explorers of Arabia, both heard about past attacks on Shi'i pilgrims, prompted by the suspicion that they had polluted the Great Mosque in Mecca with excrement.[1]

The Shi'i libel was just as far-fetched, holding that Sunnis do not regard Mecca as a sanctuary where the shedding of blood is forbidden, and that the lives of Shi'i pilgrims were forfeit in its precincts. Shi'i pilgrims were indeed liable to humiliation; Burton wrote of Shi'is on pilgrimage, "that man is happy who gets over it without a beating."[2] Yet it would seem that, for the most part, Shi'i pilgrims were as secure as other pilgrims, provided they exercised the dissimulation (*taqiya*) permitted them by Shi'i doctrine. They avoided persecution by adopting an attitude of self-effacing conformity with the customs of their Sunni hosts. And while schismatics were not especially welcome in the holy cities, the Iranians had a reputation for affluence, and Arabian merchants who profited from the pilgrimage traffic eagerly awaited the Iranian caravan. Security was also bought through the offering of tribute to desert tribes en route and to the guardians of the sanctuaries.[3] Toleration could be had at a price which Shi'i pilgrims were prepared to pay, and their lives were rarely as threatened as their dignity.

The Advent of the Saudis

Sectarian antagonisms took on renewed force when Saudi forces conquered Mecca in 1924. The divide between mainstream Sunnis and Shi'is was narrow in comparison with the chasm that stood between the official Saudi doctrine of Wahhabism and Shi'ism. Wahhabis regard Shi'i veneration of the Imams and their tombs as blasphemous idolatry. Earlier, Wahhabi iconoclasts had earned a lasting notoriety in Shi'i eyes when, in 1802, they sacked Karbala, a major Shi'i shrine city in Iraq. They slew thousands of Shi'is and desecrated the revered tomb of the Imam al-Husayn, whose martyrdom in the seventh century remains the pivotal event in Shi'i

[1] John Lewis Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia* (ed. London, 1829), pp. 168, 251-52; Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina* (ed. London, 1893), p. 168.

[2] Burton, ibid.

[3] On these taxes, see H. Kazem Zadeh, "Relation d'un pèlerinage à la Mecque," *Revue du monde musulman* (Paris), volume 19 (1912), pp. 159-60.

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religious history. The Shi'is who perished in this attack, sacrificed on the very site of Husayn's death, became martyrs in the eyes of their co-religionists.[4]

When a revived Wahhabi movement swept through Arabia during the first quarter of this century, it rejected Shi'ism's most fundamental assumptions with the same hostility as before. The leader of the movement, 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, when asked in 1918 about the Shi'i shrines in Iraq, declared that "I would raise no objection if you demolished the whole lot of them, and I would demolish them myself if I had the chance."[5]

He never had that chance, but he did besiege and occupy Medina in 1925, and his bombardment of the city produced a general strike in Iran and an uproar throughout the Shi'i world. For while the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca holds the same significance for Sunnis and Shi'is, a visitation (*ziyara*) to nearby Medina is of special significance to Shi'is. The al-Baqi' cemetery, near the city, is the reputed resting place of the Prophet Muhammad's daughter Fatima and four of the Twelve Imams.[6] The Wahhabis, who rejected the Imams' very legitimacy and who considered prayer through intercessors a form of idolatry, had leveled much of this cemetery in 1806. Its domed tombs had been rebuilt by the end of the century but the Saudis, in their purifying zeal, again demolished al-Baqi', a move regarded by Shi'is as a desecration.[7] The demolition created so profound a sentiment in Iran that the Iranian government refused to recognize Ibn Sa'ud's rule. It angrily demanded the creation of a general assembly of Muslims to regulate the holy cities, and called on all Muslims to prevent "any further humiliating insults to be heaped on their sanctities and their faith."[8]

In 1927 Tehran forbade the pilgrimage to its nationals. Although partly inspired by Reza Shah's secularizing policy of discouraging religious ritual to undercut the authority of the Shi'i clergy, the move was presented as an act of protest. Yet, the ban failed to discourage the most determined Iranian pilgrims, who continued to arrive via Iraq and Syria. And in a pragmatic step, Ibn Sa'ud moved to defuse the extensive Shi'i agitation against him by a show of tolerance de-

[4] A general history of Wahhabi-Shi'i relations is provided by 'Ali Asghar Faqihi, *Vahhabiyan* (Tehran, 1352 solar/1973-74).

[5] Quoted by H. St. J. B. Philby, *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (London: Constable, 1928), p. 67.

[6] On the special place of Medina in Shi'i Islam, see Dwight M. Donaldson, *The Shi'ite Religion* (London: Luzac, 1933), pp. 142-51. On the cemetery's history, see *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2d ed., Leiden), q.v. "Baki' al-Gharkad" (A. J. Wensinck-[A. S. Bazmee Ansari]), volume 1, pp. 957-58.

[7] This and other episodes in modern Saudi-Iranian relations are discussed on the basis of original documents in a publication of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Ravabit-i dowlat-i Shahanshahi Iran ba-doval-i khavar-i mianeh* (Tehran, 1976), pp. 61-89.

[8] On the episode, see Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 111-12.

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signed to win official Iranian recognition. Shi'i pilgrims from Arab lands met with exemplary treatment during the year in which Iran imposed the ban, and Iran's men of religion soon demanded the right to perform the pilgrimage.

In 1928, Iran lifted the pilgrimage ban, and in 1929 Iran and Ibn Sa'ud's kingdom concluded a treaty of friendship. An article of the treaty guaranteed that Iran's pilgrims would enjoy treatment identical to that of pilgrims from other countries, and that they would not be prevented from observing their own religious rites.[9] Iran's pilgrims came to enjoy a measure of toleration which reflected the pragmatism of Ibn Sa'ud on Shi'i matters, an approach that also guided his policy toward the Shi'i minority in the east of his kingdom. Ibn Sa'ud, in both hosting and ruling over Shi'is, asked only that they avoid public enactment of distinctly Shi'i rituals. In less than a decade, a pattern of tolerance seemed to have been firmly established.[10]

All the more striking, then, was the 1943 recurrence of the old Sunni libel. In that year, a Saudi religious judge ordered an Iranian pilgrim beheaded for defiling the Great Mosque with excrement allegedly carried into the mosque under his pilgrim's garment. Ibn Sa'ud remarked to some Americans that "this was the kind of offense which might be expected of Iranians," and the coffee house verdict held that "the Iranians always act that way."[11] This incident infuriated religious opinion in Iran and culminated in an official Iranian protest and the demand for an indemnity. The Iranian government even severed diplomatic relations. The Iranian press engaged in an anti-Wahhabi polemic shriller than anything published since Ibn Sa'ud's conquest of the Mecca, retelling tales of Wahhabi barbarism, especially the sack of Karbala. The government of Iran imposed another pilgrimage ban, which it only lifted in 1948, when diplomatic relations were restored.

The sudden reappearance of this most implausible of libels gave some Muslims pause, and inspired ecumenical initiatives. But the Sunni response came from Egypt, where no Shi'is live; Saudi men of religion stayed mum. In 1959, the rector of Al-Azhar, Egypt's great university of theology, issued a now famous ecumenical opinion (*fatwa*) ruling that Shi'ism constituted a legitimate Muslim rite "like the other rites of Sunni Islam." But, whatever its effect in the wider Sunni world, this ruling found no echo at all in Saudi Arabia.

To the contrary, Saudi men of religion excluded Shi'is from Saudi attempts to unite Muslim opinion. In 1962, Saudi authorities pro-

[9] Text of treaty, *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), volume 10 (1930), pp. 105-6.

[10] The evolution of this policy is detailed by Jacob Goldberg, "The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia," in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 230-46.

[11] As reported by James S. Moose (Jidda), dispatch of February 24, 1944, National Archives, Washington, Record Group 59, 890f. 404/55.

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moted the establishment of the Mecca-based Muslim World League, Saudi Arabia's principal forum for bringing together Muslims of different lands. Iranian Shi'is were conspicuous by their absence. Not one sat on the League's constituent council, a sort of Muslim college of clerics and laymen convened annually during the pilgrimage season. This exclusion seems to have been mutually agreeable, for the Shi'is registered no complaints at the time.

Shi'i opinion centered instead upon the publication, in Saudi Arabia, of an anti-Shi'i tract containing all the familiar accusations. *The Broad Lines of the Foundations on Which the Shi'i Religion Arose*, by Muhibb ad-Din al-Khatib, first appeared in Saudi Arabia in 1960, and quickly became (and remains even now) the most widely read anti-Shi'i polemic in the Sunni world.[12] The author held that Shi'ism, far from constituting a school within Islam, was a distinct religion outside the proper confines of Islam. This slim pamphlet, many times reprinted, opened a new polemical exchange, as Shi'i scholars published refutations of the charge and renewed condemnations of Wahhabism. They argued that since mainstream Sunnism and Shi'ism were moving toward conciliation, Wahhabism constituted a deviation from the emergent ecumenical Islam. This in turn fueled anti-Shi'i fires in Saudi Arabia.

In 1971, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a message to the pilgrims in Mecca from his exile in Najaf, the Shi'i shrine city in Iraq, rebuking the Saudis for permitting the continued circulation of expressly anti-Shi'i material: "Certain poison pens in the service of imperialism have for several years been seeking to sow dissension in the ranks of the Muslims, here in the very land that witnessed revelation . . . Pamphlets like *The Broad Lines* are being published and distributed here in order to serve the imperialists who hope to use lies and slander to separate a group of 170 million people from the ranks of the Muslims. It is surprising that the [Saudi] authorities in the Hijaz would permit such misleading material to be distributed in the land of revelation."[13]

Political rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran during the 1960s, the outcome of shared apprehension over Egyptian-sponsored subversion, hardly affected this doctrinal debate. Theologians on both sides continued to spew forth intolerant polemics and legal opinions against the rival branch of Islam. All the while a steady increase in the number of Iranian pilgrims was taking place, thanks

[12] Muhibb ad-Din al-Khatib, *al-Khutut al-'Arida li'l-Usus allati Qama 'alayha Din ash-Shi'a al-Ithna 'Ashariya*. The pamphlet has appeared in many editions throughout the Muslim world.

[13] Khomeini's message to the pilgrims, February 6, 1971, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini* (Hamid Algar, trans.; Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 196. The reference to 170 million persons is curious, since Shi'i Muslims number only about 80 million worldwide.

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to the introduction of direct air service for them. The number of Iranian pilgrims rose steadily from 12,000 in 1961 to 57,000 in 1972.

The Pilgrimage Reinterpreted

This influx coincided with the appearance of an introspective and overtly political genre of Iranian writing on the pilgrimage. In his book *Pilgrimage*, the radical Iranian intellectual 'Ali Shariati sought deeper meaning in the Meccan *hajj* as part of a quest for solutions to contemporary Islam's broader philosophical and political dilemmas. Shariati urged pilgrims "to study the dangers and consequences of the superpowers and their agents who have infiltrated Muslim nations. They should resolve to fight against brainwashing, propaganda, disunity, heresy, and false religions."[14]

In 1971, Saudi authorities arrested several Iranians in Mecca for distributing a message to Muslim pilgrims from Ayatollah Khomeini: "At this sacred pilgrimage gathering, the Muslims must exchange their views concerning the basic problems of Islam and the special problems of each Muslim country. The people of each country should, in effect, present a report concerning their own state to the Muslims of the world, and thus all will come to know what their Muslim brothers are suffering at the hands of imperialism and its agents." Khomeini then presented his own scathing "report" on Iran, describing it as "a military base for Israel, which means, by extension, for America."[15]

After 1971, hardly a year passed during which some Iranians did not distribute a similar message from Khomeini to Muslim pilgrims. The effort usually met with Saudi apathy, for the Saudis did not regard this preaching as directed against themselves. Khomeini worded his annual pilgrimage message in such a way as to appeal to Iranian pilgrims, and to alert other pilgrims to the "shameful, bloody, so-called White Revolution" of the shah. Such propaganda was liable to complicate Saudi relations with the shah's Iran, so Saudi authorities took measures against the more brazen distributors of Khomeini's messages. But the Saudis did not regard these few troublesome Iranians as a serious threat to their own standing as rulers of Islam's holiest sanctuaries. Indeed, Khomeini himself performed the pilgrimage in 1973, without incident.

The truly radical feature of Shi'i doctrine as expounded both by Khomeini and Shariati was their urging followers to view the pilgrimage as a political rite. This approach set Shi'is apart from other pilgrims, with serious consequences for the fragile tolerance that the Saudis had shown them. This line of action again emphasized the

[14] 'Ali Shariati, *Hajj* (2d ed.; Bedford, Ohio: Free Islamic Literatures, 1978), p. 109.
[15] Text of message, February 6, 1971, in *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 195-99.

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distinction between Shi'i pilgrims and Sunni hosts, and upset the delicate balance that had preserved the pilgrimage peace.

Following the Iranian revolution, Iran's new rulers sought to act on the principles elaborated by Khomeini by appealing directly to the Muslim pilgrims of other lands through political activity during the pilgrimage.[16] Still, the preaching of Khomeini to the pilgrims did not immediately menace the Saudis themselves. The first two seasons passed without serious incident. In 1979, Iran's pilgrims engaged in no more than light propagandizing, and in 1980, Iran organized a much reduced pilgrimage, due to the outbreak of war with Iraq. But the mission of Khomeini's supporters in the holy cities had changed; it was no longer to import revolution to Iran but to export Iran's brand of revolutionary Islam to the wider Muslim world. The pilgrimage provided an unrivaled opportunity for Iranian zealots to sway the minds of the two million Muslims attending the pilgrimage.

Large demonstrations first took place in 1981. Iranian pilgrims began to chant political slogans in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina and the Great Mosque in Mecca, resulting in violent clashes with Saudi police. A subsequent clash in the Prophet's Mosque resulted in the death of an Iranian pilgrim. In 1982, the Iranian pilgrimage took an even more radical turn when Khomeini appointed Hojjatolislam Musavi-Khoiniha as his pilgrimage representative. (Khoiniha had served as mentor to the students who had seized the United States Embassy in Tehran.) In both Medina and Mecca, Saudi police clashed with demonstrators whom he addressed. He was arrested in Mecca, and a post-pilgrimage speech delivered in Medina earned him expulsion as an "instigator."

The next three seasons saw something of a respite, although tensions remained high. Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi mediated an understanding in 1983, so that only one incident ended in violence that year. Khoiniha assured the Saudis that "Iranian pilgrims are not here to confront you," but "to counter the American and Soviet superpowers, as well as Zionism."[17] In 1984, no clashes took place between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police. But Saudi handling of a clash between Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims, which left one Iranian dead, led to a new round of Iranian attacks on Saudi management of the pilgrimage and an official Iranian protest. And in 1985, a dispute between Tehran and Riyadh over the number of Iranian pilgrims permitted to enter Saudi Arabia led the Saudis to deny landing facilities to several Iranian pilgrimage flights.

[16] A full treatment of the pilgrimage since Iran's revolution may be found in the present author's essays in the annual *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, beginning with volume six (covering 1981-82).

[17] Radio Tehran, August 29, 1983.

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By 1986, it seemed that Iran and Saudi Arabia had reached a compromise permitting Iran to conduct a limited measure of political propaganda during the pilgrimage. That understanding resulted from a short-lived attempt by Iran to show (or feign) moderation, in order to drive a wedge between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. By the informal terms of the pilgrimage understanding, Khomeini's pilgrimage representative was permitted to organize two pilgrims' rallies, the first in Medina and the second in Mecca, in areas removed from the holy mosques. A further understanding restricted the form and content of these demonstrations. Iran's pilgrims were not to import or display printed matter and posters of a political nature, and their slogans were to be directed only against the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel. Other Muslim governments and the host government were not to be criticized. Iran's pilgrims could vent their views but Saudi authorities confined their demonstrations to two fixed events.

But this agreement was short-lived. In 1986, a group of Iranian pilgrims opposing moderate policies toward Saudi Arabia took explosives with them, intending to sabotage the pilgrimage understanding reached between Iran and Saudi Arabia. They failed, however, as Saudi authorities discovered the explosives and arrested over one hundred pilgrims on arrival. Iranian leaders who had assured Saudi Arabia the pilgrimage peace would be preserved were embarrassed, and dissociated themselves from the plot by allowing the Saudis to detain the pilgrims for weeks without protest. But the plotters did enjoy the support of a major faction in Iran — the one opposing the pursuit of any opening toward the Saudis and favoring aggressive export of the revolution. In the pilgrimage plot of 1986, it became clear that the pilgrimage peace was unstable, readily affected by the changing balance in Iran's internal power struggle.

The New Pilgrimage Polemic

Conflict on the ground was complemented by the intensification of polemical debate over the pilgrimage. The debate itself has not been a simple repetition of the old libels, but these have been transformed and made more credible, so that they no longer express sectarian distrust so much as they evoke it. This transformation probably reflects the influence of ecumenism upon the intellectual climate of contemporary Islam, a climate now inhospitable to overt sectarian polemics. For most Muslims, it is no longer considered politic to dwell openly on the difference between Sunni and Shi'i Islam. Indeed, merely to cite these differences is regarded by many Shi'is as an attempt to isolate them, and even as part of an imperialist plot to foment division in Islam. Yet any reading of the declarations and documents generated by the new pilgrimage polemic cannot but

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create a strong sense that all this has been said before. Most of today's lines of argument clearly insinuate the libels of yesterday.

An example may be found in the brief correspondence between Saudi King Khalid and Imam Khomeini in October 1981, at a time of violent clashes in Mecca and Medina between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police.[18] Khalid compiled a revealing letter of protest to Khomeini, asking that Khomeini urge his followers to show restraint, but strongly hinting that the Great Mosque had been defiled by blasphemous Iranian pilgrims. According to Khalid, Iranian pilgrims in the Great Mosque had performed their ritual circumambulations while chanting "God is great, Khomeini is great," and "God is one, Khomeini is one." There was no need for Khalid to elaborate on this charge. It was obvious that the Iranians' slogans constituted an excessive veneration of their imam, a form of blasphemous polytheism. All this had aroused the "dissatisfaction and disgust" of other pilgrims, wrote Khalid to Khomeini.

In fact, Khalid's letter distorted well-known Iranian revolutionary slogans. Iranian pilgrims had actually chanted "God is great, Khomeini is leader." The Saudis had confused the Persian word for "leader"(*rahbar*) with the rhyming Arabic for "great" (*akbar*). The pilgrims' Arabic chant declared that "God is one, Khomeini is leader." Here, the Saudis had confused the Arabic for "one" (*wahid*) with the rhyming Arabic for "leader" (*qa'id*). There was a vast difference between the slogans as actually chanted by the Iranians and Khalid's misrepresentation of them, whether inadvertent or deliberate. In the slogans as reported by the Saudis, Khomeini is placed on one plane with God, a verbal pollution of Islam's holiest sanctuary. It was this familiar but disguised charge of Shi'i defilement that the Saudis sought to level at Iran's pilgrims.

In his reply to Khalid, Khomeini evoked the old Shi'i libel, charging the Saudis with failing to respect the refuge provided by the Great Mosque. "How is it that the Saudi police attack Muslims with jackboots and weapons, beat them, arrest them, and send them to prisons from inside the holy mosque, a place which according to the teaching of God and the text of the Qur'an, is refuge for all, even deviants?" This was a decidedly Shi'i reading of the meaning of the Great Mosque's sanctity, which owed a great deal to the concept of refuge (*bast*) that traditionally applied to Shi'i shrines in Iran. Such shrines were indeed absolutely inviolable places of refuge, where any kind of malefactor could find asylum.[19]

[18] Full text of Khalid-Khomeini exchange in *an-Nashra al-'arabiyya li'l-hizb al-jumhuri al-islami* (Tehran), 21 Dhu al-Hijja 1401/October 19, 1981; and in *Sawt al-umma* (Tehran), October 31, 1981.

[19] *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2d ed., Leiden), q.v. "Bast" (R. M. Savory), volume 1, p. 1088.

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Nothing could have been farther from the Wahhabi-Saudi concept of the sanctity of the holy places. These were and are regarded as sites so sacred that no deviation at all may be allowed in their precincts. Only from a Shi'i perspective did this Saudi concern for preserving the purity of the Great Mosque appear as blind disrespect. In 1979, the Saudis had acted in good conscience to clear the Great Mosque of "deviants," relying upon a *fatwa* issued by over thirty Saudi men of religion, who argued that it was permissible to dislodge the defilers even by force of arms. This decision enjoyed wide Muslim support beyond Saudi Arabia, and Khomeini's presentation of the Great Mosque as a place in which even "deviants" enjoyed absolute immunity could only be regarded as peculiarly Shi'i.

Differing concepts of sanctity also affected that part of the pilgrimage controversy played out in Medina. In 1982, Khomeini's representative to the pilgrimage chose the cemetery of al-Baqi' in Medina as the site for a series of demonstrations combined with visitation prayers. After the Saudi demolition of the shrines in the cemetery in 1926, al-Baqi' ceased to serve as a place of Shi'i visitation. But after Iran's Islamic revolution, the formal prayers were reinstated against Saudi will, and were recited ouside the high wall which the Saudis had built to seal off the cemetery. In 1986, in a concession to Iran's pilgrims, Saudi authorities allowed them access to the cemetery itself, and Khomeini's representative to the pilgrimage formally thanked Saudi King Fahd for permitting the return of Shi'i pilgrims to the venerated site, even though it remains desolate.[20] This obsessive interest in al-Baqi' and other tombs, and the resort to the cemetery as a rallying point for pilgrims in Medina, reflected an especially Shi'i notion of Medina's sanctity and served to evoke past resentment against the Saudis for having defaced the memory of the imams. Mass prayer services are conducted there not by the Saudi men of religion who manage the mosques in Mecca and Medina but by visiting Shi'i mullahs. These have established themselves as the pilgrimage's only ceremonial functionaries who are not members of the supervisory bureaucracy of Saudi Islam.

This heightened Shi'i interest in Medina also owes a great deal to changes in the spiritual geography of Shi'i Islam. Since the outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq, it is no longer possible for Iranians to visit the Shi'i shrine cities in Iraq and the tombs of the imams in their sacred precincts. For the great mass of Shi'is, the pilgrimage to these sites in Iraq had taken precedence over the pilgrimage to Mecca and the visitation to Medina. Their inaccessibility has greatly enhanced the significance of the holy cities of Arabia, and especially Medina, for Iranian Shi'ism. The number of Iranians who now desire

[20] For a description of the site's desolation in 1974, see Wa'il Sa'id 'Ali al-Wa'ili, *Mi'a sura wa-sura 'an istighlal duyuf ar-rahman* (n.p., [*c.* 1981]), pp. 524-25.

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to make the pilgrimage far exceeds the number that Saudi Arabia is willing to admit in any one year, or that Iran is prepared to provide with scarce hard currency for the journey. Application for pilgrimage is centralized in Iran, and by 1984 the list of applicants had reached 600,000. The annual figure agreed upon by Iran and Saudi Arabia (after some haggling) has stood at about 150,000 since 1984. Even within this limitation, Iran's pilgrims constitute about 18 percent of foreign pilgrims and make up the largest foreign group. Iran's pilgrims thus seem to have invested Medina and Mecca with some of the emotional significance of the Shi'i shrines of Iraq.[21] The unprecedented influx of Iranian pilgrims has made al-Baqi' again a major Shi'i center of pilgrimage.

Strong emphasis on identifiably Shi'i themes and methods of protest may have blinded other pilgrims to the political message that Iran wishes to convey during the pilgrimage. The fear that Iran's message might simply be dismissed by other Muslims as Shi'i dissent was responsible for some of the ecumenical intonations of Khomeini's pilgrimage representatives and other Shi'i clerics. At times they urged Iran's pilgrims to refrain from excessive praise of their Imam Khomeini, an admonition Iran's pilgrims usually failed to heed. Khomeini's representatives also instructed Iran's pilgrims to pray with all other pilgrims behind the Sunni prayer leaders in the Great Mosque and the Prophet's Mosque, lest they stand out for their Shi'ism rather than their political activism.

This restraint, matched by a parallel Saudi restraint in dealing with Iran's pilgrims, left the impression that the pilgrimage had been defused. The first few years following Iran's revolution were marked by high tension, but cooperation between Khomeini's pilgrimage representatives and Saudi authorities later became routine. The Saudis allowed two controlled demonstrations, in Mecca and Medina, on the understanding that Iran would prevent spontaneous demonstrations at other times and places. The Saudis insisted above all that no Iranian demonstrations take place in the Great Mosque in Mecca. The seizure of that site by messianic (Sunni) extremists in 1979 had deeply embarrassed the Saudis, who had vowed to prevent a recurrence at all costs.

The Breakdown of 1987

As the pilgrimage of 1987 began to unfold, it seemed as though the pilgrimage understanding would hold for yet another year. Mutual restraint was not codified in any written agreement between

[21] The same need explains Iranian Shi'ism's rediscovery of the mausoleum of Sitt Zaynab, the Imam Husayn's sister, near Damascus. A minor site of Shi'i visitation in the past, it has now been transformed into a major shrine, visited by thousands of Shi'is from Iran and Iranian-backed Shi'is from the Lebanese Hizballah. Iran has also invested large resources in restoration of the still lesser shrine of Sitt Raqiya, Husayn's daughter, near the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.

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Saudi Arabia and Iran, but it had acquired a certain moral force. Some argument invariably preceded the pilgrimage over the number of Iranian pilgrims and the proposed content of their demonstrations. But the experience of the recent past had established a status quo that answered the propaganda needs of Iran and the security needs of Saudi Arabia. There were those in both countries who resented the limitations imposed by this informal understanding. Some Saudis opposed any Iranian demonstrations; some Iranians opposed any limitation on the content and scope of their demonstrations. Yet as the pilgrimage season of 1987 drew near, there seemed to be no cause to conclude that these views had undermined the status quo.

A first sign of trouble came in early July in a speech by Musavi-Khoiniha, Khomeini's former pilgrimage representative and the man who had presided over the most turbulent pilgrimage seasons. His replacement as pilgrimage supervisor (and his appointment as prosecutor general) in 1985 was probably intended to reduce the chances of confrontation in Mecca. He remained a powerful figure in Iran and a champion of hardliners who opposed all limitations on Iran's pilgrims. His speech was plainly provocative. This year, he declared, "a mere march or demonstration will not suffice." Iran should not simply "gather a certain number of people who might support the views of the Islamic Republic." Khoiniha demanded that Saudi Arabia allow Khomeini's pilgrimage representative to enter the Great Mosque in Mecca for one night, and there conduct a referendum among the throngs of pilgrims over the decision of the emir of Kuwait to invite foreign escorts for Kuwaiti tankers. At the same time, the imam's representative would explain Iran's case in the Gulf war. "All we ask is that the Saudi government not oppose this, nor send its guards to the Great Mosque. Let us see what happens. We will try it for one year."[22]

Saudi authorities now had grounds to suspect that some of Iran's pilgrims might try a virtual takeover of the Great Mosque. Khoiniha's statement touched a raw nerve and immediately elicited a warning from an unnamed official in Saudi Arabia who noted that Saudi Arabia supported numerous forums for the expression of Muslim opinions, even during the pilgrimage. But such consultations in the Great Mosque would constitute an innovation in Islam, and "anyone who attempts to innovate in Islam will go to hell." Saudi Arabia would shoulder its responsibility for safeguarding the Islamic shrines in Mecca and Medina.[23] Khoiniha's statement had put the Saudi security apparatus on a high state of alert.

Khoiniha's demand did not figure, however, in the negotiations between the Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Khomeini's

[22] Text of speech, Radio Tehran, July 2, 1987, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: The Middle East and Africa* (henceforth: *BBC Summary*), July 4, 1987.

[23] Saudi Press Agency, July 3, 1987; quoted in *BBC Summary*, July 6, 1987.

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official pilgrimage representative, Hojjatolislam Mehdi Karrubi. As Khomeini's spokesman, Karrubi only asked that Iran be allowed to conduct its demonstration in Mecca as in past years. An Iranian official even covered the route of the planned demonstration with a Saudi official, and it ended one and a half kilometers short of the Great Mosque. Despite this agreement, Saudi authorities remained deeply suspicious, and, on the eve of the demonstration, pressured Karrubi to cancel the march lest violence break out. Karrubi refused and declared that "in the event of disorder and disruption, the responsibility for this will be fully with the Saudi government."[24] Two days before the planned demonstration, the Iranian media published Khomeini's annual message to the pilgrims. While longer and more high-strung than the messages of recent years, it did not constitute a major departure from the understanding regarding the pilgrimage itself. Khomeini included the customary plea to pilgrims that they "avoid clashes, insults, and disputes," and warned against those intent on disruption "who might embark on spontaneous moves."[25]

On the afternoon of July 31, the demonstration began in the usual fashion, with slogans and speeches. The march began after the speeches; as in the past, it was led by *chador*-clad women and war invalids. Near or at the end of the planned route, the march came upon a cordon of Saudi riot police and national guardsmen who refused to allow the procession to go any further. This dangerous situation became explosive due to two developments. Some Iranian pilgrims chose this moment to echo Khoiniha's provocative demand, and they called upon the marchers to continue to the Great Mosque. At the same time, unidentified persons in an adjacent parking garage began to pelt the Iranian demonstrators with bricks, pieces of concrete, and iron bars.

These provocations exacerbated the confrontation between the pilgrims and the police, and both sides began to exchange blows, the police using truncheons and electric prods, the demonstrators using sticks, knives and rocks. Because Karrubi and the other Iranian officials had not positioned themselves at the head of the march, they had no control over the conduct of Iran's pilgrims at the crucial point of contact with Saudi police. During the ensuing confrontation, the Saudis backed down temporarily, and the crowd surged forward. According to American intelligence sources, the tide was finally turned by reinforcements from the Saudi national guard, who fired tear gas shells into the crowd and then opened fire on the demonstrators with pistols and automatic weapons.[26] The Saudis have denied

[24] Radio Tehran report, July 30, 1987; quoted in *BBC Summary*, August 1, 1987.

[25] The Arabic text of the speech appeared in the weekly of the Lebanese Hizballah, *al-'Ahd* (Beirut), August 2, 1987.

[26] Report on the assessment of American intelligence sources in the *New York Times*, September 6, 1987.

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firing on the demonstrators or even using tear gas, claiming instead that the demonstrators, once dispersed, surged in retreat. According to the Saudis, those who died were trampled to death.

This reconstruction rests upon a selective reading of the contradictory accounts provided by Iranian and Saudi sources.[27] As no independent investigation will ever be conducted, important details remain in doubt. But no evidence has been produced by Saudi Arabia or Iran to establish that the other side acted deliberately or with premeditation in order to provoke violence. The evidence now available indicates that a group of undisciplined Iranian pilgrims, acting under the influence of at least one provocative statement by a leading Iranian official, wished to enter the Great Mosque as demonstrators. Saudi security authorities, who had been alerted to this possibillity but lacked self-confidence in the face of provocation, employed excessive force to thwart the Iranian crowd.

While the cause is open to dispute, there can be no doubt about the effect of the deaths at Mecca in revalidating hoary prejudices. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin 'Abd al-'Aziz relied upon Sunni prejudice when he charged that the real objective of the Iranian pilgrims was "to spoil the pilgrimage, because as is known, the pilgrimage is done only if the Great Mosque is entered." Iranian "sedition" inside the Great Mosque would have made it impossible for other pilgrims to have carried out the required circumambulations in the Great Mosque. "The pilgrimage would have been spoilt."[28] There is no evidence that the Iranian demonstrators, even those who wished to carry their protest into the Great Mosque, wished to ruin the rite for other pilgrims. But by his charge, Nayif sought to associate the Iranian demonstrators with the legendary Shi'i "defilers" of the Great Mosque.

Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back," and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics." Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what Speaker of the Parliament 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani called "Wahhabi hooligans." Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi'is) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi'is), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi'i works). The Wahhabis "will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to

[27] The most detailed eyewitness account from a pro-Iranian perspective is that of the Pakistani Shi'i journalist Mushahid Hussain, which appeared in the *Washington Post*, August 20, 1987. The Saudi director general of public security, General 'Abdallah bin 'Abd ar-Rahman Al Shaykh, provided the most comprehensive Saudi account in a statement that prefaced a special Saudi documentary film on the incident, aired on Saudi television on August 20, 1987.

[28] Nayif press conference, Saudi Press Agency, August 25, 1987; quoted in *BBC Summary*, August 27, 1987.

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pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history."[29] This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds.

These hatreds cannot be dismissed as motives. Sectarian prejudice in Islam bears no less potential for violence than racial and ethnic prejudice in other societies. Its roots are equally deep, and it also has behind it a vivid history of lore and libel. Like racial and ethnic prejudice, sectarian bigotry dare not speak its name openly. "They are now propagandizing and claiming that this incident was a war between Shi'is and Sunnis," charged Iranian President 'Ali Khamene'i. "This is a lie! Of course there is a war; but a war between the American perception of Islam and true revolutionary Islam."[30] The conflict is not, strictly speaking, only between Shi'is and Sunnis, but neither is it one between Khomeini's truth and America's falsehood. The pilgrimage is where two extremes of the Shi'i and Sunni experience meet, in an arena of high regional and international tensions. It was this volatile combination of past and present animosities that exploded in 1987.

Restoring the Pilgrimage Peace

Saudi leaders must now consider the policy they will adopt toward Iranian pilgrims in 1988, although the final decision will depend upon the political climate in the last months and even days before the arrival of the pilgrims. The Saudis have three options. First, they might forbid entry to Iranian pilgrims or order their numbers diminished. The latter step would probably be tantamount to the first, since Iran has always made it clear that it would respond to any cut in the number of its pilgrims by boycotting the pilgrimage altogether. Other difficulties placed before the Iranians, such as delays in reaching agreements for their transportation and lodging, might have the same effect of prompting an Iranian boycott of the pilgrimage.

If Riyadh chooses this course, it will have to counter the inevitable Iranian charge that the Saudis have failed in their responsibility to permit all Muslims to meet a basic obligation of Islam. Saudi Arabia might present its case in a variety of ways, but would ultimately rely for support upon the traditional Sunni hostility to Shi'i defilement of the pilgrimage. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayif has already announced that "scholars and preachers throughout the Muslim world have raised their voices asking us to close the doors to sedition before it happens." A ban on Shi'i pilgrims also has precedents, dating from

[29] Text of Rafsanjani speech to protest march in Tehran, Radio Tehran, August 2, 1987; quoted in *BBC Summary*, August 4, 1987.

[30] Khamene'i sermon, Radio Tehran, August 6, 1987; quoted in *BBC Summary*, August 7, 1987.

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the sixteenth century. But that was possibly the most divided century in Islamic history, marked by great wars of religion between Sunnis and Shi'is. Such a ban in this century would signal the return of Islam to a state of deep division.

A second course of action might be to ban demonstrations. The Saudis could argue that the crowded streets of Mecca and Medina make any demonstration a danger to public safety. By such a course, they would essentially terminate the understanding that has allowed a single demonstration in each holy city. The Saudis would then be obliged to take every measure to enforce the ban on demonstrations, including the expulsion of Khomeini's pilgrimage representative should he call for a demonstration. This option clearly contains the seeds of a further bloody confrontation. The Iranians have already turned the date of the "massacre" into "Black Friday," a day of remembrance which Iranian pilgrims will doubtless seek to mark through street demonstrations.

The third option is to allow all the elements of the previous understanding to remain in force. This would necessitate detailed negotiations with the Iranians and explicit assurances from Khomeini. Without these assurances, the consequences of pursuing such a course would be unpredictable. For in the present climate of factional rivalry in Iran, there is no certainty that assurances given by a lesser authority would bind all of Iran's pilgrims. Whether such an agreement can be negotiated while tensions persist in the Gulf seems doubtful.

To rediscover the pure faith of one's fathers is also to relearn their great and petty bigotries. Islam has emerged from its revival more divided than at any time in the living memory of its adherents. The religious awakening of Islam has already produced a devastating war between Muslims along the same frontier of Islamic history's greatest internecine struggle. It has produced denunciations of unbelief and declarations of holy war by Muslims against Muslims, of a kind that had long ceased to be heard in Islam. And now even the pilgrimage, supposed symbol of Islam's overriding unity, has become a tinderbox.

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TUNA POACHING AND NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

by Paul F. Gardner

The island states of the Western Pacific have recently moved from the travel sections onto the news pages. Fisheries agreements with the Soviet Union, connections with Libya, and military coups have brought change to this once idyllic world. At the same time, they have created a need for change in America's policy toward the region.

Separated from the rest of the world and each other by huge expanses of ocean, these nine island countries range from Papua New Guinea (with the size of California and 3.3 million people) to Nauru, a tiny one-island state of 8,000 souls. A few of the countries are well endowed with resources. Fiji has sugar, minerals, and tourism, while Papua New Guinea benefits from gold, copper, and tropical products. But some, such as Western Samoa, are mountainous and rely solely on subsistence agriculture and the sea. Kiribati (formerly the Gilbert Islands, pronounced *Kiribass*) consists largely of barren atolls, stretching over 3,000 miles of ocean (see table 1).

The inhabitants of this region embrace values remarkably similar to those of most Americans, being devout Christians and strongly attached to private enterprise. The nations themselves are young and vibrant democracies. Although military coups in May and September 1987 marred Fiji's previously fine record, few other countries in the Third World can match these nine for free, open, and effective government. After obtaining independence during the last decade and a half, all but one of the Pacific island governments actively sought a closer relationship with the United States while unequivocally rebuffing advances from the Soviet Union.

Yet during the past two and a half years, Soviet overtures have received a much warmer reception. First Kiribati and then Vanuatu signed fisheries agreements with the Soviet Union. Other island leaders expressed interest in expanding diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviets. Vanuatu, which has taken a position well to the left of its neighbors, has long had ties with Cuba and Vietnam, and recently established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea, and East Germany. Statements by leaders in the short-lived Fijian Labor party government indicated they con-

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TABLE 1

INDEPENDENT ISLAND STATES OF THE PACIFIC
BASIC DATA

COUNTRY	POPULATION '86 (EST) (000'S)	NUMBER OF ISLANDS	LAND AREA (SQ. KMS)	PER CAPITA GROSS NAT'L PRODUCT '86 (US$)	TYPE OF DEMOCRACY
Fiji	713	332	18,272	1,790	Parliamentary**
Kiribati	63	33	684	300	Presidential
Nauru	8	1	21	9,091*	Parliamentary
Papua-New Guinea	3,326	100+	461,693	653	Parliamentary
Solomon Islands	273	100+	28,530	470	Parliamentary
Tonga	104	171	699	520	Monarchical
Tuvalu	8	9	26	570*	Parliamentary
Vanuatu	132	80	11,880	801	Parliamentary
Western Samoa	161	9	2935	601	Parliamentary

* 1983 per capita GDP for Nauru and Tuvalu
** Declared a Republic in September 1987 by coup leaders

SOURCES: International Monetary Fund and the Australian National Centre for Development Studies.

templated similar steps and were cited by Fijian military leaders to justify their coup.

Disputes with the United States over fisheries and concerns over the potential deployment of American nuclear weapons in the region contributed significantly to this recent eastward shift. As a result of these conflicts, many islanders came to believe that Americans disregarded their interests and undervalued their friendship. This disaffection was in turn cultivated by a new Soviet diplomacy which seemed to grant the young states added stature.

Soviet Activities

Increased Soviet attention to this relatively distant and isolated area is part of a broader undertaking. It accords with the emphasis Moscow is placing on its role as an Asian and Pacific power (signaled in Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of July 1986) and with the creation of a new Pacific Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soviet officials have told Asian visitors this new posture signifies recognition that non-communist states of Asia and the Pacific no longer follow in the wake of the United States but possess a dynamic of their own.

In addition, anti-Western developments in the Pacific islands' neighborhood have clearly caught the Soviets' attention. Virtually every state in the region has protested French nuclear testing, and anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand led authorities there to ban visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed naval vessels. The consequent estrangement of France from the Pacific states, and the

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weakening of the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) alliance offer the Soviets a new strategic situation.

Some observers, like Prime Minister David Lange of New Zealand, doubt that Moscow takes interest in the island states themselves, but certain strategic facts must be clear to Moscow. The nine Pacific island states stretch across five million square miles. Were they to adopt policies like New Zealand's, which effectively ban U.S. port visits and aircraft overflights, American flexibility in positioning its forces would be much reduced. Conversely, permission for Soviet fishing vessels to operate in these waters would provide the Soviets with the opportunity to gather intelligence and resupply submarines. Then, as local businesses and governments gained a stake in servicing Soviet vessels, the stage might be set for a southward extension of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's operating range. The Pacific islands' region, roughly opposite Moscow on the globe, also offers valuable communications sites for Soviet space and satellite operations.

Economic interests enter the picture as well. Melanesian and Micronesian waters contain the world's richest reserves of tuna, an attractive target for the "powerful fishing fleet" that Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech promised the Far East. Papua New Guinea, the world's eighth largest producer of gold, will certainly increase its share of this sensitive market as its giant Ok Tedi mine, the largest outside South Africa and the Soviet Union, is joined by two only slightly smaller projects now nearing completion. Because the Melanesian islands have many other promising gold deposits, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu could become major producers early in the twenty-first century. Surely, Soviet interest in gold and other valuable mineral deposits contributes to its reasons for courting the Melanesian states.

Finally, the Soviet government may see a political opportunity in the South Pacific, a chance to end the losing streak in Third World gambles that Gorbachev inherited from his predecessor. Even small gains in this solidly pro-Western part of the world would add to the faltering Soviet image, while damaging that of the United States.

For all these reasons, Moscow has exploited opportunities in the Pacific islands with energy and finesse, while denying any desire to extend great power rivalry to the region. It has ended a reliance on crude intimidation as a tactic for blocking cooperation with the United States, and has dispatched smoother Soviet officials armed with proposals skillfully tailored to local interests and suspicions of the United States.

For instance, attractive Soviet offers for fishing rights were made to Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea just as those governments' relations with the American Tunaboat Association had reached a nadir. Soviet fees paid to Kiribati

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

SOURCE: Hawai'i Geographic Society — Eleventh Edition, 1987; Willis H. Moore, Editor.

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

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under a 1985 agreement — roughly double those by American and Japanese boats — amounted to 15 percent of Kiribati's budget, and exceeded aid or income from any other source.

When unable to renew this agreement at a lower price to reflect unexpectedly low catches, the Soviets made an even more generous offer to Vanuatu, which provided them continued access to the area. Fees for Vanuatu match those to Kiribati, even though Vanuatu's waters probably contain fewer fish. In return, Soviet fishing vessels won port access for reprovisioning (denied them by Kiribati). Reportedly, Moscow sweetened its offers to Papua New Guinea and Fiji with offers of fish-processing facilities, but negotiations on these have not yet begun.

In addition, the Soviets have sought to broaden trade, cultural, and political relationships with the Pacific island states. They showed an interest in timber and sugar, for example, when both these industries were depressed and the United States had reduced its sugar imports from Fiji. Invitations to visit or study in the Soviet Union have gone out to an increasing number of student, labor, and government leaders. An extensive public diplomacy campaign linked Soviet concerns with the Pacific islanders' concerns on nuclear issues. Concurrently, pro-Soviet New Zealand and Australian trade unionists focused the newly created Pacific Trade Union Conference almost entirely on anti-nuclear and related causes.

Finally, adding to the region's anti-American mixture, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi has been active in the South Pacific. The government of Vanuatu, apparently motivated by hopes of economic assistance as well as an attachment to "national liberation" causes, has helped Libya maintain contact with leftist New Caledonian and Irian Jayan dissidents. The Libyan government provided military training for leftist Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) cadres and, according to unconfirmed reports, to elements of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) as well. Vanuatu approved the establishment of a People's Bureau in its capital, facilitating the expansion and concealment of Libyan activities, until pressures from neighboring governments led Prime Minister Walter Lini to delay the bureau's opening.

These developments have alarmed Western states with interests in the South Pacific. Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Japan, among others, have counseled the Pacific island states to choose new partners in aid and trade with caution. Signaling its sense of urgency, the Japanese Foreign Ministry established a "Committee for the Strengthening of Diplomacy towards the Island Nations in Oceania" in September 1986 and plans to expand its aid program. But most Western governments attribute the problem to what Australian Prime Minister Hawke calls "past American neglect

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of the region."[1] Accordingly they look to the United States for a solution.

The Costs of "Burden Sharing"

United States policy in the Western Pacific can be summed up with two shorthand expressions: strategic denial and burden sharing. Denying the Soviet Union a strategic position in the region sets the policy goal. The method is burden sharing — leaving the development and defense of the region largely in the hands of Australia, New Zealand, and the former colonial powers of Great Britain and France. In combination, these doctrines hold that the Soviet Union can be denied a strategic position in the area without the United States establishing one for itself.

A number of motives recommended this policy of burden sharing. First, the resources of each Western ally are most effectively used when concentrated in areas of its expertise. Second, regional cooperation is enhanced when Australia and New Zealand service the security and economic needs of their near neighbors. Third, many Australians and New Zealanders fear that a large American presence might be at the expense of their traditional role in the region. Finally, this policy also responded to a belief in the Pacific island states that too prominent an American presence might enmesh them in the great power rivalry.

But recent events strongly suggest burden sharing has fallen well short of its goals and has on the contrary contributed to damaging misperceptions. The reason lies in the policy's historical context.

America's biggest imprint on the average Pacific islander's consciousness comes from World War II when U.S. servicemen were present in vast numbers, often exceeding the local population. With few exceptions, this memory is highly positive. Islanders frequently recall not only the immense wealth and technological power of the Americans but also the generosity and egalitarian spirit of the GI. The vivid contrast between that history and the United States' passive burden-sharing role convinces many Pacific islanders that America has turned its back on them. As Sir Peter Kenilorea, leader of the Solomon Islands, asks American visitors: "Why, after spending so many lives and resources in our islands, have you never come back?"[2]

To deal with the people of nine Pacific island states, as well as two self-governing, freely associated states and three dependent territories, Washington established only two diplomatic missions. In comparison, Australia has established nine and New Zealand six posts in the Pacific island nations. Only one Pacific island leader, former

[1] Radio Australia, May 17, 1986.
[2] Conversation with the author.

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prime minister Ratu (chief) Sir Kamisese Mara of Fiji, has been officially invited to Washington. The largest Pacific island country, Papua New Guinea, has seen only two Americans of cabinet rank in twelve years of independence, and they were United Nations permanent representatives (Andrew Young and Vernon Walters). The United States has made a tiny contribution to the economic development of Pacific island states; its assistance program provides only 2 percent of total aid received. Further, except in Fiji, the aid is disbursed not on a government-to-government basis but regionally through private American voluntary organizations.

By its absence, the United States has left the shaping of its image to others. Pacific islanders' lack of access to reliable newspapers and other media leaves them susceptible to local rumors of American actions and motives. A small but vocal group of leftist expatriate professors at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji have at times, therefore, succeeded in planting suspicions of American intentions and methods which those more familiar with the United States would immediately reject. Reports of American involvement in the May 1987 coup in Fiji illustrate how deep such suspicions of the United States run.

The events on Fiji had deep-seated racial roots for, unlike the relatively homogeneous populations of other Pacific island countries, Fiji divides almost equally into two very distinct communities, native Fijians and ethnic Indians (who were brought by the British during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to work on sugar plantations). Fijians ran the government for the nation's first seventeen years, until an Indian-dominated coalition gained control of the Parliament in the April 1987 election. Leaders of the army, which is staffed almost entirely by native Fijians, forcibly deposed the government on May 13. The coup leader, Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, claimed he took action to prevent native Fijians from rising up in violent reaction to the threat posed by the new government to their traditional rights. Army leaders also accused the new government of abandoning Fiji's association with the Western powers.

Leaders of the coup were eventually persuaded to leave political power in the hands of the governor general as head of state, and he sought to build a coalition of the opposing parties. Unhappy with the progress of these efforts, however, Colonel Rabuka staged another coup on September 25, 1987, and declared Fiji a republic under his leadership. Subsequent negotiations led by the governor general succeeded in obtaining all parties' agreement on a coalition government and a process for establishing a new constitution.

The United States condemned the two coups, refused to deal with the coup leaders, suspended assistance to Fiji, and supported the governor general's efforts to achieve national reconciliation. Not-

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withstanding all these steps, some highly fanciful scenarios of American involvement surfaced in the Western Pacific. For example, the ousted prime minister Tomici Bavadra suggested after being deposed in the first coup that General Vernon Walters and an "American private assistance network associated with the Iran-Contra affair" were directly involved in his ouster.[3] However incredible, these charges fit in with the distorted understanding of American motives that America's absence has permitted in the region.

With such sentiment in the background, the potential for discord is extremely high when differences arise with the United States over issues of deep concern to Pacific islanders. Two issues stirring strong emotions are nuclear testing and tuna fishing.

Nuclear Issues

Those New Zealanders and Australians who suspect the United States of endangering their security from radioactive contamination receive a sympathetic hearing from many Pacific islanders. Although the United States ceased nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1962 the memory of events at Bikini and Enewetak remains menacing. And this memory was strengthened by the powerful Australian film *Half Life* widely circulated in 1986 suggesting that the United States allowed Marshall Islanders to die as a scientific test of radiation. The allegation that the test-site was chosen out of disdain for the inhabitants produces an emotionalism that impedes a rational discussion of all nuclear issues.

Today, the prime concern in the area is French nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll, and embitterment over this matter extends to France's friends. The Australian ambassador to the United States, F. Rawdon Dalrymple, whose friendly advice sometimes has an unfortunate threatening ring, warned an American audience, "If you want the South Pacific to become an area where the Soviet Union, Cuba and others of that stripe can find fertile ground for anti-U.S. propaganda, then continue with a policy of indifference to what the French are doing there."[4] The widespread feeling that the United States "does not have time for little people,"[5] fuels suspicions that American neutrality amounts to support for the French position.

These fears of radioactive contamination segue into nuclear concerns other than testing. New Zealand's decision to ban port visits by nuclear-armed vessels stimulated similar efforts by anti-nuclear forces in the Pacific islands. Prime Minister Lange profited not only

[3] Press statement released June 16, 1987, in Washington by Tomici Bavadra after meetings with U.S. Congressmen.

[4] *Christian Science Monitor*, June 4, 1986.

[5] Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Peter Kenilorea of the Solomon Islands, August 13, 1986.

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from a general aversion to anything nuclear but from the David and Goliath proportions of New Zealand's confrontation with the United States. Although the Solomon Islands previously accepted U.S. ship visits, in 1985 its cabinet adopted a policy which, if strictly implemented, would probably rule them out. Vanuatu re-emphasized a standing ban on such visits. Leaders of the now deposed Fijian labor government indicated upon assuming office in April 1987 that they would follow New Zealand's policy. Although the older leaders of other island states found nuclear risks were outweighed by the security benefits deriving from America's presence, they have come under strong pressure from a new generation of political leaders.

The South Pacific Forum, an increasingly active and effective regional organization joining Australia and New Zealand with the Pacific island states, adopted a joint stance on nuclear issues in a treaty establishing a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone. Signed at Rarotonga in 1986 by Australia, New Zealand, and most of the Pacific island governments, the treaty recognizes the region's common nuclear concerns (particularly testing) while leaving those not shared by all (visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels) to the discretion of individual states. Nuclear powers were invited to sign protocols to this agreement, and the Soviet Union signed with great fanfare — but also with broad and vaguely defined qualifications which could permit it to ignore the treaty were U.S. naval vessels received in ports of signatory nations. China signed without reservations. France rejected the invitation, as did the United Kingdom. After much study, the United States also rejected it.

The American and British decisions evoked sharp disappointment among Pacific islands leaders, who had modeled their treaty upon the Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco (previously signed by the United States) in an effort to gain American endorsement. The Latin American treaty, however, addressed a potential threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, which does not exist in the South Pacific. Public emotions almost insure that Pacific island leaders will further pressure the United States on these issues. Americans could limit the damage by encouraging Paris to reduce its reliance on Pacific testing.

The Tuna Issue

American "poaching" of tuna rivals nuclear testing as the region's most emotional political issue. As late as 1979, only a few U.S. tunaboats visited the area, on an experimental basis. By 1984 over fifty American flag vessels patrolled the area each season, coming to the region for the richer catches they needed to survive an industry-wide depression. The large American boats, many equipped with helicopters, dwarfed the fishing vessels usually seen in those waters and took an annual catch of nearly 200,000 tons. Understandably,

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some Pacific islanders saw such ships as a threat to local tuna resources.

They were also disturbed to find Americans fishing without licenses in areas that their nations had declared to be "exclusive economic zones." According to the countries' laws, coastal states have sovereignty over all fish in such zones; U.S. law exempts tuna and other highly migratory species. Thus, the tuna fishermen were committing an offense under local law, but not U.S. law. The Law of the Sea Convention, to which the United States is not a party, in the Pacific islands nations' view supports their position on sovereignty while asserting the need for regional arrangements for the management of highly migratory species. The United States does not recognize that the Law of the Sea Convention has changed previous law on sovereignty but strongly supports regional management of resources.

These legal differences were recognized by the U.S. government as a potential source of serious bilateral problems, and of most concern were the punitive provisions of U.S. legislation, some of which allow little discretion. The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, in particular, imposes an embargo on the fish products of a foreign nation that seizes a U.S. vessel for fishing for migratory tuna. With the potential political costs of these measures in mind, the United States proposed in 1977 that the Pacific island states enter into a regional fisheries agreement that would supercede the Magnuson Act's provisions. Negotiations to this end did not lead to agreement, however, in part because many Pacific islanders felt under duress. They suspected the American Tunaboat Association of using the threat posed by American legislation to extract much more favorable terms than those enjoyed by other countries.

The Solomon Islands' confiscation of an American fishing boat seized in its waters in June 1984 brought fishery differences to a climax. American law required an embargo on imports of Solomon Islands fish products, which provided about 20 percent of that country's foreign exchange earnings. Other Pacific islands governments were enraged by this development and an islands boycott of regional fishery negotiations seemed inevitable. It was averted only when the United States set a new precedent by lifting the embargo when a newly elected Solomon Islands government agreed to resume talks with the American Tunaboat Association on a licensing agreement.

Two additional years of difficult negotiations finally produced a regional fisheries agreement. Signed on April 2, 1987, it clearly shows the United States to be no less generous than other countries. During each of its five years, the agreement provides the island nations at least $12 million, $10 million in U.S. government economic assistance

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and $2 million in license fees and technical assistance from the American Tunaboat Association.

This convention should be regarded as the beginning, not the end, of a healing period. While the signed agreement awaited ratification by the U.S. Senate, the governments of Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands continued to protest unlicensed fishing in their waters by several American vessels, one of which Kiribati subsequently seized. Islanders obviously remain suspicious of the American Tunaboat Association's good faith and of Washington's willingness to hold the association to its word.

A final resolution of the issue requires changes in American fisheries legislation. The American contention that highly migratory species of fish should not fall under coastal state jurisdiction in exclusive economic zones accurately reflects the tuna's life cycle which is divided among widely separated waters. But it has been seriously weakened by all other distant fishing nations' acceptance of coastal state jurisdiction and by the perception that the Magnuson Act attempts to force the U.S. position on coastal states. The punitive provisions of this legislation have become harmful to the United States' broader interests and to the American fishing industry itself. They should be repealed.

Toward a New American Presence

Many islanders believe the United States has taken more from them than it has given. They feel it has harvested regional fisheries, benefited from anchorages for its naval vessels, and enjoyed Pacific island nations' support in international bodies without contributing significantly to the area's economic development. Many are also bothered that the world's most technologically advanced nation does so little to help those who so closely share its political, economic, and religious values.

The older generation of Pacific island leaders have expected their principal help in meeting development needs to come from a number of donors — Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and New Zealand. Even so, they consider the tiny size and low visibility of the American contribution as a slight to their countries' friendship. Burden sharing suggests to them that their countries remain appendages of former colonial powers. They see U.S. regional aid programs as a disregard for separate national identities; the role of private voluntary organizations appears to them a conscious effort to avoid government-to-government contact.

The Pacific islands' requests for aid arrive at a moment of budgetary contraction in the United States, and especially in the area of foreign aid. But most Pacific island concerns could be met with small sums and by switching to a bilateral approach. The larger Pacific

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island countries (such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands) require technical and educational assistance more than material help. This is particularly true of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, where only one in three people is literate and just one in three thousand has a college education. Countries seeking material aid, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, have tiny, relatively well-educated populations.

Many of the Pacific islands' needs are in areas in which the United States has more to offer than other donor nations. All the Pacific island states center their development plans on private enterprise, but many lack the skills and the knowledge of international markets to compete effectively in world trade. Similarly, their governments, most of which are less than fifteen years old, badly need managerial and technical training. The United States is ideally placed to meet these needs.

Current U.S. policy — denying hostile forces a strategic position in the South Pacific by leaving the island states' concerns almost entirely to others — misrepresents U.S. interests. The ugliest American in the Pacific has proved to be the missing one. His image has been constructed from resentment, suspicions, and the fabrications of others.

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Under these conditions, obtaining the islanders' support for American strategic goals is likely to grow increasingly difficult. A new generation of Pacific island leaders, with few memories of World War II and more venturesome ideas for charting their nations' direction, is coming to power. They question whether the United States can be counted upon to maintain a defensive shield over an area in whose economic development it has shown little interest. Many young politicians also believe their countries' growth would be enhanced by reducing bonds with their past colonial administrators, most of whom have sharply cut aid anyway. While the elders would look West, the new generation is inclined to turn East.

U.S. goals therefore require a new stance and a new policy. Comparatively few of this new generation of leaders know the United States, as Papua New Guinea's last two governments illustrate. The prime minister knows China well but has never crossed the Pacific. The foreign ministers had not visited the continental United States on taking office. Not one cabinet minister had received any part of his education in the United States. Few cabinet members had had contact with the U.S. aid programs. And this pattern is repeated

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elsewhere. Not one of the 300 Vanuatuans currently studying abroad, for example, is in the United States.

Programs stressing training that associates the United States with the development goals of individual countries would reduce misperceptions at little cost. A small higher education program can create powerful links, given that a university degree virtually guarantees the holder a leadership position.

The United States still has time to enhance its presence in the Pacific and circumscribe the Soviet Union's capabilities for mischief. As yet, the Soviet presence is limited and tenuous, and public attitudes do not favor it. Implementation of the regional fisheries agreement, accompanied by repeal of punitive U.S. legislative provisions, can resolve one sensitive issue. Sympathetic attention to Pacific islanders' anti-nuclear feelings will keep another problem in check. Beyond these issues, Washington needs to build relationships that will retard future strains. Small bilateral assistance programs focusing on education exchanges, additional diplomatic representation in the larger states, and more high-level visits should accomplish this goal at a total additional cost of less than $10 million per year. Only by assuming a more committed, if still modest, role in the region can the United States assure that the Soviet role remains limited.

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Review Essay

TERRORISM IN DECLINE?

by Patrick Clawson

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism — The Report and Papers to the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. By Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987. 447 pp. $22.95 (paper).
America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare. By Joseph Douglas and Neil Livingston. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987. 195 pp. $19.95.
The Age of Terrorism (1987 edition). By Walter Laqueur. Boston: Little, Brown, 1987. 367 pp. $19.95.
La Nebuleuse: Le Terrorisme du Moyen-Orient. By Xavier Raufer. Paris: Fayard, 1987. 404 pp. FF110.
Holy Terror. By Amir Taheri. Bethesda: Adler and Adler, 1987. 313 pp. $19.95.
The Financing of Terror. By James Adams. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 284 pp. $18.95.
Terrorism and International Order. By Lawrence Freedman et al. London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs and Routledge Kegan Paul, 1987. 107 pp. $10.95.
Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World. By Richard Rubenstein. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 253 pp. $17.95.

Many spectacular terrorist incidents took place within seven months in 1985 — the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*, the TWA 847 flight hijacked to Beirut, the Vienna and Rome airport shootings, the mid-air destruction of an Air India jumbo jet, and the bloody rescue in Malta of a hijacked Egyptian airplane. In addition to extensive media coverage at the time, these events have generated a whole cottage industry of books on terrorism that have recently appeared in print.

Most of the books are destined to disappear quickly and quietly, for they have little useful to offer. Also, unfortunately for the authors

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and publishers of the new books, they appear during a lull in terrorism, at a time when the public's interest in the topic has faded. But, as we await the next burst of terrorism, some of the new books are worth reading to learn what lessons were drawn from the last outbreak. A few authors clarify basic truths about terror and counterterror, not one of which is particularly new; others reveal the thinking behind the most common misconceptions about terrorism.

The Terrorist Threat

Public perception of the terrorist threat has closely paralleled the incidence of terrorist episodes. The intensive coverage of the TWA hijacking in mid-1985 exaggerated the threat, and this made terrorism more effective at accomplishing its goals by pressuring policy makers to act, whether appropriately or not. The current time of quiet has popularized the theory that terrorism really does not matter very much, a view well expressed by Jeffrey Simon. Simon asks rhetorically, "Are vital U.S. interests really threatened by international terrorism? And if not, should Washington be devoting as much attention to the problem as it has been in recent years?"[1] This skepticism aside, terrorism *does* pose various threats: to lives, to governments, to Western influence in the Third World, and to democratic values.

TERRORISM AND THE THREAT TO LIVES. Terrorist episodes have so far posed only a limited threat to lives. The most bloody episode in recent decades was the death of 392 passengers and crew in the mid-air destruction of an Air India Boeing 747 over the Irish Sea. The number killed worldwide in an entire year by all international terrorist episodes has never reached 700, or less than the average weekly toll from either the Iran-Iraq war or America's highways. Thus, tragic as these deaths were for families and friends, the numbers killed have been tiny. If terrorism is the price the West must pay for an open society, then it has paid a small price so far for such a precious value.

If terrorism is the price the West must pay for an open society, then it has paid a small price so far for such a precious value.

Terrorists could become wholesale murderers only through nuclear or biochemical attacks. In books of very different style, Leventhal and Alexander look at the prospects for the former, Douglas and Livingston look at the latter.

[1] Jeffrey Simon, "Misunderstanding Terrorism," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1987.

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Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander's collection offers dispassionate, well-informed articles that show that the prospect of massive deaths from nuclear terrorism is slight.[2] If terrorists seize a nuclear power plant, the popular reaction might be semi-hysterical, but the terrorists could not do much with it to threaten public health, unable as they would be to undo its many safeguards. They certainly could not make a nuclear bomb, because the technology needed to make an explosive device is more demanding than was once thought. Leventhal's earlier concern about a "coffee can bomb" led, in part, to the formation of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism by the Nuclear Control Institute. Upon further study, Leventhal concurs in the Task Force's conclusion that bringing together at high speed a relatively substantial amount of fissionable material is necessary for an explosion, which, therefore, could not be acomplished with simple technology. Stealing a weapon, or being provided one by a friendly state, appears a much more serious prospect than building one.

But the main question is why terrorists would resort to weapons of mass destruction. "Simply killing a lot of people has seldom been a terrorist objective. Terrorists want a lot of people *watching*, not a lot of people *dead*."[3] Contributors to the Leventhal and Alexander book note that the use of nuclear weapons would provoke mass revulsion at the terrorists' cause and bring severe reprisals against their state sponsor.

Since a state sponsor would almost surely be involved, the most effective way to deter nuclear terrorism may be to devote resources and high-level attention to protecting nuclear arsenals and monitoring international traffic in materials needed for atomic weapons, so that Western authorities can identify the responsible government should terrorists someday acquire the bomb.

Painting nightmarish pictures, no matter how implausible, seems to sell books; it should also ruin reputations — specifically those of Joseph Douglas and Neil Livingston. Their book gives no grounds whatsoever to expect terrorist use of biological or chemical weapons, but it does seriously misrepresent the ease of producing (or acquiring) biochemical weapons and dispersing them over a large area quickly without being apprehended. Douglas and Livingston also seriously underestimate mechanisms in place to monitor the production of

[2] A slimmer volume, both physically and intellectually, edited by the same authors is also available (*Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat*, Pergammon/Brassey's, 218 pp. $24.95). It is the report of a June 1985 conference that had the participation of various government officials, most of whom are at pains to emphasize how careful their agencies are being about terrorism. Representative Richard Gephardt (D-Missouri) makes a strident pitch for more controls on plutonium and highly enriched uranium shipped to countries without atomic weapons.

[3] Brian Jenkins, head of Rand's political science department, "The Future Course of Terrorism," *The Futurist*, July/August 1987, p.8. Emphasis in the original.

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deadly biochemical agents in the quantities needed to make a weapon that could affect more than a small group.

TERRORISM AND THE THREAT TO GOVERNMENTS. Walter Laqueur demonstrates in the updated version of his well-informed, perceptive, and eminently readable classic that rarely if ever have terrorists overthrown a government. Though true, this point is not entirely relevant. Terrorists usually expect their attacks to spark large-scale actions that lead to the overthrow of the government; rarely do they expect their acts alone to effect this goal. Indeed, terrorists acting against colonial powers have at times gained wide popular backing and had a vital role in expelling the colonists as in mandatory Palestine, southern Ireland, Kenya, and Algeria.

Outside of disaffected regions like Northern Ireland or Basque territory, no Western country has to worry about mass support for terrorists. For the United States, only in Puerto Rico is it plausible to speak of tacit support for terrorism among as much as 2 or 3 percent of the population. At their peak in the 1970s, Italian or German left-wing terrorists certainly had no more than this low level of support. Any claim that such minute groups pose a serious threat to the governments of an industrial country is highly implausible, even if they do create some spectacular political propaganda. For instance, the assassination of Aldo Moro only served to strengthen resolve in Italy to wipe out the terrorist danger.

TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO WESTERN INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD. Fundamentalist Muslims have largely succeeded in driving Westerners out of Lebanon, and they are steadily reducing Western influence in the country's economy, culture, and politics. More broadly, the threat of terrorism has reduced Western involvement in many other parts of the Arab world. Both the Amir Taheri and Xavier Raufer books take up the issue of Middle East terrorism, especially the sort connected to fundamentalist Islam. The contrast is striking. One would expect Taheri to be the better informed, for he was a prominent journalist in pre-revolutionary Iran and has excellent contacts inside the Islamic Republic, while Raufer relies primarily on secondary sources, mostly newspaper accounts and academic analyses. Yet Taheri presents an utterly implausible thesis based on rumor and innuendo. He implies that the Iranian government runs branches of a tightly organized "Party of Allah" throughout the Muslim world and the Western industrial countries and that its members are ready to leap into suicidal terrorist action. It would be charitable to say that the evidence to support this thesis is slim. Commonality of viewpoint on many issues, sympathy for the Iranian Revolution, and admiration for martyrs are widespread among fundamentalist Muslims, but this does not imply a worldwide organization tightly controlled by one directorate. Nor should statements

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from Iranian leaders about their material support for and role in Islamic movements elsewhere be taken at face value: they have every reason to exaggerate their activities for a domestic audience.

Raufer, on the other hand, maintains a proper skepticism about the self-description of the various actors on the Mideast terrorist stage. The fifty-two U.S. congressmen who recently wrote Secretary of State Shultz calling for support of the Organization of the People's Mujahidin of Iran (OPMI)[4] would do well to read this book. Raufer shows that the Mujahidin were responsible for the assassination of U.S. advisers under the shah and the killing of civilian targets in contemporary Iran; further, the organization is run entirely on despotic principles. Mujahidin followers converted into a proud moment the bizarre episode in which Mujahidin leader Mas'ud Rajavi forced the number-three man in the organization to divorce his wife so that Rajavi could marry her with a haste contrary to Islamic law. This is as good an example of double-think as any produced by a religious cult.

In his description of some of the major terrorist groups, such as Abu Nidal's outfit, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and the Lebanese Hizbullah, Raufer emphasizes clan-like characteristics rather than proclaimed political ideologies. Politics in Lebanon (and elsewhere in the Middle East too) resembles the Hatfields and the McCoys: deep, unreasoning hatreds, violence at any opportunity against the other side, and definition of the enemy as anyone of a different blood line regardless of age or sex. To imagine that attacks on civilians, or on outsiders who could be useful pawns, will stop if redress is made for legitimate grievances is quite optimistic — though, as Raufer emphasizes, this is no reason for refusing to address those grievances.

Neither Taheri nor Raufer provides any sense of the popularity of Western values in the Middle East, which remain strong. Despite the civil war in Lebanon, much or even most of the population there sustained important elements of Western life until the mid-1980s, including a free economy and a moderately open cultural life (though each faction exercised de facto press censorship). But Western-style politics, culture, and economics depend upon a structure of freedom and openness. Once a small Lebanese minority, one which enjoyed only limited support even in the Shi'i community, went on a determined terror campaign, Western influence disappeared quickly.

[4] The letter, largely organized by Representative Mervyn Dymally (D-California), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, reads in part, "We are pleased to learn ... that an understanding of the role of resistance, namely the anti-Khomeini People's Mujahideen, in the Iranian power struggle, may be growing among our policy makers."

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TERRORISM AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES. By providing a means for a tiny but militant minority to coerce the majority, terrorism pollutes the political waters. None of the authors pays much attention to the most significant threat of terrorism — the danger it poses to free and open political debate in a democratic society. In a country like the United States, where pressure groups compete for influence, a group that uses violence to force consideration of its interests raises special dangers. Terrorism is not an all-or-nothing proposition: gains short of complete victory are quite possible. Should Westerners begin to weigh the merit of taking certain actions (or worse, expressing certain positions) against the cost of possible terrorist responses, the terrorists will have influenced the agenda, and that would be a substantial accomplishment for them.

One such case took place in Colombia, where terrorists intimidated the country's Supreme Court into declaring an extradition agreement with the United States unconstitutional.[5] Hiding behind anti-American politics, the terrorists really worried about jail sentences in the United States; attacks on courts and jails long ago made remote the prospect of imprisonment in Colombia. If we look only at their progress toward the proclaimed goal of overthrowing the Colombian government, we miss the fact that these terrorists have already perverted Colombian politics.

It is difficult to deter pressure groups, even violent ones, in a society that exalts diversity of views and upholds the rights of individuals to act freely. But certain political views imply actions that threaten the society as a whole. This dilemma needs to be remembered, though it gets forgotten in the concern about overzealous persecution of harmless radicals. Risks to civil liberties come not only from hard-line prosecutors and police, but also from those who organize to destroy the freedom of open political debate. Precisely for this reason, the American Civil Liberties Union used to actively oppose the influence of totalitarians in liberal movements. Limiting totalitarian participation in movements for peace and social justice is, however, no longer popular among civil libertarians or liberals, in large part because earlier police activities exceeded what the public would accept.

While the steps appropriate to deter political violence are a legitimate topic of debate, one hopes there is a broad agreement on the merit of gathering information about groups that advocate violence against democratic governments. these groups need not be outlawed or persecuted, but their goals and ideas should be made widely known, if only to prevent true democrats from mistakenly

[5] *New York Times,* August 16, 1987. The intimidation came from anonymous killings, some reported to be by the FALN, some by the M-19 movement, and some by other groups and by thugs hired by drug dealers.

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supporting them.[6] Obvious candidates for this treatment include supporters of such terrorists as the Posse Comitatus, Jewish bombers, or the Irish Republican Army.

Suppressing freedom in the name of preserving it from terror is a real worry. Precious rights should not be eroded in the course of countering terrorism. Vigilance in keeping the public informed about the repulsive consequences of apologies for terror makes it less likely that terrorists will find the support they need. Indeed, the gravest danger to civil liberties may come from lack of timely action, which could lead to a rash of terrorist incidents — in which case the public might cry for immediate measures, no matter how draconian. To resist such pressures, policy makers should take steps now to expose apologists for terrorism and should have legitimate plans of actions that can be activated when needed.

Countering Terrorism

While the analysis of terrorism is useful, determining means to counter it has even more importance. It is in this area that James Adams and the authors in the collection edited by Lawrence Freedman for the Royal Institute of International Affairs have much to offer.

Adam Roberts makes a distinction between two approaches to counter-terrorism in his contribution to the RIIA collection: one relies on sanctions against offending states and police work; the other, on military action. The dichotomy is false. Even the most ardent partisans of military reprisals or pre-emptive strikes fully agree that, within a democratic state, the police should take care of counter-terrorism. Only in the most extreme circumstances, such as those in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, is the use of the military within the borders of a Western country appropriate. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1881 forbids the armed forces to take action against domestic crimes, and the United States has a long and valuable tradition reserving the military for foreign enemies.

Indeed, those who endorse military reprisals also most strongly support an active police role in countering terrorism, for they see terrorism as a criminal activity. In contrast, those who stress the need to understand the causes of terrorism sometimes seem to believe that *tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner*. But insight into the motivations for criminal activity should not lead to the slack pursuit of criminals. In a democratic society, social injustice does not justify crime. The political motives claimed by terrorists should never color a government's response. To maintain the broad popular support

[6] See Guenter Lewy's " Does America Need a *Verfassungsschutzbericht*?" ORBIS, Fall 1987, pp. 275-92.

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vital to their success, the police must be (and must be seen to be) apolitical, pursuing with equal energy those criminals with whom the government may be vaguely sympathetic as well as those it abhors. The incorrect perception that the Reagan administration pursued abortion clinic bombers less than vigorously had, for example, an adverse effect on liberal support for counter-terrorist measures.

But even vigorous police efforts do not reduce the need for military involvement in counter-terrorism, for many groups operate with acquiescence and even the active support of a state. Roberts's false dichotomy hides the issue of whether sanctions or military actions are most effective against terrorists operating under the sponsorship of governments. He, along with all the other RIIA authors, has in fact a firm position on this issue: they oppose military retaliation. Indeed, they all agree that retaliation only spurs a cycle of violence and alienates allies. It is gratifying to find academics taking such a clear stand, without waffling, so that their acumen can be judged.

Contributors to the RIIA volume take the U.S. bombing of Libya in April 1986 (the incident, indeed, that motivated the writing of their book) as Case A. But they wrote too soon; the record since the bombing hardly proves their point. For five months after the raid, there were no major terrorist episodes. In September 1986 three major events took place: a bombing campaign in Paris, an attack on a Pan Am plane in Karachi, and a massacre in an Istanbul synagogue. In the year and three months since, there has hardly been a single incident of international terrorism. The American raid on Libya apparently forced terrorism's sponsors to reconsider the costs of their actions; and it certainly spurred European governments to take counter-terrorist steps more seriously, through increased cooperation among police forces and tougher action against terrorists once apprehended.[7] In short, all the RIIA authors were flatly wrong in their prediction about the effect of retaliation against Libya.

Unfortunately, in their eagerness to deplore the alleged "tendency of military reactions to terrorism to further a cycle of violence,"[8] those who oppose military retaliation will probably ignore the historical record. It is true that military attacks are no panacea and can at times worsen a situation, but they can be an important policy instrument. Returning to the role of the police in countering terrorism, James Adams makes an important contribution by spelling out the similarity between terrorism and organized crime. Terrorism offers many ways to earn a good living — extortion, "protection,"

[7] On the connection between the raid and stepped-up counter-terrorism in Europe, see James Markham, "Europe's Anti-Terrorism Tied to U.S. Libya Raids," *New York Times*, April 14, 1987.

[8] Simon, "Misunderstanding Terrorism," p. 39. Note that this was written a full year after the Libya raid.

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drug-dealing, bank robberies. Further, a young person who has launched a career as a terrorist acquires skills that are not readily transferrable (except to other forms of crime). To expect such a person to abandon terrorism is to ask him to give up a career with few prospects for finding a similar level of income in another line of work. The terrorist may become less of an ideologue and abandon his original aims, but he is unlikely to leave the life of crime.

Adams makes too much of the dichotomy between independent terrorists sustained by crime and and those backed by states. In fact, some governments happily engage in ordinary crime and provide training and rest areas for like-minded terrorists. The same Bulgarian government that counterfeits Western goods gladly provided for a price a base for right-wing Turkish drug smugglers who financed assassinations in Turkey, and out of this emerged the complicated papal assassination attempt. Though the Bulgarian secret police may not have ordered Mehmet Ali Agča to shoot John Paul II, they may be held at least partially responsible for the asssassination effort because they knew that Turkish narco-terrorists were operating from their territory.

Adams draws interesting policy implications. He holds that counter-terrorism has much to learn from the fight against organized crime. In both cases, attention should be directed to leaders, not to the easily replaced foot soldiers. The most effective tactics may be those that raise the cost of doing business, not splashy raids. Much as legitimate businesses have at times worked out cozy arrangments with the Mafia, so too, writes Adams, can "the rise to wealth of the terrorists be blamed on the willingness of business organizations — banks, oil companies, investment houses — to do business with terrorists."[9] He particularly criticizes kidnapping insurance, which has been profitable for Lloyd's and a boon to terrorists. It is hard to fault his conclusion: "In the same way as industry has the right to protection from the assaults of terrorists, so society has the right to expect that the business world will act responsibly in dealing with terrorism." [10]

Police experience sheds light on the much-debated issue of negotiations and concessions. As the assistant executive director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Oliver Revell, emphasizes, police negotiate often with criminals over matters like treatment of hostages, terms of surrender, or just to gain time.[11] In themselves, negotiations are not concessions. A willingness to talk must not be confused with softness. Paul Bremer, the State Department's ambassador-at-large for counter-terrorism, explains: "It has been long-

[9] James Adams, *The Financing of Terror*, p. 249.
[10] Ibid., p. 250.
[11] Presentation at a February 26, 1987, forum sponsored by the Scientists' Institute for Public Information and interview with the author.

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standing U.S. government policy that we will talk to anyone who might be able to effect safe release of Americans held hostage. That remains true. Speaking with hostage holders does not mean, however, that we will make concessions which would only further encourage terrorists to undertake such acts in the future."[12] Promises made during such negotiations should not be seen as binding, for, as Revell argues, there is nothing immoral with breaking promises made under extreme duress.

Terrorism, Violence, and Warfare

Discussion of terrorism in the 1980s has often centered on its relation to warfare. Is it true that one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter? Is terrorism the poor man's war? Is it a form of low-intensity conflict sponsored by states? These three issues make up a large part of the second edition of Laqueur's classic text; they are also at the heart the major leftist analysis of terrorism, the book by Richard Rubenstein.

TERRORISM AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. Neither Rubenstein nor Laqueur have much patience with pacifist-like blanket condemnations of political violence. Confronted with an evil, non-democratic government, such as Nazi Germany, violence may be an appropriate instrument of politics. Perhaps the assassination plot aimed at Hitler was terroristic, but it would be hard to condemn morally. Certainly the action was illegal, but the laws of an illegitimate government deserve no respect.

Rubenstein's arguments on this point are weak, relying primarily on a romantic notion of the historical justice of revolution. He regards as almost natural violent movements inspired by anitcolonialism or socialism, and he devotes much effort to exploring the role of intellectuals in such movements. His theories are quite irrelevant to some of the most important and contemporary violent struggles, whether by Islamic fundamentalists or by Central American or African anti-Communists. Laqueur, on the other hand, gives a solid analysis with historical examples from violent movements of the last few centuries, no matter what their ideological orientation.

The Reagan administration would do well to heed the lessons of history as brought out by Laqueur. Political violence by armed groups has been used in a great variety of circumstances and should not be automatically decried, in the fashion of State Department adviser Abraham Sofaer.[13]

It is unworthy of a government that owes its origins to an illegal resort to violence against a colonial power to issue sweeping con-

[12] Address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, April 23, 1987.

[13] Abraham Sofaer, "Terrorism and the Law," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1986, pp. 901-22.

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demnations of violence in other colonies, for instance, in Namibia. Denunciations of political violence also fit poorly with the Reagan Doctrine of support for those battling in Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

These are mistaken views: the Reagan administration should, instead, recognize that violence by an armed group, acting against the laws of an unjust state, may be the only possible way to redress a legitimate grievance. Washington should make the important distinction between those fighting to overthrow a democratic state and those opposing an undemocratic state, be it totalitarian, colonial, or a military occupation.[14] Perhaps because of the greater experience with terrorism, Italy's law makes this distinction; indeed, it was a major issue at the trial of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers.[15]

Some who resort to violence to overthrow a government are indeed freedom fighters and some are terrorists. The distinction is not arbitrary but depends upon the methods and aims of the revolutionary group in question. The term "freedom fighters" should be reserved for those who obey the rules of war, including not attacking civilian bystanders, and who fight to establish a democratic government. Especially since many cases are somewhat ambiguous, the applicability of these criteria to any group is clearly a matter of judgment, but that is not to say it is arbitrary. Differences of opinion will certainly occur, but that does not mean all judgments have equal validity: some people are mistaken. In short, one man's freedom fighter may be another man's terrorist, but that is because one of the two men is wrong, not because the categories are meaningless.

One man's freedom fighter may be another man's terrorist, but that is because one of the two men is wrong, not because the categories are meaningless.

TERRORISM AND WAR. Rubenstein bluntly expresses the view that terrorism is another form of war: "there is nothing as terroristic as a nation state at war." By viewing the difference between war and terrorism as mostly a matter of the size of the forces involved, he implicitly accepts the silly view that all is fair in love and war. Warfare is conducted according to rules designed to restrict violence to combatants to the extent possible (the reluctance to use nuclear

[14] A classic example of this error is the definition of "terrorism" as "any violent activity conducted by a non-state organization in order to obtain political objectives" in Anat Kurz, et al., *Inter 86: A Review of International Terrorism in 1986*, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Jerusalem, 1987, p. 4. Among other problems with the definition, it is hard to see why every failed coup d'état and every anti-colonial war of independence should be called terroristic.

[15] Antonio Cassese, "Le legitime et le condamnable," *Le Monde diplomatique*, September 1987.

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weapons reflects in part the difficulty of adhering to this principle). Terrorists are distinguished precisely by their violation of the rules of war, especially by attacking civilian bystanders.[16]

The Reagan administration has muddied the waters on the crucial distinction between terrorists and soldiers in irregular war. Some policy makers, such as Ambassador Bremer, recognize that the rules of war provide a sound basis for distinguishing between terrorists and guerrillas. "Terrorists and other their sympathizers, invoke the banal phrase that 'terrorism is the poor man's war' . . . . But even the internationally accepted rules of war provide no hiding place for terrorists. The Geneva Conventions on rules of war outlaw nearly every act of terrorism."[17] Others, such as Abraham Sofaer of the State Department's legal office, deplore "granting revolutionary groups protection as combatants," evidently independent of their behavior, saying that only "radical groups" and their sympathizers support Geneva Convention status for guerrillas.[18]

But if Judge Sofaer and radical groups believe that the Geneva Convention would benefit a terrorist movement, they are sadly mistaken. Were the IRA granted its demand to have its members treated as prisoners of war, the British could legally imprison them for the length of the conflict without having to charge them with having committed a crime — not exactly a plus for the IRA. The same applies to other cases, such as PLO members caught in Israel.

Those who fight for an unjust cause at times use unjust means. Any individual who is guilty of crimes committed during an unconventional war should be punished for this; but we should not condemn an entire movement on the basis of the actions by isolated individuals. The key test is how a movement reacts to criminals (terrorists) when they are exposed. The contrast between the Contras, who have cleaned up their act periodically, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is instructive. The PLO has a position on paper against terrorism; Article 162 of the "revolutionary penal code" adopted in January 1979 establishes penalties for "anyone who kidnaps a person or hijacks a plan, train, boat or other similar things belonging to a friendly or foreign state."[19] It seems highly unlikely that this provision has ever been applied.

STATE SPONSORSHIP FOR TERROR. Laqueur places little importance on state sponsorship of terror as a form of low-cost war, for he emphasizes the varied motivations for terrorism, through history and across the contemporary world. State sponsorship was not a factor

[16] The application of the rules of war to terrorists is discussed at more length in my article, "Why We Need More but Better Coverage of Terrorism," ORBIS, Winter 1987.

[17] Ambassador Bremer, in his April 23, 1987 speech.

[18] Abraham Sofaer, "Terrorism and the Law."

[19] *The Palestine Yearbook of International Law*, II-1985, Nicosia, 1987, p. 153. See also Cassese, "Le legitime et le condamnable."

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for many terrorist groups, either for the nineteenth-century European anarchists or the contemporary U.S. racist "white Christians." Eliminating state support would therefore not end terrorism.

At the same time, governments have played a key role in some modern terrorist movements. Daniel Pipes has analyzed Iran's and Syria's central role in gang-pressing "volunteers" for suicide missions in Lebanon.[20] It does not take much religious fervor to decide to be a martyr whose family receives honor and privilege when the alternative is execution by a firing squad in Damascus and persecution of one's family. Further, Laqueur chronicles that Syria and Iran have provided considerable arms and training for terrorist causes. Nor should one underestimate the support the Soviets give to terrorist movements of the most varied political complexion; the only affinity between some of these movements and the Soviets is that both oppose democratic values.

Laqueur is correct in his assessment of the constraints on state assistance for terrorists. Democracies will tolerate states that assist terrorism "only as long as it is not used too frequently and if it does not cause too much damage. If it becomes more than a nuisance, the political calculus changes, and the inhibitions against retaliation no longer function." But he does not draw the obvious policy conclusion, namely, that the best way to reduce state support for terror is to ferret out where it occurs and take firm steps against the perpetrators, to prevent terrorism from becoming more than a nuisance.

Conclusion

Though adding little to our understanding of terrorism as a general phenomenon, the works under review demonstrate how well old truths apply to new developments. They also bring out the lessons of history; for instance that terrorism has been a tactic used by such varied groups, it may be inappropriate to expect that much is common to them all.

On the issue of countering terrorism, these authors have more to say — paradoxically so, since this is not generally their first concern. An examination of terrorism yields a far better understanding of how to counter terrorism than do the manuals written for potential terror victims. With regard to ideological terrorists, democracies cannot afford to be accommodating, for violence must not be allowed to replace voting as a form of political pressure. With regard to ethnic-based or colonial terrorism, sympathy toward the struggle must not color one's opposition to terrorist tactics, or a consensus against ter-

[20] Daniel Pipes, "The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism," *The National Interest*, Summer 1986, p. 98.

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rorism will never develop. Vigorous action and a principled stand, one that combines active police work with military reprisal, has proved to be effective at saving lives over the long run.

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Documentation

THE YELTSIN AFFAIR

by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Boris Yeltsin has been the most wholehearted of Mikhail Gorbachev's protégés. Yeltsin's style has been very much attuned to Gorbachev's new politics and has embodied the general secretary's populist orientation. He has also emulated the secretary general in establishing direct links with the party rank-and-file. As first secretary of the powerful party committee of Moscow, he consistently tried to implement Gorbachev's strategy of restructuring in the face of resistance on the part of the party and state bureaucracies. Yeltsin has never been promoted to full membership in the party's Politburo (despite Gorbachev's support), but even as a candidate (or non-voting) member he witnessed at close hand the conflict between reformist and orthodox party leaders.

Yeltsin's speech at the 27th Congress in February 1986 was an unusual exercise in candor for, unlike most of his colleagues, he went beyond the traditional criticism of the previous leader (in this case Leonid Brezhnev) and the compulsory celebration of the new secretary general. He admitted personal responsibility for the sorry state of affairs during what is now labeled "the period of stagnation."

Yegor Ligachev, leader of the orthodox faction, number two in the Kremlin, and reportedly Gorbachev's chief rival, has been Yeltsin's main nemesis. Yeltsin entered into open conflict with Ligachev (who supervises both ideological affairs and the personnel policy) when he tried to turn the Moscow party organization into a personal power base. Yeltsin's increasingly radical criticism of the nomenklatura*'s privileges made him even more a target. No wonder that his enemies waited for Yeltsin to commit a blunder to get rid of him.*[1]

Their moment arrived on October 21, 1987, when Yeltsin tempestuously attacked the bureaucracy and offered his resignation from the Politburo during a plenum of the Central Committee. All his colleagues, including Gorbachev, stigmatized Yeltsin for his speech during that plenum. Glasnost *notwithstanding, Yeltsin's controver-*

[1] For background of the Yeltsin affairs, see Elizabeth Teague, "Yeltsin Sacked as Moscow Party Boss," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 453/87, November 11, 1987.

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sial speech was not published. The official communiqué of the October plenum offered a cryptic reference to the Central Committee's unanimous rejection of Yeltsin's attack on the party leadership. Public utterances by other Politburo members only alluded to Yeltsin's statement. Its content remained unknown and wild rumors circulated about its thrust. Several months later, the French newspaper Le Monde *published a document which may be a transcript of Yeltsin's speech, though the Soviet Foreign Ministry immediately denounced it as a forgery.*[2]

Presumed Text of Yeltsin's Speech[3]

Comrades! Like all those present here, I was very impressed by Comrade Gorbachev's report [on preparations for the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution]. It reflects the full complexity of the heroic path followed by our people over 70 years of socialism. Yes, we are pioneers, and this is the reason for some painful and difficult chapters in our history. Of course, Comrade Gorbachev is right: If we want to move forward with confidence, we must know and study the mistakes made along the path, to ensure that they are never repeated. His report gives us a detailed and objective analysis of our world's stormy and at times contradictory political life. He has shown us the essential, I would say crucial, role played by our state. And, comrades, we can legitimately be proud of this beneficial and positive influence which our country has on events in the world.

Yes, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of restructuring our society for the future of socialism in the world. Yes, it is now that the question of whether or not there will be a socialist society in the world is being decided! It is precisely for this reason, comrades, that I would like to dwell on some painful problems which are curbing restructuring in some cases. Mikhail Sergeyevich [Gorbachev] suggested that I should postpone discussion of these problems until after the anniversary celebrations. But, I do not think that the anniversary atmosphere will hamper us and, instead, it will help us to examine these questions seriously and with party honesty and to give them a principled, Leninist assessment.

As you know, comrades, the Moscow *gorkom* (city party committee) and I receive many letters from workers in which Muscovites inform us of their ideas, their doubts, and their hopes for restructuring. Well, comrades, when you start to read this correspondence and try to answer it, the anniversary spirit vanishes. Yes, comrades,

[2] Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a press briefing in Moscow on February 4, 1988, that the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee had told him that the text in *Le Monde* "had nothing in common with Yeltsin's speech at the party plenum on October 21, 1987." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Soviet Union*, February 5, 1988, p.9.

[3] *Le Monde*, February 2, 1988.

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it is difficult for me to explain to a factory worker why, on the 70th anniversary of his gaining political power, he is forced to stand in line to buy sausages in which there is more starch than meat, whereas our tables are loaded with sturgeon, caviar, and all kinds of delicacies easily acquired from a place which he cannot even approach.

How can I explain that to veterans and to those who fought in the civil war, the survivors of which can be counted on our fingers? Have you seen the list of foods ordered for the anniversary celebrations? It was brought to me, and shown to me. How am I supposed to react when they say that these are the remnants from the feast? Do you understand what feast they mean? How can I look them in the eye? It was they who laid down their lives to win power and entrusted it to us. What can I say to them now? Perhaps Comrade Ligachev will whisper the answer to me? I think, comrades, that all these binges, as the people call them, are a legacy from the great period of stagnation which we experienced in our lives. We must put an end to this phenomenon.

I do not think that those forces for whom all kinds of privileges give meaning to their lives and work are our fellow travelers. Do not shout at me, Comrade Ligachev. I do not need lessons from you. I am not a kid. This is my principled line. And I must tell you frankly, comrade, that it is difficult to work when, instead of friendly, practical help, you only receive sermons and crude rebuffs. In this connection, comrades, I am forced to ask the Politburo to spare me petty supervision from Raisa Maximovna [Gorbacheva], her telephone calls, and her almost daily reprimands.

Comrades, I have some rather depressing figures relating to the various institutions of the Moscow administrative apparatus, but I will not spoil the anniversary atmosphere, especially since most comrades know them. Remember how much discussion there has been, how many resolutions adopted! But the number of bureaucrats has not fallen in most departments; it has even increased in the agro-industrial committee[4] for instance! That is what is holding us back. It is here that restructuring is marking time. It is here that all the good intentions become bogged down in bureaucracy. Comrades, we must realize that until we eliminate the army of bureaucrats and pettifogging officials — I use the word army advisedly, comrades — our restructuring will have no future, all our resolutions and decisions will be lost in the tide of instructions and forms.

The situation is not improving in commerce. I have told you, comrades, what the position is here in Moscow. Since then, little has changed, the same ministry officials are covering up for "under the

[4] The Gosagroprom, or State Agro-Industrial Committee, replaced the ministry of agriculture and several other ministries in 1985. It is chaired by Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, one of Gorbachev's close aids.

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counter" thieves. I do not think that they do so for humanitarian reasons. No, [KGB chairman] Comrade Chebrikov, I am sorry, but these are facts.

There is too much talking, comrades, but no progress is being made. Meanwhile, the ordinary man is not deriving any benefit from these discussions. "The cat Vaslea listens and goes on eating." She does not care about debate as long as no one has taken her food dish. It is time to take action, comrades. It is time to use power, and we have it. This power is given to us by the people. If we drown in talk without using our power to defend the people's real interests against greedy cats, restructuring will produce no results.

There is another problem, comrades, a serious problem which we inherited. It is Afghanistan, comrades. Almost one-third of the letters which we receive relate to this question. You all know the results of the opinion poll of Muscovites which a French journalist conducted in Moscow on this subject.[5] And I think, comrades, that there cannot be two opinions. This problem must be solved as quickly as possible. The troops must be withdrawn from Afghanistan. I think that it is precisely this question which [Foreign Minister] Comrade Shevardnadze should closely examine. At present he is dealing with other matters, which I regard as less urgent, and he has been abroad for months.

In conclusion, I would like to express my deep conviction that our present difficulties are initial difficulties, arising at the beginning of a transitional period, that we must overcome them, and that we will overcome them as quickly as possible. I would like to assure you, comrades, that the Moscow party organization, drawing support form all the city's Communists, all Muscovites, and patriots, will make every effort to ensure that this painful period ends as quickly as possible with complete victory for the ideas of restructuring.

Is this a counterfeit or the authentic Yeltsin address? It is impossible to offer an unequivocal answer, but the radical flavor permits one to assume that the text contains significant fragments of what Boris Yeltsin did indeed say. Reading it carefully, one is struck by the tone of frankness and intransigence. The onslaught on the nomenklatura*'s privileges sounds like Yeltsin to anybody who has followed the previous statements of this flamboyant politician.*

The ironic remarks about Mrs. Gorbachev's annoying interferences in his work are somewhat puzzling. But then, a man who has decided to speak his mind against all bureaucratic odds could well make such a criticism. After all, if glasnost *is to be taken seriously, what he allegedly said about the general secretary's wife should not*

[5] This is probably the joint opinion poll conducted by French (*Le Point* and IPSOS) and Soviet organizations in the fall of 1987.

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be treated as lèse-majesté. *Furthermore, this passage is almost negligible in comparison to Yeltsin's rebellious tone in the verbal duel with Ligachev. It is clear that the two men had often collided and that the October incident revealed the intensity of their competition. Refusing to bow to Ligachev's commands, Yeltsin catalyzed the ongoing conflict between Gorbachev and his chief lieutenant. Hence, assuming it is authentic, the leak of this document helps Gorbachev compromise his dogmatic critics and restore his reformist image.*

Gorbachev Berates Yeltsin

On November 11, 1987, at a plenum of the Moscow party committee, attended by both Gorbachev and Ligachev, speaker after speaker indicted Yeltsin for his "leftist" and "anarchic" behavior. Pravda *carried the full text of the proceedings, including Gorbachev's address, which follows.*[6]

It should be said that as a whole Comrade Yeltsin's speech was politically immature and extremely confused and contradictory. The speech did not contain a single constructive proposal and was based not on analysis and facts, but on distortions, and the Central Committee members assessed it to be demagogic in content and nature.

Comrade Yeltsin tried to call into question the party's work on restructuring since the Central Committee April plenum and the 27th CPSU Congress and the nature of the current changes, and went so far as to say that the restructuring effectively does nothing for people. In Comrade Yeltsin's opinion, the Central Committee plenum's aim of implementing the tasks of the new stage of the restructuring in the next 2-3 years is erroneous and disorients the party and the masses.

Here he displayed complete theoretical and political helplessness in analyzing the course of the restructuring, and proved incapable of understanding that in this enormous job of renewing Soviet society, the party and all the working people have to resolve both long-term and medium-term tasks and achieve a marked improvement in the next few years in satisfying the people's urgent needs. All his arguments basically amounted to pompous talk. In particular, in his opinion, the party leadership lacks "revolutionary vigor" in implementing the restructuring. There was a particularly sharp reaction among Central Committee members to Comrade Yeltsin's attempts to represent in a distorted light the work and the atmosphere in the Central Committee Politburo, first and foremost on questions concerning the principles of collegiality.

Naturally, in itself the fact of a Central Committee member's speaking out at a plenum with criticisms of the Politburo, the Sec-

[6] *Pravda*, November 13, 1987.

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retariat, and individual comrades should not be seen as anything out of the ordinary. It is normal. In this respect our position is unequivocal: In the party there should be no zones closed to criticism or workers protected from it. We will continue to develop criticism and self-criticism at all levels. In this case, what happened was something entirely different. At a crucial political moment, when the Central Committee's attention was focused on fundamental questions of the theory and practice of our development, Comrade Yeltsin tried to lead the plenum's work in a different direction, declaring his own special position on a number of questions.

In a view of the nature of Comrade Yeltsin's statement at the plenum, it was decided to conduct an exchange of opinions. Twenty-six Central Committee members took part in the discussion. I must say that Comrade Yeltsin's speech aroused perplexity and indignation among the Central Committee members. The plenum displayed complete unanimity in assessing this speech, deeming it to be politically erroneous. Not one of those who spoke supported Comrade Yeltsin. The main question formulated by the Central Committee members was this: Can Comrade Yeltsin really see nothing positive in the country's life since the Central Committee April [1985] plenum? (. . .)

Pondering what happened with Comrade Yeltsin, one cannot help remembering Lenin's warnings about the high responsibility of leaders and the accuracy of their political positions. Vladimir Ilich once said that there is an objective logic of struggle, which "inevitably leads even the best people — if they insist on the incorrect position they have adopted — to a position which to all intents and purposes is indistinguishable from unprincipled demagoguery." That is indeed the case in life, when mistakes spring from personal ambitions and the desire to stand out, and if things do not go as they should and the people in question have to be corrected, they start to dig in their heels and give free rein to their own ambition. Then mistakes occur, are exacerbated, and may turn into an unacceptable position.

I think that we are dealing with just such a situation here. Comrade Yeltsin placed his personal ambitions above the interests of the party. Incidentally, he had these manifestations pointed out to him by the Politburo, and he promised to draw the necessary lessons. But, as we can see, these promises were not worth very much. In the overall opinion of Central Committee members, the irresponsible and immoral actions of Comrade Yeltsin were damaging the thing we need most just now — the pooling of all forces and the mobilization of all potential in order to resolve the major tasks of restructuring.

At the end of his plenum speech Comrade Yeltsin stated that his work in the Central Committee Politburo was not working out for various reasons — "lack of experience and, perhaps, lack of sup-

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port." He posed the question of being released from his duties as candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo.

Certain explanations are needed here, starting with the fact that I knew about Yeltsin's intention to resign before the Central Committee plenum. While on vacation, I received a letter from him containing a request to resolve the question of his continuing both in the Politburo and in the post of his first secretary of Moscow party *gorkom*. After returning from vacation I talked with Comrade Yeltsin and we agreed that it was not the time to discuss the question and that we would meet and discuss everything after the October holidays. Nonetheless, Comrade Yeltsin, violating party and purely human ethics, decided to raise the issue directly at the plenum, bypassing the Politburo.

As for the motive which Comrade Yeltsin puts forward as the reason for his resignation — lack of support from the Central Committee Secretariat — it should be said bluntly that this statement is quite absurd and does not correspond with reality.

Gorbachev's speech suggests that the general secretary felt personally betrayed by the intemperance of his once-favorite apparatchik, and that Yeltsin's outburst created an embarrassing situation for him. He had long sought to impose his image as a man of the consensus. But now, with Yeltsin gone, Gorbachev would have to face his conservative foes directly. Attacking Yeltsin's radicalism, Gorbachev wanted to placate the fears of the bureaucratic caste.

Yeltsin's Self-Criticism

During the same meeting on November 11, 1987, Yeltsin behaved like a disciplined party member, by engaging in the classic Stalinist ritual of self-criticism. At the same time, he took advantage of this meeting to reassert his commitment to full-fledged restructuring.

I think there is no need to provide an evaluation of myself here inasmuch as my action was simply unpredictable. Today, at the Central Committee Plenum, at the Politburo, at the *gorkom* bureau, and at this plenum, I have heard a great deal I never heard before in my life. Perhaps that was to some degree the reason for what happened.

I merely want here to give a firm assurance and to say, Mikhail Sergeyevich to you and the Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries present here, to the party *gorkom* members, and to all those who are at the *gorkom* plenum today, first that I give my sincere party word that of course I had no ulterior motives [*umysly*] and there was no political orientation in my action. Second, I agree today with the criticism which has been voiced. (. . .)

I must say that I believe in, that I have absolutely firm confidence in the party's general line and the decisions of the 27th Congress, I

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have absolute confidence in restructuring and in the fact that however hard its path may be it will nonetheless triumph. It is another matter, and here we have indeed sometimes had different nuances in our evaluations of it, that it is proceeding differently for different regions and even for different organizations. But, of course, I believe in restructuring and there can be no doubts here. I am stating this absolutely honestly to you Communists after working together in the party organization for two years. And any action of mine which contradicts this statement of mine should of course lead to expulsion from the party.

At the beginning of last year I was recommended by the Politburo and was elected party *gorkom* first secretary at a plenum here and a bureau was formed. And it must be said that the bureau worked very fruitfully. A Moscow *gorispolkom* [municipal executive committee] was formed, and basically I have in mind the chairman and his deputies who, of course, and many people noted this, began to engage in specific work. But from approximately the beginning of this year I started to notice that things were going badly for me. You remember that at the party *gorkom* plenum we said that if things are going badly for him every leader must always say honestly, go and say honestly to his higher-ranking party organ: Things are going badly for me. But here, of course, there was also a tactical error. Obviously this was connected with overwork and so forth. But for me, and I cannot speak for the entire bureau, things did indeed start to go badly in my work. Today this has perhaps been expressed most clearly in the fact that it was easier to give promises and to elaborate comprehensive programs than it was to implement them. That is the first point. Second, it was in that period, that is recently, that one of my chief personal features started to operate — that is my ambition, which has been mentioned today. I tried to combat it but, unfortunately, not successfully.

The main thing for me now as a Communist of the Moscow organization is, of course, what to do, what decision to take to minimize the damage to the Moscow organization. Of course, it is damage, and damage has been inflicted, and it will be difficult for the new *gorkom* first secretary, for the bureau, and for the party *gorkom* to ensure that this wound which has been inflicted, this damage which has been caused, and not just to the Moscow organization, to ensure that work is done to heal it as rapidly as possible.

I cannot agree that I do not love Moscow. Other factors were at work but no, I had time to fall in love with Moscow and tried to do everything somehow to eliminate the shortcomings which existed before. It was particularly hard for me today to hear very specific criticism from those party comrades with whom I have worked for two years and I would say that I can deny none of it. (. . .)

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I bear a great burden of guilt before the Moscow party organization, a very great burden of guilt before the party *gorkom*, before you, of course, before the bureau, and, of course, I bear a very great burden of guilt personally before Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, whose prestige is so high in our organization, in our country, and throughout the world.

As a Communist I am sure that the Moscow organization is united with the party Central Committee and that it has marched and will march very confidently behind the party Central Committee.

The Moscow party committee voted unanimously to replace Yeltsin with Lev Zaykov, a Politburo member and a Central Committee secretary. Taking into account that Zaykov is one of Gorbachev's allies, this outcome of the Yeltsin crisis does not suggest a reduction of Gorbachev's power. After losing his Moscow job, Yeltsin became first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Constructions with the rank of a minister of the USSR. The February 1988 plenum of the Central Committee confirmed Yeltsin's political decline and dropped him from the Politburo. The hard-liners scored thus a major victory in their campaign against the partisans of change. Yeltsin's ouster sent an unmistakable signal to all those thinking the current reforms are irreversible. That Gorbachev presided over this purge indicates not only his maneuvering skills but also his commitment to compromise at the highest party echelon.

Yeltsin's high standing was due primarily to Gorbachev's interest in maintaining an equilibrium of forces in the shaky world at the top of Soviet politics. But, as The Economist *put it, in the aftermath of Yeltsin's purge, Gorbachev "is left as the man so many of his colleagues have mutteringly suspected him to be: the chief shaker and breaker of communist traditions and communist privileges."*[7]

Ligachev on Yeltsin

In December 1987, Yegor Ligachev traveled to Paris to attend the 26th Congress of the French Communist party. In an interview there, he rejected the "Western-made legend" about his "conservative" leanings. But Ligachev made no secret of his opposition to all-embracing glasnost *at the moment he emphasized that "criticism must be constructive." He also discussed Boris Yeltsin's case.*[8]

LE MONDE: Why is Mr. Yeltsin's October 21 plenum speech, which lay behind this entire affair, not published for the sake of *glasnost?*

Ligachev: We have many plenums whose proceedings are not published. Yeltsin was elected Moscow first secretary by the Moscow

[7] *The Economist*, November 21, 1987.
[8] *Le Monde*, December 4, 1987. Interview conducted by Michel Tatu and Daniel Vernet.

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organization's plenum and it was not the October plenum that decided on his dismissal. It was the Moscow committee, and all the speeches there have been published.

LE MONDE: Not his October 21 speech, however.

Ligachev: It is unnecessary to publish it insofar as it duplicates what he said in Moscow.

LE MONDE: Did he make his self-criticism at the October plenum?

Ligachev: Definitely. He actually spoke twice.

LE MONDE: Was the self-criticism in his first or second speech?

Ligachev: Anyone who has lived in Moscow for some years will know that it was in his second speech. [Laughs]

Repeated denials to the contrary, the top Soviet leadership is torn between proponents of sweeping political reforms and partisans of the status quo. Gorbachev and Ligachev stand out in this escalating battle as symbols of two opposed conceptions on both the Soviet past and future. The former relies primarily on the liberal intelligentsia and the awakening civil society. The latter captures in his pronouncements the anguish of the bureaucracy. Sooner or later, this conflict must force one faction out of power. The Yeltsin affair, with all its mysteries and odd turns, is only the tip of an iceberg.

QADHDHAFI'S DIMINISHED VISION

by Daniel Pipes

There has been a tendency in recent years to dismiss Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi as an irrelevant extremist, largely because of the isolation he and the Libyan government have encountered. But Qadhdhafi has been in power for almost twenty years and he yet dominates the Libyan state. And however shaky his regime may be at present, he is now only forty-seven years old, so that he could rule Libya for another three or four decades. In combination, Qadhdhafi's power and his volatile personality make his views key to an understanding of the Libyan state.

Qadhdhafi facilitates this task for he, somewhat like Fidel Castro, engages in long, rambling, and largely unrehearsed speeches. The following excerpts derive from a wide-ranging 25,000-word address delivered by Qadhdhafi to the General People's Congress on November 22, 1987.[1] *The speech is reprinted here (in part) not because*

[1] The speech was broadcast by Tripoli television, then recorded, transcribed, and translated by the U.S. government. The text was published in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East and South Asia*, December 2, 1987, pp. 9-30 and slightly adapted for use here.

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it offers new facts or establishes new policies, but because it provides unusual insights into Qadhdhafi's mind.

His basic concern in this talk is to impress on those assembled the wide powers they enjoy as members of the Congress. But Qadhdhafi also uses the speech, as he does every one, to pursue his grand purpose — remolding the individual Libyan as a first step toward the ultimate goal of establishing a new universal order ("the Third Universal Theory"), as described in his Green Book.[2]

This partially explains why so much of the speech deals with the most curious minutiae of daily life. Qadhdhafi vents opinions on issues that most rulers would never take up, inveighing, for example, against able men holding sedentary jobs, state banks, and teachers who marry their students. In the excerpts that follow, he argues that anyone who cuts down an olive tree should have his hand amputated and explains why anyone who challenges the government should be "bodily eliminated." It would seem that pan-Arab unity and the other grand schemes of his early years having so crushingly failed, Qadhdhafi wants to make sure that, at the very least, every detail of life in Libya accords with his schema. Dismayed by the poor response to his ideas abroad, he promotes them with even greater urgency within Libya itself.

While the speech has an ostensibly upbeat and democratic tone, in fact, it is filled with a sense of frustration and disappointment. Whatever the topic — social equity, agriculture, or jobs — Qadhdhafi keeps returning to the economic decline of the country and the Libyan populace's unwillingness to take the steps required to reverse this course. He also berates the Libyans' political fickleness, and their deficient ardor in pursuing anti-American and anti-Zionist policies, but he sounds resigned to the fact that his vision will never be satisfactorily implemented.

A few ghosts are revealed here. John Maynard Keynes told of "practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences," but who "are usually the slaves of some defunct economist."[3] *In like fashion, Qadhdhafi prides himself on the originality of his thinking, but, in reality, he toils under the influence of such varied political thinkers as Jean-Jacques Rousseau,*[4] *Lenin, and the Fabians. In this regard, it is also striking to note how his ideas derive more from Western sources than from Muslim ones.*

History should show that if there was any mold, I have contributed toward its destruction. If there has been any shackle binding

[2] Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, *The Green Book* (Brooklyn N.Y.: Revisionist Press, 1982).

[3] John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936).

[4] Sami G. Hajjar, "The Jamahiriya Experiment in Libya: Qadhafi and Rousseau," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18 (1980): 181-200.

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the Libyan people, I have participated in its demolition until the Libyan people have become free. (. . .)

You can sign anything of your own free will. You are free to sign anything you want. If the entire Libyan people decide to have foreign bases, that will be great. They then cannot claim that someone sold the land in spite of them and no one will stage a revolution against such a situation because the entire people decided it. You are free. You can sign agreements on bases with the United States after holding discussions about them and finding that the best thing for you would be to have U.S. bases. (. . .)

This is a rich country; it is the cheapest country in the world. Libyans do not have great needs and there are no problems recurring every year. It does not mean that we have an economic problem like other countries. On the contrary, you have a rich country and you are rich. However, we are not talking about money; you have stacks of money and oil is plentiful and will last dozens of years. There are also resources other than oil; there is water. This is what we are talking about: We are talking about people's democracy. We are talking about people's authority. Whenever someone takes stock of his funds, people think that there is a shortage of money and oil. Oil is as abundant as water, and there is money. There is absolutely no economic crisis in Libya.

Just look at the countries with economic crises. People eat out of garbage cans. A rich person puts his garbage can outside his house and later finds a family eating out of it. They have a crisis. There are those who live in pipes; a family may live in a pipe which has not been buried in the ground. There are marriages and births in these pipes — sewage and road maintenance pipes in which we find cats and rats here. In other countries you find human beings in them. They have a crisis. Even in the United States, there are three million citizens living on the pavement. They sleep on the pavement; they have no homes. They are on the pavement from night until morning. Three million — that is a town or two. Those people have a crisis. There were people in France who died of the cold. They had no money to pay the gas company for gas; the company cut off their supply and they died. Forty families were found frozen in their homes. This is a crisis. They had no money to pay for the gas, so the company cut off their supply. You can see for yourselves that people are dying in the streets of other countries; they are dying from hunger. They are dying in the streets and they are swept to the graveyard or to the crematorium. There are people who cannot find anything to eat, who are not choosy about what they eat or what clothes they wear.

Our present problem is what shall we wear — shall we wear silk or nylon? This is our crisis, as you can see. It is a matter of desire.

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That man is sitting naked in the cold and says: "I will wear canvas if I can find some." He says: "Anything I find I will eat or I will starve to death." While we say: "Shall we eat wheat or shall we eat flour?" This is our problem: a choice between one thing or another, while for them it is a choice between life and death. (. . .)

You do not need me or any of my colleagues. What do you want us for? You haven't a single crisis, so we want you to do without us and know that you are free. This does not mean accepting someone else to replace me. No. In that case we will fight him. If someone has to rule, then we are more entitled to do so. Either the people rule or we do; and as long as we have decided not to rule, then only the people can rule.

This is the reason why we sometimes eliminate somebody — because he intends to rule the people. Therefore, we confront him and bodily eliminate him, for either the people or the group which carried out the revolution should rule. As long as those who carried out the revolution and who have the right to rule do not want to do so, there is no place for any tramp who comes late and asks: "Where is my share?" What has this tramp got to do with it? When the Italians filled Tripoli, where were you? When the British filled the country, where were you? When the Americans had five bases, where were you? And when treason, reaction, and decay were rampant and the oil was flowing to the United States, where were you? Now you come and find it cool and nice and you want to rule.

Such people must be beheaded. This is what makes us strong enough to show it on television. Others execute someone, run him over with a car, or poison him. We do not do that. When we execute someone, we do it on television. We told the revolutionary committees to call out the masses to conferences in the open air and to put the gallows in a field without police or anything else. Why? Because those individuals had intended to rule the people; but that is impossible. This people either rules itself or we who carried out the revolution should rule. And because we have decided not to rule, we will not allow anyone else to rule the people. We will intervene. Anyone who contemplates ruling the people we will execute in a field before the entire world without fear. (. . .)

The agricultural land which I see you are not concerned about is your future. . . . Once you decide that he who cuts down an olive tree should have his hand amputated, that is it. The day after you see on television someone having his hand amputated, you will not say: "How barbaric and savage!" No, because this would be sacred social legislation. Whatever the people creates is sacred. The people say that he who cuts down an olive or palm tree will have his hand cut off.

"You! What is this palm tree you are cutting down?"

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He replies: "This is my palm tree on my own land."

Your palm tree and land are part of the Libyan land and part of our wealth, and we are not as inattentive as some people to really let you cut your trees down on the pretext that they belong to you. It is not your plantation; the land belongs to all. Suppose you only have one palm tree in front of your home, or ten palm trees, which is enough to supply your family, and you cut them down and replace them with a house and then you seek dates or (?sweets)[5] from abroad, while we (?thought) you would be able to be self-sufficient with those ten palm trees. This is a sacred tree, rare in this world. This palm tree is better than you, you ignorant enemy of the homeland and the future. This palm tree is as good as 100 trees and will provide for three generations. It would be better to sacrifice you as an individual. Kill him. Kill him (?instead) of the palm tree. We kill him instead, and we announce it on the air that today a person was killed in Suq al-Jum'a because he cut down a palm tree, a sacred palm tree.

If people find someone who has killed a cow, they can execute him because cows are sacred. Not because the cow is God, but because the cow provides meat and milk and can give life. Thus, it becomes sacred. The palm tree is sacred; the olive tree is sacred; the female camel is sacred. Yes, the camel which you bring fodder to, which lives on Saharan grass, which weighs more and has more meat than any other animal, which has milk, which can be used for transport and for plowing, is sacred. (. . .)

The [Qadhdhafi] program provides for the abolition of trifling vocations. I cannot understand how a strong man can go around selling roses, unless he has a rose nursery and this is his work. But for someone to go selling roses to another who then goes and stands at the Martyrs' Square to sell roses — this should be banned. Women can work in a textile factory, in agriculture, in the fields of health and education, but not go selling as venders in the street. This is something we cannot accept. A people which have such things cannot forge its way to the future in the present age, the age of the atom and the arming of space and the laser. The woman who goes selling in the street can, for instance, organize the municipality garden. She can work in a coffeeshop. (. . .)

Land is the property of all. It belongs to anyone exploiting it to fulfill his needs, with his own effort, without exploiting others. Any Libyan passing by a farm with unexploited land, fertile land, may look for its owner and say to him: Look, I give you a week. Either I find this to be a farm from which you and your family draw a living or I and my family will come bringing sticks, axes, and knives. We

[5] Question marks in front of words indicate that the FBIS transcribers were not precisely sure of a word.

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will then fight for it and take it by force because the land belongs to all Libyans. (. . .)

Perhaps the United States will enter Islam and come among those whose hearts have been reconciled to the truth. True, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia is quite old and secret, and perhaps the Americans will enter Islam. For this reason Saudi Arabia is giving them billions. . . . If you bring something from Saudi Arabia it means that such a thing is stained, stained by the Americans. There should not be Americans in the sacred land [of Mecca and Medina]; neither their aircraft nor their ships, bases, experts, military men, or their intelligence services. But the United States is fully present in Saudi Arabia. The things you bring from Saudi Arabia are germ-ridden. The frankincense brought from holy Mecca is in fact brought from under the feet of the Americans. (. . .)

Each branch office in each area where there is a savings bank should have officials and guards who are appointed by the people themselves. Then the people can deposit their money in it. This is quite right. Who has confidence in a bank that is situated along the seashore? The Americans or the (?Jews) might come and seize it. We can never trust it. Also, you should not put your money in a bank that belongs to (?the government). That is right; have a bank that belongs to you. As for state banks, we must have nothing to do with them. Who knows who might come and seize them tomorrow and take the money in them?

When I talk about self-administration, I mean to say that everyone should clean his own house, office, or yard. And when I say that an official or doctor should clean his own office instead of someone else, this is what I mean. When I say that chauffeurs should be abolished in this country, that everyone should drive his own car, and when I say that there should be no secretaries — man or woman — and when I refer to freedom of education, I mean anyone who has a workshop should have a group of pupils so that he can teach them there. When I say officials should also teach one lesson at a kindergarten, primary, or secondary school; and when I say that as part of the revolutionary program 400,000 women should take the place of 400,000 men, and when I say that unimportant vocations should be closed down, like working on the radio or selling roses, what do I mean by all these things? I mean we should save a huge amount of manpower. (. . .)

When each of us drives his car himself, cleans his own office, cleans the street himself, and when there are no more people, male or female, sitting in cafes, in shops or at the road side selling something, it will mean we have saved manpower as if it had sprung from the ground. And when it actually springs from the ground, you yourselves will ask where all those people have been. They were absorbed

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by trivial and unproductive jobs. And of course, production will increase, the land will become green, the factories will start to run at full capacity. Every factory is now running at one-quarter of its capacity. Why? Where are the other three-quarters? There are no people, is the answer. No, the people are there, but where? They are sitting in the radio station, in the cafes, or selling flowers; they are drivers, secretaries and empty [words indistinct] and those sitting idly cross-legged. (. . .)

If all primary education is done at home, then seriousness will come into the family. Now perhaps a quarter of the Libyan families live in ivory towers. At home the only thing they do is watch video cassettes and other trivialities. We must involve them. They must teach their children. Teaching your children their primary education at home does not mean working with a child from morning to nightfall. This is not necessary. It would be enough to give him one or two sessions a week. What matters is that after a number of years he will absorb his primary education. (. . .)

Why does the United States drop its bombs on us? Because we are unifying the Arab nation, liberating Palestine, and realizing the dignity of this humiliated nation. Then how can we declare the fight and stand idly by? This gives value to our lives; otherwise, what value would they have? Reports say 2,000 Libyans have died in road accidents. Who mourns them? If it was said 2,000 died in a battle, 2,000 died for the liberation of Palestine, 2,000 died in the Gulf of Sidra, then all the world would treasure their memories. (. . .)

The model state would begin in the world, the Jamahiriya, the state of the masses. . . . But presently you are not a model at all. (. . .)

If you say, "Bring me bananas, bring me a Mercedes, bring me silk while I sit idly by" — no, this is not feasible. There is no rain of gold or silver from heavens. Produce and you can buy anything from abroad. . . . Produce something other than oil; sell it and buy these things. (. . .)

There is no need for an able-bodied man to be seated at work. He must use an axe, a tractor, a spraying machine, or anything else. This is the way to build your country. It is a shame to see a strong man sitting 24 hours a day on a chair saying, "And now we present to you a song by Fahd Ballan." Is this reasonable? This is ridiculous. You are right to laugh because this is not likely to create the future. How can an able-bodied man sit around and get a salary just by saying these words? This can be recorded on a cassette and then played automatically. Or, if you need a person, bring a handicapped person who cannot work outside. The handicapped person in a wheelchair would say, "We present to you this or that," or "We bring you the news bulletin."

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Or bring a woman who cannot go outside. Let her sit down. All the factories, especially textiles and light and medium industries, must be completely occupied by women, and the offices there must be fully run by women. Likewise, women must be in the teaching and health sectors and in simple farming like gardens and green houses made of plastic and glass, including small farms. All this must be run by women. Cars inside the town are like coaches. They should be driven by women, not men. A car marked general public inside the cities must be driven by women, not men. They are like coaches. Buses inside towns are like coaches. Even a veiled woman can enter the bus, sit on the driver's seat, drive the bus, stop, and open the doors at bus stops without being seen by anyone or seeing anyone. Doors are open and closed and somebody at the back sells tickets. You can use a man for selling tickets or one of these women who is on the pavement and trades in small items. (. . .)

We are an illiterate people; backward, subjugated by colonialism, and made backward and ignorant by colonialism. (. . .)

This is a Mediterranean country and it must be a country of tourism. You have oil and have forgotten [other possibilities]. Our neighboring countries are tourist countries and tourism brings in much income. There are plans to build tourist towns on the Libyan coast. Do you not like Europe and young Europeans? All right, it is possible to bring Europe to the Libyan coast. Tourist towns will be built in partnership with European firms on the Libyan coast. You can bring Europe to them; you can bring whatever you like in Europe to these towns. You can bring in anything that prompts you to go abroad. These tourist towns are not useless things. (. . .)

This is Islam American style. When the United States was with Iran, Iran was considered Muslim, and we as Muslims were its brothers. When the United States turned against Iran, Iran was no longer considered Muslim, and we [the Arabs] were against it. Thus, Muhammad has become a Yankee. The American Yankees have become Muhammad. They are the ones who tell us who is a Muslim and who is not, who is your brother in religion and who is not your brother in religion. What a shame and disgrace. It is very disgraceful to a country like Libya to have relations with these filthy and traitorous [Arab] regimes. Only the enemy benefits from them. If this is the situation, then we can do without them. [Audience chants "If the whole world becomes our enemy, we will never abandon our principles."] (. . .)

If you are a teacher teaching girls and then you show bias in favor of one of them because you want to marry her, then you are no longer fair. You may ensure her passage to the upper class; you may give her unfair marks. One must be neutral in such circumstances. No, this is not permissible. This is a great social crime. . . .

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The marriage of a student to a student, a lecturer to a lecturer, a doctor to a doctor or an officer to an officer is all right because these are equal relationships, while the other kind of relationships cause imbalance. I have noticed that you are not aware of this phenomenon and it is spreading in Libyan society.... This question you cannot solve except by law, so that when someone comes to the notary or to the court to get married saying that this is my student, or my enlisted soldier, or my secretary, it will be forbidden. If a head of a firm intends to marry one of his female employees, it should be forbidden because he will be biased toward her and the entire transactions of the firm will be spoiled. These practices are forbidden in many countries, even in Europe which is not Muslim. This concerns not only Islam; it is a social question. Many countries forbid marriage to one's secretary and consider it a major crime.

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Correspondence

POLICY TOWARD CHINA

To the Editor:

Steven Mosher calls (in "Three Steps Toward Opening Mainland China," Fall 1987) for the United States to frame its cultural policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) so as to foster fundamental change in China's domestic political system. He argues that the United States should pursue policies designed to encourage the pluralization of China's political system, even though implementation of such measures would, as Mosher honestly recognizes, "seriously threaten the Peking regime" and weaken its control over "sensitive border regions." While not disagreeing with all of the specific policy measures Mosher advocates (increasing Voice of America [VOA] broadcasting to China or pushing China to further decentralize its exchange program, for example), I do think his conceptual framework is profoundly wrongheaded.

Mosher's argument raises a fundamental question regarding U.S. policy toward China: should the United States attempt to build a friendly and cooperative relationship with communist China, or should it work to undermine communist rule in China? To adopt the latter standpoint, to premise U.S. policy on the accomplishment of fundamental change in China's political system is, it seems to me, to adopt an approach which is very unlikely to succeed and very likely to undermine Sino-American cordiality. The probable result of Mosher's prescription is not likely to be a pluralistic China friendly toward the United States, but a communist China hostile toward the United States.

We should bear in mind that many generations of Westerners have tried to change China and that those efforts did not meet with notable success. From Jesuit monks in the seventeenth century to American missionaries in the nineteenth century, to Americans and Soviets in the mid-twentieth century, these Westerners were all convinced of the superiority of their values. Each tried mightily to change China, and each ultimately met with very limited success.

Consideration of the two most recent attempts is instructive. From 1941 to 1945 American influence in Nationalist China was very great and U.S. officials tried to use this influence to pressure the Nationalists to institute military, political, and social reforms — all of which were not very successful. A decade later the Soviet Union

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supplied vital military and economic support to communist China, and they too attempted to use that support as leverage to direct China's development along lines acceptable to Moscow. Again these efforts failed: China persisted in its Great Leap Forward.

We should reflect on these episodes and ask ourselves if China's current dependence on the United States is greater than was Nationalist China's dependence during World War II or the PRC's dependence on the Soviets in the 1950s. We should also ask ourselves why those earlier efforts to change China failed and if the factors responsible for those failures are still operative in contemporary China. My own answer to these questions is that our leverage over China today is in fact considerably less than during those earlier periods and that the deeply rooted values, traditions, and pride which proved so resistant to foreign pressures in the past are still very much alive in contemporary China.

A policy of seeking fundamental change in China's political system is also likely to antagonize the Chinese government and many Chinese people. Nationalism has been an extremely potent force in twentieth-century China. An ardent desire to wipe out China's "humiliation" by foreigners and to establish China as a great and respected power was one of the driving forces of the Chinese revolution which, inter alia, created the PRC. These nationalist passions remain quite strong in post-Mao China. Indeed, as Marxism-Leninism has lost credibility, the regime has substituted patriotism and nationalism in its place. Many factors indicate that these efforts have struck a responsive chord. The very dissident students on whom Mosher pins his hopes, for example, have demonstrated against the growing Japanese presence in China. In all probability, nationalism will remain a potent force in China into the next century.

How could U.S. efforts to foster basic change in China's political system be received by these Chinese nationalists? Many, both outside of and within the Chinese Communist party, would react quite negatively. From personal experience in China I know that many ordinary Chinese do not sympathize with student demonstrations and protests. Rather, such actions tap fears of a breakdown of social order, fears rooted in the recent experience of the Cultural Revolution and in more ancient tenets of Chinese political philosophy. If VOA began actively encouraging pro-democracy demonstrations as Mosher proposes, I suspect that a great many Chinese would be alienated by what they would perceive as U.S. efforts to undermine China's social order. China's communist rulers would, of course, encourage these beliefs. Moreover, those rulers would probably conclude that U.S. policy was premised on hostility towards China's communist system regardless of China's international behavior and orientation. Given U.S. hostility, they would probably find occasion to respond in kind.

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China's communist rulers find much that is reprehensible in the U.S. system. How would Americans react if China began, say, agitating in support of protest actions by striking U.S. workers, minorities in urban ghettos, or farmers forced off their land by foreclosures? Many Americans would be incensed, and rightly so, by such Chinese interference in U.S. domestic affairs. China and the United States have very different traditions, ideologies, and social systems. If they are to maintain cordial relations it is imperative that both sides not expect the other to conform to its own values, but adhere to the principle of mutual non-interference in domestic affairs.

John W. Garver
School of Social Sciences
Georgia Institute of Technology

The Author Responds

To the Editor:

I find it exceedingly odd that Professor John W. Garver should disagree so profoundly with my central thesis — that the United States should more actively attempt to pluralize China — while accepting most of the specific policy recommendations that it engenders. An interesting contradiction this, and one to which I will return.

Garver agrees with my recommendations that we strengthen VOA broadcasting to China and decentralize our scholarly exchange program. He does not mention, and so presumably does not strenuously object to, my third recommendation, that China should be held to the same human rights standard that we apply to other nations. The recent Senate resolution condemning Chinese repression in Tibet, which passed by a 98 to 0 vote, is an example of the activist human rights policy I espouse.

The only specific proposal that Garver takes issue with is of his own invention. At no point in my essay did I suggest that the VOA should begin "actively encouraging pro-democracy demonstrations." Rather I argued that VOA programming "should be expanded and include regular features discussing the principles of democracy, the free market, rule of law and other fundamental principles of politics in the United States" (p. 333). It is my wish to educate the Chinese people in democratic fundamentals, not incite them to riot or rebellion.

The main burden of Garver's argument is that it would be not only fruitless but counterproductive to try pluralize China. From the Jesuit effort in the seventeenth century to proselytize the elite to the American effort in the 1940s to pressure the Nationalist government

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into military, political, and social reforms, past efforts to modify Chinese policy have been bootless. History thus presages the failure of any plan to influence the current regime.

But the success of my proposals does not hinge on the conversion of Communist party elites into democratic capitalists. I do not intend to repeat the error of the Jesuits who were certain that, if they could attract the attention of the Chinese royalty, their preaching would transform. The policies I propose will affect the Chinese intelligentsia, university students, and the lower echelons of the party and bureaucracy. Moreover, we find communist China is now at a unique historical juncture. In the past, the difficulty of communication and the xenophobia of the elite, at their zenith under Mao Zedong, insulated China from foreign influence. Now those barriers have started to come down.

It took the loss of the mainland to shock the Nationalists into accepting the necessity, long argued by the United States, of land reform. Communist China suffered an equally devastating defeat, albeit of a political and economic nature, under the misrule of Mao Zedong and his immediate successor. As a result, the Chinese people lack confidence in the policies of the Communist party, which is itself gingerly feeling its way towards economic reform. The students, the intelligentsia and, to some extent, party apparatchiks already see the West as a source of solutions to their many and pressing economic problems. There is no reason why we cannot be aggressive in providing solutions to China's political and social problems as well.

However willing Deng and company are to experiment with economic policy, they are absolutely impervious to arguments about the superiority of democracy. At the same time, they have decided that, for the sake of access to American science and technology, they must tolerate a certain amount of "spiritual pollution." We need to take full advantage of this window of opportunity to target, through the Voice of America and expanded scholarly exchanges, the Chinese intelligentsia and its next generation, the students. If democratic ideals become current within the intelligentsia, the party would have to begin paying them at least lip service. The intelligentsia is too critical to the modernization effort to simply ignore.

Garver feels that, however reasonable the steps I propose, the overall policy could prove extremely costly to U.S.-China cordiality. Any perception by Peking that the United States sought to undermine communist rule would prevent the establishment of a "friendly and cooperative relationship with communist China."

While freely admitting that my intent is to advance the interests of competing centers of power at the expense of the all-powerful

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Communist party, I am not proposing that the United States sponsor a democratic revolution in China. At the same time, it is my firm conviction that, to whatever extent China evolves into a more pluralistic society, relations between our two countries will improve.

While U.S.-China relations are infinitely better than during Mao's reign (when for decades they did not exist at all), it is an exaggeration to characterize them as "friendly and cooperative." Our friends usually vote with us more often in the United Nations than three times out of a hundred, which is China's record. States interested in cooperating with us do not sell missiles to known terrorist governments whose targets include U.S. flag carriers, as China did when it sold Silkworm missiles to Iran. (The Silkworm missile case is instructive, because it was only after the State Department abandoned "quiet diplomacy" and went public that Peking promised to halt future shipments.)

It is not U.S. policy, but fundamental differences between our two systems that limit our ability to build a "friendly and cooperative" relationship. Still subject to central control on Peking's side, trade between our two countries remains disappointingly low. Still obsessed with "foreign spies," China continues to impose onerous restrictions on U.S. diplomats, businessmen, tourists, and scholars. China's Draconian one-child policy and its continued repression of Tibet are manifestations of the vast ideological divide that separates us.

The principle of mutual noninterference in domestic affairs offered by Garver is a good rule of thumb for democratic governments in their dealings with one another. It fails utterly as a measuring stick for relations with a state in which political power is the sole preserve of a Marxist-Leninist party. Why should a relatively small organization, conspiratorial in nature, have the right to impose its will on the population it controls without international reproach or resistance? Certainly we don't allow the South African government that prerogative.

I doubt if even Garver would argue that the Khmer Rouge, with its hyper-Maoism, simply had "very different traditions, ideologies, and social systems." Or that he would refrain from criticizing their genocidal policies — similar in many respects to those of the Chinese in Tibet — on the grounds that this would violate "the principle of mutual noninterference in domestic affairs." Surely everyone recognizes that Marxist elites have become quite skilled at justifying their oppressive policies by invoking considerations of "ideology, tradition, or ethnicity." Surely everyone discounts these self-serving and transparent attempts to exempt themselves from criticism for violating universal standards of human rights.

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Only a democratic China can truly be a U.S. ally. This is what makes the policy of encouraging political change in China worth running the risk of miffing the communist leadership.

Stephen W. Mosher
Asian Studies Center
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Brief Reviews

WORLD POLITICS

The ABM Treaty and Western Security. William J. Durch.

The Bad War: An Oral History of the Vietnam War. Kim Willenson, with the correspondents of *Newsweek.*

Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World. Gregory F. Treverton.

The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought. Robert E. Osgood.

Orthodoxy: The American Spectator Anniversary Anthology. R. Emmett Tyrrell, ed.

Passport to World Band Radio, 1988 Edition. Lawrence Magne.

Le reveil des somnambules: Le parti communiste, les intellectuels et la culture (1956-1985). Jeannine Verdes-Leroux.

Shaping Political Consciousness: The Language of Politics in America from McKinley to Reagan. David Green.

Strategic Defense and Arms Control. Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus, eds.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Adjustment with a Human Face. Volume 1. Giovannia Cornia, Richard Jolly, and Francis Steward, eds.

Auction Quotas and United States Trade Policy. C. Fred Bergsten, et al.

The Economics of Soviet Bloc Trade and Finance. Franklyn D. Holzman.

Industrial Structure, Capital Markets, and the Origins of British Economic Decline. William Kennedy.

Perspectives on a U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement. Robert Stern, Philip Trezise, and John Whalley, eds.

The Political Economy of International Relations. Robert Gilpin.

WAR STUDIES

The Arms Control Delusion. Malcolm Wallop and Angelo Codevilla.

Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance. David P. Calleo.

The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918. Tim Travers.

The Mask of Command. John Keegan.

The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000. Paul Kennedy.

MIDDLE EAST

Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited. Rosanne Klass.

Africa and the Middle East Conflict. Arye Oded.

Among the Afghans. Arthur Bonner.

The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine. Livia Rokach.

Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism. Amir Taheri.

The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options. Anthony H. Cordesman.

Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett.

Israel: Polity, Society and Economy, 1882-1986. Michael Wolffsohn.

Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East. Steve Posner.

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BRIEF REVIEWS

The Life and Times of Menachem Begin. Amos Perlmutter.

The Middle East in Global Strategy. Auriel Braun, ed.

National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. John Markakis.

Oil and Power: Political Dynamics in the Middle East. Skeikh R. Ali.

The Papacy and the Middle East. George E. Irani.

The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East. Steven L. Spiegel, Mark Heller, and Jacob Goldberg, eds.

Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and Great Power Strategies. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Mark Bruzonsky.

The Vatican, Islam, and the Middle East. Kail C . Ellis, ed.

The Wind Blows Away Our Words: A Firsthand Account of the Afghan Resistance. Doris Lessing.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

China Watch. John King Fairbank.

The Chinese Debate About Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985. Gilbert Rozman.

The Future of Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond. Hungdah Chiu, Y.C. Jao, and Yuan-li Wu.

Indian Security Policy. Raju G.C. Thomas.

The Invisible Resource: Women and Work in Bangladesh. Ben J. Wallace, et. al.

The New China: Comparative Economic Development in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Alvin Rabushka.

Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia. Compiled by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain.

Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean: Lessons From the Latin Quarter Islands. Philip M. Allen.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution. Richard Abraham.

Chekisty: A History of the KGB. John J. Dziak.

Cold War or Détente in the 1980s: The International Politics of American-Soviet Relations. Peter Savigear.

A Cup of Coffee with My Interrogator. Ludvik Vaculik.

From Below: Independent Peace and Environmental Movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Catherine Fitzpatrick and Janet Fleischman.

The Russian Album. Michael Ignatieff.

Thinking Like a Communist: State and Legitimacy in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. Tony Smith.

A Way of Hope: An Autobiography. Lech Walesa.

World Socialism at the Crossroads: An Insider's View. Silviu Brucan.

WORLD POLITICS
by Adam M. Garfinkle

The ABM Treaty and Western Security. By William J. Durch. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988. 128 pp. $19.95.

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Durch, an official with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, has written on nuclear strategy and strategic defense. He begins with a comparison of views, juxtaposing them in Socratic fashion, lauding those skeptical of strategic defense.

But he states the counter argument so well, he undermines his own position. For example, Durch admits that the ABM treaty has facilitated Soviet counterforce targeting and that the Soviets emphasize damage limitation and surprise attack. But instead of addressing these truths, he launches into a highly technical discussion of alternative futures. Remarkably, nowhere in the entire book does Durch cite the reasoning used to justify the ABM treaty, and nowhere does he realize that this treaty has helped bring about what it was designed to prevent — the vulnerability of retaliatory forces. By ignoring this, Durch's justifications for continuing the ABM treaty read like Ptolemaic epicycles in a Copernican world.

The Bad War: An Oral History of the Vietnam War. By Kim Willenson, with the correspondents of *Newsweek*. New York: New American Library, 1987. 451 pp. $19.95.

From two perspectives, *The Bad War* is not a bad book. It is a good read, offering the extemporaneous and anecdotal recollections of dozens of people involved in the Vietnam War. And as semi-finished material for more probing minds and more serious research, the book is a treasure. Although most major figures are missing (Bundy, McNamara, Rusk, Kissinger, Nixon), some of those who speak here (Thomas Pologar, Graham Martin, Richard Armitage, James Stockdale, Les Aspin) have never spoken so self-reflectingly and extemporaneously before on the Vietnam War, and they offer new, sometimes startling, information. General William Westmoreland, for example, did not ask for 206,000 more troops in the *wake* of the Tet offensive, but had responded with that figure *before* Tet in response to General Wheeler's "what if" proposal about mobilizing the reserves. But Westmoreland's response was leaked to the press, misrepresented and misunderstood in the immediate post-Tet cauldron.

But as a finished product *The Bad War* fails. Willenson's organizing effort is artificial and sometimes maddening; draft resister Davis Harris is lumped together with POWs in a chapter called "Captives." His introductory materials are superficial and tendentious, the latter especially evident in his stated effort to foil conservative efforts to "re-write" the history of the war: "It is the continuing campaign of the revisionist hawks to restyle the past that makes it worthwhile to give voice to people who actually participated in the event." Even granting excesses in conservative revisionism, many of those who dissent from the prevailing liberal orthodoxy on the war

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also "participated in the event." Actually, many "revisionist" insights appear in *The Bad War*, some of them quite edifying. Given Willenson's biases, however, one wonders how many others lie strewn on the editing room floor.

Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World. By Gregory F. Treverton. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 304 pp. $19.95.

Covert Action is well-written, revealing the political culture of intelligence bureaucracies, and humble about a topic inherently difficult to research. It also weaves the legacy of postwar covert operations into the broader fabric of U.S. foreign policy. That said, Treverton's mastery of the cases he surveys — Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), Chile (1972), and Angola (1974) — is uneven. In short, *Covert Action* is everything one could hope for from a former aide to Senator Frank Church — yet it is still wrongheaded.

Treverton asserts that covert operations are hard to control and prone to counterproductive spin-offs. But they are not always counterproductive and not much more difficult to control than foreign policy in general. Treverton stresses that "overthrowing governments in the name of democracy" does more harm than realists understand: restoring the shah in 1953 brought Khomeini in 1978. But this ignores a quarter century of pro-Western stability and assumes that U.S. foreign policy was the central factor of Iranian political evolution. Treverton is right to note the permanent paradox of an open society resorting to covert operations, but his solution is disengenuous; he accepts the need for covert action but places so many conditions on them that the effect is a near-total ban. In the end, Treverton's case against covert action rests on the presumed impossibility of keeping secrets and on convictions about the eroded "power of our example" once secrets become known. This is a serious argument, but not a persuasive one.

The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought. By Robert E. Osgood. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 138 pp. $23.85.

Dozens of books on nuclear strategy and arms control cross this desk each year. Most confirm the conclusion that everything worth saying about the matter has been said. Exceptions are rare, and this is one of them. Of six essays, the first, an introductory sketch, "Military Strategy and Security in the Nuclear Era," is a model of calm clarity. It suggests there have been three irreducible aims of U.S. strategy in the nuclear era, but that they have pushed policy in different directions. The real debate has been about balance, not "either/or." The second, "The Spectrum of Approaches to the Nuclear Dilemma," is an original psycho-ideological typology of approaches to nuclear weapons, defining Rejectionists, Abolitionists and Mitigators. Sections

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on "extended deterrence" and "the decline of arms control" are masterful weavings of recent history and doctrinal debates leading to "The New Strategic Debate," which examines strategic defense. The final essay, "Toward a Concept of Just Deterrence," attends to ethical issues.

The high quality of this work shows in its usefulness to novices and experts alike. Beginning students, easily put off by technics and high levels of abstraction, will find it a delightful introduction. Yet those present at the creation of strategic studies will also find much to ponder in this retelling of the familiar. The appearance of this book makes the recollection of Dr. Osgood's death a little over a year ago all the more bitter.

Orthodoxy: The American Spectator Anniversary Anthology. Edited by R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 511 pp. $24.95.

Some expected *The American Spectator* to lose its zip when Tyrrell reached forty; others predicted trouble when Jimmy Carter lost the 1980 election and a favorite target disappeared; yet others saw the end when the operation moved from Bloomington, Indiana, to inside the Washington Beltway. And while the magazine does have its share of misses, it is also true that Tyrrell's pugnacious editing continues to make the *AmSpec* a lively, engaging monthly. For those who doubt, try P.J. O'Rourke's review of *Iacocca*, Rachel Flick on "*Cosmo*'s Aging Vixen," or J.D. Lofton's "Leonid, We Hardly Knew Ye." Fortunately, when it comes to international politics, Tyrrell also knows how to be serious, witness Peter W. Rodman's piece on Cambodia, Stephen Rosen's on nuclear weapons, and Gregory A. Fossedal's on the Reagan doctrine. D.P.

Passport to World Band Radio, 1988 Edition. Edited by Lawrence Magne. Penn's Park, Penn.: Radio Database International, 1987. 400 pp. $14.95 (paper).

"World band" is a new term for shortwave and this compact, inexpensive handbook offers an excellent introduction to the subject. In addition to consumer advice on purchasing a radio, and a complete listing of world band broadcasting, *Passport* provides unusual insights into the state of international politics. Total international broadcasting on world band frequencies comes to 156,170 hours a week, meaning that on average 930 programs can be heard at any given moment. Three states — the USSR, followed by the United States and China — produce over a third of this total. (Sixteen stations broadcast from the United States.) Jamming takes place 11,640 hours per week (or 7.5 percent of the time). Predictably, the United States is the main victim of this practice, being jammed 7,185 hours (or 39 percent of

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the time). But it is followed by a not entirely expected list of muffled states: the Republic of China, Israel, Great Britain, West Germany, Iran, and Syria. D.P.

Le reveil des somnambules: Le parti communiste, les intellectuels et la culture (1956-1985). By Jeannine Verdès-Leroux. Paris: Fayard/Minuit, 1987. 491 pp. FF 150.

Verdes-Leroux carefully investigates the mental universe in which, for many years, Parisian intellectuals were all on the left and membership in the Communist party was *de rigueur.* Based on tens of confidential in-depth interviews with members and ex-members of the French CP, the book offers a wealth of material on the agonizing choices faced by communist intellectuals. For most, life within the Communist party held many frustrations. The party's Stalinism fostered a climate inimical to free discussion or creativity; indeed, this visceral dogmatism eventually caused the party to lose its hold on the left and to become a vociferous sectarian group, ever more isolated from the mainstream.

According to Verdes-Leroux, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 decisively shattered the faith of French communist intellectuals. That event put a brutal end to the reformist illusions of many; then, the French communist leadership's refusal to go beyond a moral condemnation of the Soviet intervention (and re-examine the whole Stalinist past) awakened many intellectuals. The idyllic times of the party's control over the committed left are over. Defections have been contagious since the 1970s. Passionately written, this fascinating and deliberately controversial book should be read by all who wish to understand the meandering path of contemporary radicalism. V.T.

Shaping Political Consciousness: The Language of Politics in America from McKinley to Reagan. By David Green. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 277 pp. $29.95.

Here a historian takes a philological approach to twentieth-century American history in the belief, following Wilhelm Dilthey, that philology shows the sedimenting of human traditions.

Green examines the migrating meanings of the major labels of American politics, showing how they have both reflected and contributed to social and cultural change. His thesis is straightforward: "In politics, real intellectual victory is achieved not by transmitting one's language to supporters but by transmitting it to critics. The person who adopts the usage employed by a political side, though he remains critical, nonetheless adopts the definition of the situation espoused by that side. Once the critic has been linguistically co-opted, effective opposition is undercut, the more so because the co-optation

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takes the critic unawares." Green writes well, is fair-minded, and well-informed. Although free of cant or of any obvious ideological agenda, his book does have a radical epistemological ambition: to distinguish between the "custodianship" of political language in scholars and practitioners unaware of its formative powers, and "critical analysis" in those who are aware of it. In this, Green succeeds.

Shaping Political Consciousness has such appeal and power, it immediately raises the question: Why has this not been done before? Yet, is it not a hallmark of fine books to reframe vast subjects in simple form? Perhaps Green, who took fifteen years to write this book, can now be persuaded to fix his gaze on the international dimension of his topic.

Strategic Defense and Arms Control. Edited by Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus. New York: Paragon House, 1988. 261 pp. $24.95.

As with tomes on nuclear strategy and arms control, so with essay collections on arms control and strategic defense: many dozen pass this way and few show much originality. Weinberg and Barkenbus have put together an exception that stands out on three counts. All the essays discuss one idea and it is a new idea: the defense-protected build-down. This ingenious combination of two notions, which suggests that arms control and strategic defense can go quite well together, not only has a theoretical future but possibly a practical one. Second, the authors are not all "strategic analysts"; engineers, physicists, and mathematicians have been brought on board as well. The prose style of the hard scientists occasionally makes for tough going, but the agony is generally worth it. Third, the editors themselves write in a refreshingly humble, open-minded, and constructive way. They admit in the epilogue that their book does not prove the defense-protected build-down is unproblematical, nor does it offer an unambiguously successful policy. But this study proves beyond doubt how utterly refreshing a real idea can be between two covers.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

Adjustment with a Human Face. Volume 1. Edited by Giovannia Cornia, Richard Jolly, and Francis Steward. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 319 pp. $45.00 ($15.95, paper).

What would you expect from a UNICEF study on economic problems: a pitch for more foreign aid? a denunciation of banks? a

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call to secure artificially higher prices for raw materials? In fact, this team makes a case that supply-siders on the right wing of the Reagan administration would find acceptable. Like supply-siders, the authors argue that promoting growth best achieves economic equilibrium. Furthermore, their recipe for growth calls for improved economic efficiency, not government controls. They hold that government should provide a safety net but suggest the sums can be modest if the money is properly targeted to those in need. Conversely, charging non-poor users of a government's health and education services can help balance budgets. While the UNICEF group does argue for more foreign aid, it is chiefly concerned with using available aid more efficiently. In any case, its recommendations focus on the policies of poor countries, not on the aid practices of wealthy countries.

The study has its weaknesses. The authors tend to be overly cautious; disastrous situations require drastic actions, not slow adjustment. In addition, greater frankness is needed in identifying the principal barrier to economic change: bureaucrats and their friends, who benefit from complicated regulations and inefficient spending. Nevertheless, it makes an important contribution. Judging from speeches given by the heads of the World Bank and the IMF at their 1987 annual meetings, the ideas set forth here are already gaining ground.

Auction Quotas and United States Trade Policy. By C. Fred Bergsten, et al. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987. 241 pp. $10.00.

Although widely opposed to import quotas, economists have not bothered to analyze the peculiar system used to allocate such quotas in the United States, nor have they spoken out against it. Now, a team from the Institute for International Economics has assembled a clear and convincing argument against the American system. Currently, import quotas are simply given away: the U.S. government hands out the dairy quotes, while the exporting countries themselves (under "voluntary export restraints") determine quotas for sugar, meat, textiles, machine tools, automobiles, and carbon and specialty steels.

Acknowledging that quotas are not likely to disappear, the authors advocate their auctioning. Their idea, which is already in use in Australia and New Zealand, has many advantages. First, the auction clearly reveals how much restrictions drive up prices for consumers. Second, knowledge of how much the foreign producers are willing to pay for their allocation makes it possible to replace the quota with a tariff, generally a preferable restraint. Finally, profits from the quota's restraint on trade would go to the U.S. government, not to the foreign firms that now enjoy the quotas for free. Opponents of

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auctions claim they are less flexible than "voluntary export restraints" because the auctions require congressional authorization and would generate revenue that Congress would be loath to give up. This argument has little force since, unfortunately, "voluntary export restraints" have also proved nearly impossible to eliminate.

The Economics of Soviet Bloc Trade and Finance. By Franklyn D. Holzman. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 208 pp. $32.50.

Holzman, a respected analyst of the Soviet economy, has gathered his recent essays on East-West and intra-Soviet-bloc trade. He applies the insights of economic theory to these issues in a clearly stated, non-mathematical manner accessible to the informed general reader. Nonetheless, the result is incomplete or unconvincing. First is the argument that Western export controls are unlikely to affect the Soviets much because their gains from trade with the West are small relative to their overall economy. But, Western gains from the trade are trivial, while Soviet leaders appear to place significant importance on access to Western technology. Second, Holzman analyzes the reasons for a phenomenon he sees as clearly demonstrated, namely, Soviet losses in their trade with Eastern Europe. Certainly the Polish economists associated with Solidarity do not share this view of Soviet-East European trade. Holzman's evidence relies on price comparisons, which tell us little about the quality of the goods being traded; variations in quality, even for raw materials, can make a difference in worth that would easily outweight the small price differentials he notes. He then focuses on the persistence of dollar shortages, exacerbated by Soviet inefficiency and over-ambitious planning, and on the barriers to making the ruble convertible. Essentially, Holzman is analyzing the reasons for the Soviet bloc's eagerness to borrow dollars. It would have been useful to discuss how the Soviet bloc's behavior was influenced by the availability in the 1970s of credit from Western governments and banks on (near-concesssional) terms.

The viewpoint of economic theorists, represented in this volume is much that of détente proponents: expanded trade is beneficial; Soviets do not want to expand their empire because it is costly to them; and Western creditors have only been passively responding to desperate Soviet demand. The analysis does not fully consider the implications of trading with the enemy; specifically, should we be prepared to make a small sacrifice in order to deny the enemy a larger gain?

Industrial Structure, Capital Markets, and the Origins of British Economic Decline. By William Kennedy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 230 pp. $49.50.

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Those who see the free market as the best engine for economic development confront a major paradox. Late Victorian England boasted one of the freest markets of its or any other day. Why then did it have such a poor growth record, increasingly rigid industrial structures, and obsolescent technology? Kennedy's study of this economic era delineates the battleground for interpretation. He ably documents Britain's decline and shows that the problem was not a scarcity of labor or raw materials. He suggests the problem lay in the English financial system keeping funds locked up in low-risk loans that went to the British and colonial governments and to railways, rather than investing in technologically and commercially promising activities. He contrasts this situation to America, where firms acquired capital through issuing stock and through retaining earnings for reinvestment.

Kennedy's analysis has troubling implications for the contemporary United States, where a frequent explanation for low growth is that private investors seek a quick return and lack the daring, or patience, or foresight to fund new industries and processes. Unfortunately, Kennedy does not examine the source of this pattern of behavior: does it lie in the government's laissez-faire policy, in a lack of verve, or in some other factor? The matter is hardly idle.

Perspectives on a U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement. Edited by Robert Stern, Philip Trezise, and John Whalley. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987. 266 pp. $12.95 (paper).

Trade between the United States and Canada far exceeds that between any other two states, but its relatively untroubled course makes it far less studied than, say, U.S.-Japan trade ties. To correct this deficiency, the universities of Michigan and Western Ontario jointly sponsored a conference to examine the proposal that Canada and the United States establish themselves as a free trade zone. The papers (obviously written before the December 1987 signing of a free trade agreement) are individually good. Andrew Schmitz and Collin Carter show the difficulties of implementing free trade in a field like agriculture where each country maintains a dense network of subsidies. Margaret Biggs, who clearly prefers multilateral agreements, warns about the dangers of bilateral ones: free trade between the United States and Canada may prompt increased restrictions on other countries in order to maintain the same degree of protection for domestic industries.

But this collection has large lacunae. It lacks a history of the trading relationship itself (though Sperry Lea gives a solid history of the proposals for U.S.-Canadian free trade): what is traded and the flow of trade changed in recent decades. More important, no contributor analyzes the issues that have been most prominent in the

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current Canadian debate about ratification of the draft agreement. Its supporters have argued that without an agreement, the United States would move to implement restrictions on a large scale, i.e., it is inappropriate to assume, as these authors do nearly always, that the alternative to free trade is no change from current policy. Opponents of the draft agreement have expressed concern about the impact of U.S. trade on Canadian culture and the potential impact that more extensive U.S. ownership of businesses in Canada would have on politics and society.

The Political Economy of International Relations. By Robert Gilpin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 449 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Well designed for use as a college text and written by an eminent Princeton professor, here is a book on the cutting edge — of the 1970s. Two of the ten chapters are devoted to issues considered key then but rarely thought to be of major import now, namely, whether multinational corporations subvert national power and whether the dependency of poor countries on economic ties with the rich nations blocks the former's development. Gilpin also classifies the differing viewpoints about the world economy in a way that highlights theories on the wane. Two of his three categories — Marxist (really Leninist) and nationalist (meaning mostly Third World socialist inspired by Marxism) — are proponents of heavy state economic control, while all pro-market views — ranging from Swedish-style welfare capitalism, through Keynesian active government macropolicies and regulations, on to Thatcherist pro-entrepeneur small government — are in one group. Nothing is conveyed of the importance now ascribed by most analysts to improving incentives for production, such as reducing excessive regulations, ending price controls (or setting prices at world market levels), and forcing government-owned enterprises to maximize profits like a private firm.

On international relations too, the book's coverage is remarkably limited. The Soviet Union and other centrally planned economies hardly merit mention. Missing, therefore, is the ferment over linking trade to improved human rights through the Jackson-Vanik amendment; the debates on technology exports and national security; the issue of dependence on Soviet gas; and Soviet-East European relations in the age of Solidarity and *perestroika*. Even more surprising, the European Economic Community is not analyzed. The Common Agricultural Policy, the European Monetary System, the enlargement of the community itself, and the barriers to full economic integration apparently do not warrant even a few pages, in this remarkably U.S.-centered view of the world.

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WAR STUDIES
by John H. Maurer

The Arms Control Delusion. By Malcolm Wallop and Angelo Codevilla. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1987. 220 pp. $16.95.

Wallop and Codevilla contend that arms control is a dangerous delusion because it has failed to constrain the threat posed by Soviet nuclear forces. For example, SALT did not prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring nuclear forces to put at risk the land-based legs of the U.S. deterrent — the so-called window of vulnerability. Meanwhile, the authors argue, arms control lulls the American public into a sense of false security, thereby hindering military programs that would enhance national security. According to this view, arms control is a pipe dream that undermines the security of the United States by hamstringing U.S. weapons programs (SDI in particular) and permitting the Soviet Union to gain strategic military advantage.

Not surprisingly, the authors castigate utopian thinkers of the peace movement for pursuing arms control as a substitute for a defense policy. They also discharge a surprising amount of venom toward the Reagan administration for pursuing arms control alongside nuclear modernization and strategic defenses. Indeed, the authors criticize Reagan for suffering from the arms control delusion. Under its influence, they charge, he has ducked the hard choices on defense strategy and committed "political irresponsibility." But this indictment ignores the difficulties facing an administration in building a political consensus behind its defense policy. It could be argued, for instance, that SDI has greatly benefited from its importance as a bargaining lever in arms control. Thus, arms control can be a vehicle for gaining domestic support for the administration's weapons programs.

Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance. By David P. Calleo. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 304 pp. $20.95.

An emerging consensus holds that the United States has overextended itself strategically and allowed commitments to outrun resources. There is also a growing concern that the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe is no longer credible. As a consequence, one increasingly hears the question on both sides of the Atlantic: could Western Europe defend itself from the Soviet Union without a large U.S. army on its soil and Washington's nuclear guarantee?

Calleo's analysis offers one of the most thoughtful responses yet. He argues that Western Europe could defend itself by closer military

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cooperation between Britain, France, and Germany. The French and German armies together could thwart a Soviet blitzkrieg on the ground, while British and French nuclear forces could provide an assured second-strike capability preventing a successful Soviet knockout blow with nuclear weapons.

Calleo offers coherent prescriptions that are difficult to implement. For example, creating a conventional forward defense on the Central Front would mean making greater use of German reservists and rebuilding the French army with modern weapons, and neither country shows any inclination to bear the economic burden of those tasks. Meanwhile, British and French decision makers shy away from a genuinely closer collaboration in the development and targeting of nuclear weapons. And in the end the question remains whether an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent can credibly guarantee West Germany. Thus, Calleo's sensible blueprint breaks down in the face of the strategic illogic of incompatible national interests.

The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918. By Tim Travers. London and Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987. 333 pp. $34.95.

The many British and French offensives on the Western Front during the First World War are widely seen as the epitome of wrongheaded strategy and stupid generalship. In his detailed study, Travers shows why the British high command repeatedly ordered these assaults, despite the grim reality of trench warfare that practically foredoomed a strategic breakthrough of the German lines. Travers argues that the roots of these failures can be found in the British army's prewar doctrine — the so-called spirit of the offensive —which grew from an intense study of the campaigns of Napoleon and the elder Moltke. This excellent work goes a long way toward explaining the heavy casualties suffered by Britain on the Western Front.

Travers's case study of the interaction between a doctrinal paradigm and technological innovation illustrates that new weapons are made to fit pre-existing patterns of thinking about warfare. That should stimulate some thinking about contemporary parallels, such as ways to frustrate a Soviet "Schlieffen Plan" to overrun Western Europe in a single campaign. Thus, this account might make a strong case for barrier defenses along the inner-German border of the Central Front, which offer the most effective way to stall a Soviet invasion.

The Mask of Command. By John Keegan. New York: Viking, 1987. 384 pp. $18.95.

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Keegan knows how to spin a good yarn, and he shows off his talent in this book on military leadership. In military biographies of four famous war leaders (Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Adolf Hitler), Keegan uses the concept of heroic leadership to compare dissimilar figures. Alexander exemplifies the heroic commander questing for glory; Wellington and Grant typify anti-heroic leaders; and Hitler illustrates the crazed, false hero.

Despite the fine writing, it is difficult to fathom what Keegan's inquiry tells us about the wars these men fought or the nature of heroic leadership. It appears that the author chiefly wants to persuade us that hero worship is dangerously atavistic in the nuclear age. Perhaps so — but without Churchill's heroic stand, rallying the British people, the crazed false hero might have won his war. More important than the overarching thesis are the specific psychological portraits of these four leaders and Keegan's shrewd use of the portraits to provide insight into their military decisions.

The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000. By Paul Kennedy. New York: Random House, 1987. 677 pp. $24.95.

This thought-provoking, richly detailed history examines the rise and fall of the great powers during the past 500 years. From this comparative examination, Kennedy discerns a causal relation between a great power's strategic overextension and its economic decline. Again and again, Kennedy traces out this pattern — for example, during the seventeenth century imperial Spain's global commitments overburdened its economy and caused it to fall behind emerging rivals — and argues that it continues to operate today. In a concluding chapter, "To the Twenty-first Century," Kennedy extrapolates from current economic trends and forecasts the future balance between the great powers. Decline confronts the United States and Soviet Union, given their lackluster economic performance when compared with the strides taken by Japan and China. In Kennedy's opinion, the daunting task confronting statesmen in both superpowers is managing the relative decline of their countries in world affairs.

Some critics may label Kennedy's approach economic determinism, but a careful reading belies this. He does not argue that statesmen's decisions derive mechanically from economic conditions. For instance, Germany stood to gain mastery in Europe in this century due to its superior economic performance; but its political leaders recklessly gambled on achieving this mastery through war, and their country instead suffered defeat and partition. Conversely, dynamic leadership can improve a country's economic position relative to rivals — witness Stalin's transformation of Russia's economy during

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the 1930s, or Deng's recent impact on China. For great powers, the book of fate is not an economics text but a discourse on statesmanship.

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited. By Rosanne Klass. New York: Freedom House, 1987. 519 pp. $29.95 ($19.95, paper).

The "great game" of the nineteenth century has changed in many ways — Communists rule Russia; Americans have replaced Britons; and the Persian Gulf, not India, now constitutes the prize. But in some key respects, the conflict remains constant. The Soviets, for example, adhere closely to older Russian ambitions, a point emphasized in nearly every one of this book's thirteen chapters.

The chapters deal with Soviet long-term planning toward Afghanistan between 1917 and the 1979 invasion; Soviet economic interests in Afghanistan (which include hundreds of mineral deposits, all sorts of fuels, and much else); Soviet strategic interests; military operations; cultural policy; and human rights abuses.

In contrast to those many multi-authored volumes that offer no more than disjointed essays between hard covers, Klass has produced a work of clear vision and great importance. Three chapters especially stand out. Klass's introduction provides perhaps the most persuasive case in print why decent people should make the Afghan cause their own. Yossef Bodansky sheds new — and disturbing — light on the Soviet war effort in Afghanistan. "The Soviet military," he says, "appears to be delighted with its strategic and tactical gains resulting from the seizure of Afghanistan, and unconcerned about the costs."

But Alexandre Bennigsen expects the Afghan war will lead to serious troubles within the USSR. As a high-ranking Communist party official of Muslim origin told him, "the resistance of the Afghan is for us the first gleam of hope since the Russian conquest."

Africa and the Middle East Conflict. By Arye Oded. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987. 244 pp. $29.50.

For some decades, Israel and its Arab enemies have made black Africa a field of intense competition — more intense probably than the region deserves. The outline of the story is quickly told with a few figures. Before 1973, Israel had diplomatic relations with 33 of the 41 members of the Organization of African Unity (i.e., all except the members of the Arab League). Then, in a brief period around the 1973 war, all but four of the African governments broke off their

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relations with Israel. The years since have seen a mending of the broken relations, though in early 1988 the total number of states with official relations still numbered only seven.

By combing the African, Arab, and Israeli press, and by conducting interviews, Oded has written an exhaustive account of this topic, post-1973; indeed, he probably provides as much information as anyone wants on the subject. He concludes that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis are likely to prevail entirely, for the African states benefit from the continued competition.

A final observation, about the title: the time has come to recognize that the Arab-Israeli problem no longer is *the* Middle East conflict; that status has been inherited by the Iraq-Iran war.

Among the Afghans. By Arthur Bonner. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987. 366 pp. $27.95.

Bonner devoted several years to learning about Afghanistan, researching the war, and traveling with the mujahidin (fighters). He then transformed his learning and experience into an eloquent and engrossing traveler's tale.

Bonner sees the war in Afghanistan as encompassing much more than a military confrontation between Soviet forces and Afghans. It also contains many gray areas, exemplified by what he calls "curious examples of live and let live," and these point to the conflict's true center of gravity, the civilian or non-mujahidin Afghans. "This war is 75 percent political," Bonner says, "and only 25 percent military." For this reason mujahidin treatment of the non-mujahidin has taken on critical importance. Although there are many tensions between fighters and civilians, the mujahidin understand that victory will ultimately depend on villagers remaining in the countryside, and so they treat the civilians in a basically respectful way. The Soviets realize this too and, accordingly, have changed tactics. Will the civilian Afghan population aid the resistance, the Kabul government, or opt for neutrality? Bonner argues that the fate of the country lies in this political choice.

Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism. By Amir Taheri. Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1987. 332 pp. $19.95.

Holy Terror represents a major effort by an Iranian Muslim to take stock of a decade of Islamic revolution. To be sure, Amir Taheri is no prose stylist, nor philosopher, nor even a careful writer (the book is replete with inaccuracies). He has also served himself badly with a trendy title and a sensationalist dust jacket that make it appear his book explains the Iranian role in airplane hijacking and hostage taking — subjects of limited importance. Nevertheless, Taheri offers an informed, courageous, and rare Muslim critique of the surge in

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radical fundamentalist Islam. His eye for the striking detail and his insight into the arcane world of the Iranian leadership make this book an important source for ascertaining the impact of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime, both in Iran and in the Middle East as a whole.

The author offers suggestions to two diverse audiences, Western and Muslim. To the West, he advocates firm resistance to the extremists and steadfast adhesion to its own principles. As for fellow Muslims, Taheri sends out a highly unusual public call to arms: the fundamentalists have "to be faced and fought, and must eventually be defeated by forces of life in the Muslim world itself before Islamic societies can tackle the inescapable problem of modernization." Those of us on the sidelines can only hope that this appeal is heard, for the stakes are great. Should it be ignored, hundreds of millions of Muslims will remain backward and angry, and the whole world will pay the price.

The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options. By Anthony H. Cordesman. London: Jane's, 1987. 185 pp. $28.00.

In striking contrast to the Arab-Israeli conflict — a long-standing, much-studied dispute — the Iraq-Iran war is recent and little known. A veteran government analyst who recently began writing publicly under his own name, Anthony Cordesman, has been perhaps the most helpful writer on the subject, and this study may be his finest book.

Cordesman's appraisal turns on the evenness of the conflict: "The war is in its seventh year precisely because the military forces and strategic capabilities of both sides have remained in so close a balance." Both countries are stretched to their limits; in both, butter is steadily cut back for guns. While chance or a single military mistake could decide the war's outcome, Iran's revolutionary fervor and favorable geography make it far less vulnerable. This accounts for a cautious Iraqi strategy bordering on the paralytic.

The author is pessimistic about postwar conditions, for he believes the war may spur a long-term rise in Kurdish separatism in Iraq and a long-term decline in Iran's standard of living. An Iraqi defeat could also split that country along religious lines. And though he calls the territorial disagreement behind the war "stupid and pointless," he foresees it continuing even after fighting stops.

Cordesman's policy recommendation deserves close attention: The West "can afford to wait and to act in its own interests. . . . A consistent and balanced Western policy toward both nations — protecting Iraq from defeat while maintaining the offer of better relations and economic ties with Iran — is all that is necessary."

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Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. By Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett. London: KPI, 1987. 332 pp. $57.50.

The Slugletts purvey a far-left view of modern Iraqi history, approving the regime when it pursued socialist and pro-Soviet policies, disapproving as it has increasingly abandoned these and turned more toward capitalism and the West. In pursuit of their thesis, the authors skew history mercilessly, choose carefully what will show Baghdad to advantage before its turning point (which they see as the oil price rise of 1973), and choose nothing but its blackest aspects thereafter.

Unintentionally, the Slugletts' analysis serves to strengthen the hand of those who seek to improve U.S.-Iraqi relations. Their regret that the Iraqi government has moved so far from its radical efforts to transform society, from aggressive pan-Arabism, and from the USSR serves to confirm the potential for the United States to expand its ties with Baghdad.

Israel: Polity, Society and Economy, 1882-1986. By Michael Wolffsohn, translated from the German by Douglas Bokovoy. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1987. 301 pp. $15.00 (paper).

Michael Wolffsohn of the University of the West German Armed Forces — of all places — has given us the most accurate, up-to-date, usable and well-sourced reference work on Israel available today. Divided into three main sections covering politics, society, and the economy, there are chapters on the system of government, the parties, the military, the media, foreign policy, population, religion, interest groups, education and recreation, Israel and world Jewry, social and economic policy, the budget and taxes, foreign trade and more. In addition, the author provides a short chronology (a bit too much attuned to Israeli-West German relations) and an excellent bibliography covering major books and articles in English, German, and French. But what is most remarkable about this work is that in between the 149 charts and tables, the narrative manages to be intelligent, balanced, and thoughtful. Indeed, a beginning student could skip all the data and end up with a short, crisp, and very well-crafted primer somewhat light only in historical background. In this regard, the volume lacks a glossary for the uninitiated but that is hardly a serious flaw. That fact that the publisher saw fit to make the book available in paperback adds compassion to competence.

A.M.G.

Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East. By Steve Posner. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987. 350 pp. $17.95.

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There is no intelligence agency in the Western world like Israel's Mossad for tales of quick wits and spectacular derring-do. Posner reveals some new tales and closes the lacunae in some old ones. Especially interesting is the story of Dina al-Asan, a Muslim Circassian woman who sympathized with the Palestinians' plight but abhorred the PLO's methods. She provided key data that led the Israelis to discover a 1977 plot by Libyan operatives to kill Anwar as-Sadat of Egypt. Posner argues, reasonably, that Menachem Begin's decision to turn this evidence over to Sadat led to the Egyptian attack on Libya in July 1977 and helped set the mood for Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November of that year.

But for all his new information, Posner lacks 350 pages worth; his book could be condensed to two or three fast-paced articles. So he resorts to some rather obvious and tiresome padding. The chapter on Begin's decision to give Sadat the information about the Libyan plot has exactly two paragraphs on this decision and six pages on Begin's biography. When the Israelis intercept an airliner hoping to catch George Habash, the narrative suddenly stops and Habash's biography takes up the next five pages. Someone familiar with Middle East politics will probably skip 90 percent of the book. Someone not familiar will have difficulty making his way through the haphazard presentation of information.

The Life and Times of Menachem Begin. By Amos Perlmutter. New York: Doubleday, 1987. 444 pp. $21.95.

In addition to giving us his own best book in recent years, Perlmutter has also given us the best biography of Menachem Begin to date. Depth is probably its greatest value. More than most Begin biographies, Perlmutter's spends time on Begin's life before he came to Palestine and refers back to these formative years throughout its narrative. This is especially elucidating in Begin's case because he remained more than ordinarily scarred by his early experiences.

But the central hazard of biography is also demonstrated here: a bonding with the subject. In this case, the phenomenon has been intensified by meetings and conversations the author held with Begin beginning in 1973. On occasion, Perlmutter even lapses into the first person, as when he describes Begin's maiden speech to the Knesset on February 19, 1949. Permutter was there. Thus, if Menachem Begin's life seems a bit more heroic than it ought to — "almost biblical" as the dust jacket suggests — perhaps it is because Perlmutter's own memories have an edge to them as well.

A final caveat: the detailed reconstruction of events many decades past is an approximate art, particularly when events retain their power to stir passions in the minds of contemporaries, as the Dayr Yassin and the *Altalena* incidents clearly do. Moreover, as with many

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of Perlmutter's other books, a flair for expression and a will to interpretation can shade the truth from time to time. Perhaps this is the price one has to pay for intellectual stimulation and a good read these days, for Perlmutter's book is both. A.M.G.

National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. By John Markakis. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 314 pp. $44.50.

Markakis transcends the usual focus on a single state to compare the experiences of the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia in the twentieth century. Despite the book's title, the author points to neither nationalism nor class antagonism as the key force in these experiences. Rather, he sees the basic issue in the unhappy history of the three countries as city vs. countryside.

As Markakis interprets the anti-colonial nationalists, they did not aspire "to undo what imperialism had wrought" but to preserve the privileged political and economic positions that they — the urbanites — had attained. These efforts succeeded entirely, as shown by the constant aggrandizement of the post-colonial central governments. Those excluded from the state and the modern economy — the rural dwellers — were "pushed to the margins of the colonial domain and left to fend for [themselves] in a situation of expanding population and shrinking resources." To express dissatisfaction, the rural dwellers had no recourse but violent rebellion. Consequently, all three states have suffered repeatedly from anti-state uprisings. The rebels define themselves variously along the lines of nationality, region, ethnicity, class, and religion, but Markakis holds their true common denominator to be "powerlessness accompanied by material deprivation and social discrimination." His intelligent, depressing study adds much to an understanding of one of the world's poorest regions and of the failure of the post-colonial state in general.

Oil and Power: Political Dynamics in the Middle East. By Sheikh R. Ali. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 173 pp. $35.00.

Ali writes two interesting sentences in an otherwise dull and utterly derivative book: "A review of the intra-Arab position before, during, and after the [1973 oil] embargo provides convincing proof that political realities in the Arab world — particularly the rivalry between progressive and conservative governments — doomed the oil weapon from the start. This factor, coupled with the Arab-Iranian schism, clouds predictions as to whether oil can ever be used effectively to achieve Arab policy goals." Unfortunately, Ali never shows how those divisions blunted the oil weapon; instead, he devotes his text to a wide-ranging but tired recapitulation of events in the Middle East during the past fifteen years.

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The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East. Edited by Steven L. Spiegel, Mark A. Heller, and Jacob Goldberg. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Press, 1988. 392 pp. $42.00 ($17.95, paper).
The Middle East in Global Strategy. Edited by Aurel Braun. Boulder: Westview Press/Mansell Publishing, 1987. 274 pp. $31.50.
Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and Great Power Strategies. Edited by Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Mark Bruzonsky. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 366 pp. $38.50 ($15.95, paper).

Three multi-authored books on roughly the same subject have appeared within a few months. The Spiegel volume is by far the best — one of those few conference volumes where the whole adds up to more than the parts. Twenty-two chapters cover every aspect of the great power rivalry from arms transfers to terrorism to the Iraq-Iran war. The editors have virtually eliminated duplication while preserving a diversity of viewpoints. Almost every chapter provides an important study of a major topic. In brief, this is a model cooperative effort.

Braun's collection cannot match such consistent excellence, but it does offer several fine essays, including those by the editor, Joel J. Sokolsky, and Roger Savory.

Little good can be said about the Wells and Bruzonsky book. It has no clear topic of focus and its authors tend to rehearse old information and flog well-worn arguments. Indeed, one-third of the chapters are made up of works published between 1981 and 1984 and there is hardly a single reference to events after 1984. A sense that this book slipped out of a time-capsule is reinforced by finding advice proffered to an incoming second Reagan administration. The section on the "Palestinian quagmire" makes for embarrassing reading, as Herbert C. Kelman tries to find the social psychological mood suitable for an Israeli-'Arafat agreement, Simha Flappan offers an Israeli apology for the PLO, and Bruce R. Kuniholm devises ways for the U.S. government to turn the screws on Israel.

The Vatican, Islam, and the Middle East. Edited by Kail C. Ellis. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987. 344 pp. $39.95.
The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine. By Livia Rokach. London: Saqi Books, 1987. 229 pp. $45.00.
The Papacy and the Middle East. By George E. Irani. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986. 218 pp. $22.95.

Relations between Catholics and Muslims became a lively topic in 1965, when Vatican II urged both sides "to forget the past and to strive sincerely for mutual understanding." The Ellis volume represents a Catholic effort to continue the dialogue with Muslims. Accordingly (and the book's title notwithstanding), three of its four sections say nothing about the papacy, but deal with a host of issues

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in Christian-Muslim relations, from a comparison of the theology of monotheism to communal relations in the Philippines. Virtually all the contributions offer new information but only one rises to the level of providing new ideas — the sparkling essay by Robert M. Haddad on the current standing of Middle East Christians.

The two other books deal more narrowly with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and both approach the subject with considerable bias. At times Rokach seems most interested in using the Vatican as a channel through which to vent her spleen against the actions of the Israeli and American governments. A considerable research effort is rendered nearly invalid by tendentious argument and intemperate writing.

Irani goes over much the same ground as Rokach and shares many of her prejudices. But he has risen above them to produce an informative and useful study that deals with three main topics: the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, the Jerusalem question, and the war in Lebanon. He sees a recurring pattern: "The fate of the Catholic community in the Arab-Islamic world, and the importance to the Church of the Palestinian issue, moved the Holy See to take bold actions, well aware of the harm these actions could do to Catholic-Jewish relations, the essential point being that most Catholics in the Middle East are of Arab descent." These contradictory pressures go far to explain the Church's generally confused policies in the Middle East.

The Wind Blows Away Our Words: A Firsthand Account of the Afghan Resistance. By Doris Lessing. New York: Vintage Books, 1987. 171 pp. $5.95 (paper).

Despite admirable motives — to use a novelist's powers of description to publicize the Afghan plight — Lessing's result is so flawed that it may actually diminish one's understanding of the Afghan war.

The book rests on a basic deceit: though the author claims to provide a "firsthand account of the Afghan resistance," she never set foot in Afghanistan, never traveled with the mujahidin, and did not witness a single battle. The whole of her very brief visit was spent in Pakistan. Nor does she achieve what a renowned novelist should — bringing the Afghans to life by describing them in an affecting or memorable way. The Afghans she meets remain pallid figures trapped in their cultural roles, stereotypes rather than individuals. And her facts are a calamity. She has World War II lasting four years, the Prophet Muhammad's grandsons being murdered in the fifth century (Muhammad himself was born in 570), and the Afghans being Jews. Some of her inaccuracies set back the mujahidin's cause, for example her comic portrayal of the very deadly Afghan secret police.

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The Wind Blows Away Our Words has all the ingredients of that unfortunate new genre, the "snap" book, in which a famous writer spends a week or two in a political hot spot and writes an impressionistic account to further a cause. The book calls for thick paper, large type, and lots of padding — excursus (Lessing's long and tiresome first chapter retells the myth of Cassandra), "documents," and whatever comes to mind, including odd memories and small incidents.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
by Arthur Waldron

China Watch. By John King Fairbank. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1987. 227 pp. $20.00.

For forty years beginning in World War II, the dominant scholarly view of China saw that nation as gripped by a "great revolution," and the United States, a prisoner of cultural arrogance, as tragically unwilling to embrace it. This collection of twenty-six essays, most of which appeared in the *New York Review of Books* after 1970, unintentionally chronicles the breakdown of that view. Its persuasiveness, we can see, depended on depicting post-1949 China as an improvement on past history, and American attitudes as therefore irrational. Up through the 1970s, that could be done and Fairbank shows how. When dealing with books that revealed the truth about Maoism (by Jean Pasqualini, Simon Leys, Liang Heng, and others), he calmly notes the abuses revealed and then "puts them in context." An author's indignation (Leys's, for instance) is chalked up to psychology.

By the 1980s, however, the facts had outgrown any plausible context, and Fairbank began to spend proportionally less time on them, more time on American cultural arrogance. Thus, reporters Fox Butterfield and Richard Bernstein were culturally informed and initially sympathetic, but Fairbank puts them down as "now-it-can-be-told" journalists, and treats their muckraking as an example of the "Sino-American culture gap" rather than an honest response to real problems. Nor does he have much use for the new "American religion" of human rights (or try to explain why it appeals strongly to the Chinese). In the end, the book exemplifies what it professes to deplore: writing about China that is "America-centered," though his has a negative evaluation of America at its core.

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The Chinese Debate About Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985. By Gilbert Rozman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987. 407 pp. $45.00.

How do the great powers of Northeast Asia perceive each other? In an earlier volume, *A Mirror for Socialism* (1985), Rozman dealt with Soviet studies of China. Now we have the second stage in his ongoing project, an exhaustive survey of official Chinese attitudes toward the Soviet practice of socialism. Drawing on documentary sources (most of them classified, or *neibu*) and interviews with the most important Chinese Sovietologists, Rozman probably reveals more than you ever wanted to know. He offers detailed information on everything from Chinese evaluations of Soviet port facilities to the most recent thoughts about Trotsky. But the book is more than a massive compilation of ephemera. Rozman takes Chinese evaluations of Soviet socialism as revealing the current state and future prospects of Sino-Soviet relations. He shows us how Peking watches Moscow — through which institutions and journals, paying attention to which topics, and with what disagreements. Although bits of historical background are supplied, this is really a book about current events. But it is solidly documented and informative, not to mention timely — given that both the USSR and China are currently re-evaluating their internal policies, and their relationship.

The Future of Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond. Edited by Hungdah Chiu, Y. C. Jao, and Yuan-li Wu. New York: Quorum Books, 1987. 268 pp. $45.00.

In 1997 Hong Kong will be turned over to Chinese rule and if the result is to be anything but a disaster, these seven essays tell us, a substantial number of minefields will have to be negotiated. Although the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 spelled out some admirable principles (for example, "a high degree of autonomy"), it did not specify how those principles were to be achieved — and that is where problems will arise. This detailed and well-documented examination of the territory's future offers a mine of information on the topic, and appendices rich in relevant documents add to its value and usefulness. The authors turn up dozens of practical questions — ranging from Hong Kong's internal politics to its economy to its international status. Much of their concern has to do with issues such as freedom to travel, convertibility of the Hong Kong dollar, and repatriation of profits. Though technical, these issues raise the question of the colony's free-port status, so fundamental to its success and so utterly incompatible with the People's Republic of China. The issues are also of importance beyond Hong Kong, for if the transfer goes badly wrong after 1997, the repercussions for the rest of Asia will be serious.

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Indian Security Policy. By Raju G.C. Thomas. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986. 312 pp. $37.50.

The intensification of India's problem with Sikh separatists in the wake of their assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 and the dispatch of a peacekeeping force to Sri Lanka in 1987 highlight an important point made by the author of this useful and informative study: India's approach to its security is determined as much by threats from inside as from outside. Defense programs must therefore be structured to cope with a variety of threats, each of which requires different kinds of forces and weaponry.

The core chapters on internal security, the political process, the economic aspects of defense policy, and the effects of new technologies on procurement are excellent. The attention to personalities, processes, and politics will attract students of comparative politics. Less satisfactory are the chapters dealing with defense and foreign policy. What the author leaves unsaid is perhaps crucial to an understanding of India's foreign policy.

While noting the ambivalence "in the Indian rejection of 'balance of power' politics in principle" (p. 17), but the adherence to it in practice, he underestimates the Realpolitik that guided Nehru's foreign policy. Nehru made mistakes, notably with China in 1962, but he established the foundation for the all-important relationship with the Soviet Union. India may want to be regarded as a world power, but its aversion to involvement in conflicts and issues beyond its immediate borders bespeaks a persisting preoccupation with its own security. Far from being taken seriously, "India's extended strategic interests in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean" (p. 291) are regarded by other powers as more form than substance. Finally, more attention might have been devoted to the centrality of Pakistan in Indian strategic thinking. Alvin Z. Rubinstein

The Invisible Resource: Women and Work in Bangladesh. By Ben J. Wallace, et. al. Boulder: Westview, 1987. 161 pp. $18.50.

Bangladeshi women are major contributors to the economy of the countryside, say the authors. After all, 92 percent of the nation's women are village dwellers, and they account for 48 percent of the population. Nevertheless, they argue, like women in many other underdeveloped countries, rural Bangladeshi women are economically invisible. That is, their economic activities are hidden, disregarded, and untallied simply because the society perceives their work as a wifely duty rather than a job. The danger for any strategy or plan of economic growth, the authors conclude, is that it too will ignore village women as a major resource, thereby dooming itself to failure. Well-written with detailed charts, maps, and statistical data,

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The Invisible Resource presents a sophisticated analysis of the importance of women in Bangladesh's rural development.

Shaheen Ayubi

The New China: Comparative Economic Development in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. By Alvin Rabushka. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 266 pp. $32.50.

The division of the Chinese world over the last forty years into socialist, mixed, and *laissez-faire* areas has provided a vivid experiment in comparative economics. Rabushka devotes roughly equal amounts of space to each of the three territories, and provides thorough and comprehensive summaries of their experience, as well as statistical tables of key indicators. Despite this wealth of information, however, the focus here is not so much on China as on how any country can grow rich. The conclusion, that free markets are the key to growth, may seem conventional, until it is recalled that most books about the Asian miracle economies look to culture ("the Confucian heritage") and not to economic systems for their explanations.

Indeed, to argue as purely an economic case as Rabushka does is unusual, and risks neglecting political analysis. Markets do not create and sustain the conditions for their own existence. That must be done by politicians — and the Chinese record in that respect is rather poor, as Rabushka points out in passing. The important questions then are about how to create and sustain a free economy more than they are about the (now pretty-well decided) issue of markets versus planning.

Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia. Compiled by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985. 408 pp. $32.00 ($19.50, paper).

It is hard to imagine a more comprehensive, well-written introduction to a key but neglected subject. The book's forty-eight selections are drawn from materials published between the 1880s and the 1980s, and almost without exception the compilers selected major pieces to excerpt. Included are representative writings of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, Harry J. Benda, Deliar Noer, Clifford Geertz, and Raymond Firth. Most chapters deal with the history and contemporary issues of Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia, but there are also quick glances at Islam in the Philippines and Thailand, and even in Cambodia and Viet Nam.

D.P.

Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean: Lessons From the Latin Quarter Islands. By Philip M. Allen. Boulder: Westview, 1987. 260 pp. $37.50.

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This detailed and definitive study deals with a neglected sphere of oceanic influence. The author focuses on the five island states of the western Indian Ocean — Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Comoros, and Réunion (the last, a French Overseas Department). Using a wide variety of sources, Allen analyzes these members of the Latin Quarter in various contexts. First, he discusses the historical aspects of British power and French cultural tradition, the influence of twentieth-century nationalism in Asia and Africa, the vulnerability of the five island societies to the fluctuation of international markets, and the regional competition between major security systems. Next, he profiles each island independently and emphasizes the responses of the five societies to the pressures of underdevelopment, dependence, and national self-determination. In the final section, he concludes that these states have accepted dependence as part of the price paid for economic and military security. But, Allen argues, because outside powers pursue their own strategic and economic interests, the national aspirations of the five islands are constrained, while the emergence of national autonomy and regional cooperation are frustrated.

Shaheen Ayubi

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution. By Richard Abraham. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 503 pp. $29.95.

Abraham offers a well-researched biography of the man who embodied the strengths and weaknesses of Russia's short-lived democracy after the February 1917 revolution. He challenges the Soviet portrayal of Kerensky as a bankrupt adventurer, driven only by an inordinate personal ambition, in the process dispelling the unfounded picture of Kerensky as a quixotic, uprooted intellectual with no sense of fateful political games. Abraham explores Kerensky's role against the background of the collapse of the Romanov dynasty, Bolshevik manipulation of the starved population, and the failure of the Russian political class to set up viable liberal alternatives to tyranny. Kerensky is portrayed as a tragic personality caught in a historical maelstrom and defeated by forces he barely understood, let alone resisted. Until the very end of his long life in exile (he died in 1977), the former premier of the provisional government hoped against hope that Lenin's triumph was ephemeral. He never resigned himself to the idea of the definitive, irreversible victory of the Bolsheviks. In this pathetic

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refusal of unfortunate historical circumstances lies Kerensky's vulnerability and his grandeur.

Chekisty: A History of the KGB. By John J. Dziak. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1987. 234 pp. $17.95.

In December 1917, mere weeks after the Bolshevik coup, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission was born, known from its initials as "the Cheka." ("Chekisty" means "members of the Cheka.") In its place today stands the Committee for State Security — the KGB. But under whatever name, it is the Soviet secret police, and Dziak, a Sovietologist at the Defense Intelligence Agency, gives us a thoroughly researched and readable history of the organization.

To convey what the Cheka meant for the Soviet people, Dziak compares its repression with that of tsarism. In eighty years, the tsarist regime executed 900 people, while in its first six years, the Cheka executed 200,000. Under Stalin, of course, murder reached the millions. But when Gorbachev denounces Stalin for debasing Leninism, it is worth recalling that Stalin inherited a fully operational terror machine. And Dziak uses Soviet statistics to prove Lenin's victims were not bourgeoisie, which some might find exculpating, but peasants, workers, and enlisted men.

Secret-police repression on this scale, the author argues, suggests the Soviet state is something new in history, something he dubs a "counter-intelligence state." By this Dziak means that a totalist messianic state such as the USSR is necessarily at war with an unprecedented percentage of its own people. Its counter-intelligence agencies therefore assume a scale, an importance, and a power that other nations' agencies approach only in wartime. Some even claim the KGB now rules over the Communist party, but Dziak believes the party and state security apparatuses have simply become interlocking. The more important point, as Dziak makes clear, is the Soviet Union's ineluctable dependence on its agents of repression — the chekisty.

Juliana Pilon

Cold War or Détente in the 1980s: The International Politics of American-Soviet Relations. By Peter Savigear. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 196 pp. $29.95.

The superpowers are not what they used to be. They are in decline, certainly relative to the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, when they had greater control over allies, international developments, and their own domestic destinies. Now, each is affected by lesser powers. The big question is really not whether they will go to war but rather how much they will be able to affect the international system in the decade(s) to come.

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This study contributes to fresh thinking about the evolving U.S.-Soviet relationship. Running through the six separate but interrelated essays is the assumption of the growing importance of the nation-state. The effect of the nation-state system has been to constrain the superpowers and impose a kind of "de-ideologization" on their behavior.

The essays are thoughtful, coherent, suggestive. They deal with the difficulties of assessing the military balance and agreeing on measures of equivalence; the evolution of alliance systems; the emergence of the two Germanys as key actors and their importance for stability in Europe; the impact of arms transfers to Third World countries on the international political economy; regional conflicts; and the political-ideological tensions keeping the new Cold War a central feature of international politics. Alvin Z. Rubinstein

A Cup of Coffee with My Interrogator. By Ludvik Vaculik. London and New York: Readers International/Persea Press, 1987. 128 pp. $14.95 ($7.95, paper).

Coffee houses in East-Central Europe once offered customers foreign newspapers to read, and state borders in that region were irrelevant to those who believed in the pre-eminence of spiritual values. Those times are a source of bittersweet nostalgia in the era of police dictatorships. The official ideology now requires intellectuals to submit politically or lose the privilege of being published.

Vaculik is one of these writers whose works have not been published since 1968 (except in *samizdat*). Although a non-person (along with Vaclav Havel, Ivan Klima, Karel Kosik, and many other intellectuals), Vaculik is a very important non-person. His name does not appear in the official media, but he is often summoned by the security police to explain his subversive activities. Vaculik captures the primitive language of the interrogators and their overbearing behavior: "When we come into contact with such people it is always difficult to differentiate between their two main characteristics; that is, their human nature and their anti-human (or rather non-human) calling. They act and express themselves as if they were not part of the mankind's long evolution, as if nothing was owed to the past, as if they and they alone were here to legislate and to preserve. In physics, matter is opposed by anti-matter; here we are dealing with anti-thought."

The sharp-tongued, acerbic feuilleteons collected in this marvelous little book shed light on the sullenness of everyday life in Czechoslovakia. Vaculik is skeptical about the rulers' reformist promises, having been too deeply involved in the illusions of the Prague Spring to be enthralled by *glasnost*. This is not to say that he thinks the reforms should be a priori discarded as window dressing, for they

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could ease the burden of state oppression, but that his hopes are modest.

From Below: Independent Peace and Environmental Movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. By Catherine Fitzpatrick and Janet Fleischman. New York: A Helsinki Watch Report, 1987. 263 pp. $12.00 (paper).

Lately, in Poland, Hungary, the GDR, and even the USSR, unofficial groups have emerged that advocate openness in the discussion of socially significant issues. For example, independent peace movements criticize the militarization of communist societies while ecological groups point to the devastation of the environment.

This Helsinki Watch Report documents the origins, aims, methods, and dilemmas of these movements in a very thorough fashion. Offering a country-by-country survey of the groups, the report emphasizes the distinction between the unofficial peace groups and other, more politically oriented, oppositional activities. It offers valuable information on contacts between pacifist groups in East and West, as well as on the harsh reactions of the communist authorities. Key documents illustrate the political philosophy of independent peace movements.

Precisely because of their commitment to peace, these groups insist on the importance of human rights. For example, the "Prague Appeal" issued in March 1985 by a group of Charter 77 members holds that "the freedom and dignity of citizens are the key to the freedom and self-determination of nations." In other words (and this realization may be their greatest contribution), peace and human rights are indivisible.

The Russian Album. By Michael Ignatieff. New York: Viking Penguin, 1987. 191 pp. $18.95.

Ignatieff takes the reader on an absorbing journey into the vanished world of the Russian court aristocracy. A descendant of two of Russia's most illustrious families, Ignatieff reconstructs the main events that resulted in the collapse of tsarism and his own family's exile. Drawing from the memoirs of his grand-parents (who were direct witnesses to the last convulsions of the old regime) he brings out new and perceptive insights. The author's grandfather, Count Paul Ignatieff, a liberal constitutional monarchist who served as the last tsarist minister of education, desperately sought to convince the monarch to slough off incompetent officials and renounce his government's most unpopular decisions. But with the fallacious certainty of sleepwalkers, Nikolay Romanov and his close entourage chose to ignore these warnings. Count Ignatieff resigned and, after the Revolution, emigrated first to England, then to Canada.

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In addition to a grain of benign irony, there is also empathy in this attempt to fathom the passions, hopes, expectations, and anguish of a family whose destiny was so intimately intertwined with that of the leadership of pre-revolutionary Russia. Though Ignatieff claims not to be seeking his roots, this book constitutes a search for an impossible dialogue with the shadows of his ancestors. At the same time, it offers a fascinating account of the dramatic activities of men and women whose fate was indelibly marked by a gigantic historical fracture.

Thinking Like a Communist: State and Legitimacy in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. By Tony Smith. New York: Norton, 1987. 244 pp. $16.95.

Smith ambitiously attempts to fathom the structure of communist convictions, mentalities, and values. He seeks to grasp the common elements that guarantee the unique nature of communism in all its major varieties. His goal is to make sense of the communist mind, to reveal its secret articulations, and to explain the practical appeals of this ideology.

According to Smith, acting like a Communist is impossible without thinking like one. In other words, all variants of Marxist-Leninist experience in this century have a common ground in the shared belief that capitalism must be replaced by socialism and that revolutionaries have to do their best to accelerate this process. Communism is a passion as well as a theory, a mixture of historical determinism and flaming voluntarism. Thinking like a Communist is also an emotional matter. Some join out of altruism, others because of personal grievances.

Smith knows the inherent difficulties of his project, that his argument about the coherence of the communist mind can easily be refuted by recalling the recurrent squabbles in the many Marxist chapels. Can one say that Italian and East German Communists view the world similarly? Do Communists in opposition and in power? Do Stalin and Gorbachev? But, as Smith convincingly demonstrates, it would be difficult to deny the existence of structural similarities, common traditions, aspirations, resentments, and phobias among all communist ideologies.

A Way of Hope: An Autobiography. By Lech Walesa. New York: Henry Holt, 1987. 325 pp. $19.95.

Walesa's autobiography explains how a shipyard electrician becomes the charismatic leader of a social movement that eventually threatens a communist regime. He does it by highlighting milestones in his political radicalization, moments that exactly coincided with

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the aggravation of social conflicts and the heightening of mass discontent.

Reading Walesa's account makes clear just how important working class unrest in Poland has been. The Poznan riots of 1956 ended with the workers accepting the promises of the communist potentates, but by the time of the bloodshed in Gdansk in 1970, they realized that the regime could not survive without repression, and responded accordingly. Walesa's recollection of the attempts to force the government into a dialogue is a most useful compendium of the range of oppositional methods possible within a totalitarian system. The emergence of Solidarity and the movement's non-violent strategy ushered in a new era in East-Central Europe. Walesa acknowledges the contributions of critical intellectuals and the Catholic Church. At the sime time, he does not conceal the internal tensions within the opposition, including controversies on tactics and the pace of change between radicals and moderates.

Looking to the future, Walesa holds that "when political methods fail, there are others that may work." In other words, civil society cannot be stifled forever but has an inner dynamic that will compel the rulers to undertake reforms. Otherwise, Walesa predicts, "if government measures are too slow or too superficial and our country continues to stagnate, then there will be an outburst of legitimate protest along the lines of August 1980 and earlier."

World Socialism at the Crossroads: An Insider's View. By Silviu Brucan. New York: Praeger, 1987. 208 pp. $37.95.

An independent Romanian Marxist discusses the predicament of contemporary Soviet-type regimes. Brucan advocates daring reforms to enable communist states to meet the challenges of modernity. Like other reform-minded communist thinkers, he is convinced that the system can incorporate the new scientific and technological achievements, if only they can get rid of the Stalinist political carcass. For Brucan, the Communist party has to be adjusted to the new imperatives through genuine democratization of party life. But will this result in overall social democratization?

Brucan's proposals stop short of calling for a reconstruction of the communist states' body politic. Leninist clichés about the Communist party's leading role still dominate his outlook. Brucan overestimates the role of the communist elite and misses the significance of the independent movements, the groups which may well be the only alternative to the ossified bureaucratic structure of the Communist parties. His theory of political change is therefore unilateral and outmoded, at least in so far as countries like Poland or Hungary are concerned. To Brucan's credit, one should note that his book was written inside Romania, a stronghold of unreconstructed neo-Stalin-

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ism. Under the distressing conditions of Nicolae Ceausescu's dictatorship, such thoughts amount to unforgivable heresy. One only hopes the author will not pay dearly for articulating them to an international audience.

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

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